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ABSTRACT

Writers representing diverse backgrounds and professional interests have contributed essays to this collection on the relationship between these two disciplines. Contributors were asked to sketch areas in the humanities which might be used in the social studies, and to discuss how the ideas, attitudes, philosophies, and information might be utilized. In addition, curriculum development and planning and teacher training are covered. Some of the topics included are the youth value crisis, social and moral values, behavioral sciences, individual development, understanding through language development, humanism, human relations, cross cultural study, law and social order, and the creative development and expressions of man. (References are included.) (SBE)

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Humanities and the Social Studies

Edited by THOMAS F. POWELL

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NATIONAL COUNCIL

Bulletin Number 44

FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

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*Humanities
and the Social Studies*

Humanities

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Foreword

HUMANITIES AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES IS ONE OF THOSE RARE books that you wish had not ended so soon. Especially if one is interested in charting future roles for social studies education. For this is a collection of essays, many pointing in divergent directions, and not a unified argument in favor of a particular viewpoint. This variety of views adds spice to the theme.

As more leaders in social studies education turn to the role of the affective domain in the social studies curriculum, this is a timely publication. The essayists examine the potential offerings of the humanities to social studies. They raise such questions as what is man and by what values does he choose to live; areas of concern to both the social scientist and the humanist. Each writer in effect challenges us to re-examine our program and to evaluate it in terms of his field. Thus questions of values are thrust upon us. And they require positive responses as curriculum is developed. Whatever one's personal view, he will find both support and challenge here.

The National Council for the Social Studies wishes to express its thanks to the editor, Thomas F. Powell, and to his cooperating writers for the timely and provocative essays for this new NCSS Bulletin.

RONALD O. SMITH, *President*
National Council for the Social Studies

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The National Council for the Social Studies is a National affiliate of the National Education Association of the United States. It is the professional organization of teachers of social studies. It holds a series of meetings each year and publishes materials of significance to those interested in this field. Membership in the National Council carries with it a subscription to the Council's official journal, *Social Education*, the monthly magazine for social studies teachers, and the Yearbook. In addition, the Council publishes bulletins, pamphlets, and other materials of practical use for teachers of the social studies. Membership dues are \$12 a year. Application for membership and orders for the purchase of publications should be made to the Executive Secretary, 1201 Sixteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

Preface

OUR DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE OBJECTIVE IN THIS WORK IS TO suggest some ways in which social studies teachers can draw upon the humanities. Contributors to Part One were asked to sketch out some ways in which their areas in the humanities might be illuminating or useful in the social studies. Those who wrote Part Two were commissioned to point out how the social studies can take advantage of what the humanities offer. In general, writers for Part Three are interested in curriculum building and teacher training. Contributors to this work have never conferred or consulted with one another, and they represent exceedingly diverse backgrounds and professional interests.

This has been a troublesome book to prepare because it is so unusual. It is a collection of essays for social studies teachers: but of the 20 essayists, only 5 have been principally involved in social studies education. We have sought to present ideas different from those ordinarily found in the literature of social studies education, and the result is more controversial than homogenized. The divergent views of social science presented by W. C. Wilcox and Charles E. Scruggs exemplify the absence of any prevailing intellectual doctrine in this volume. In fact, it might be noted at the outset that none of these essays necessarily represents the National Council for the Social Studies, any member of its publications committee, or anyone but its own author.

But this is not to say that we lack a central line of thought. Each author has written something of value on the relationship between the social studies and the humanities, and the congruencies and comple-

mentary judgments from essay to essay are far more fascinating than the areas of disagreement. In fact, one can only be impressed by the similarities of opinion and concern among writers representing such diverse fields, from constitutional law to art. We must ask only that the social studies teacher bear in mind the fact that most of us see social studies from another angle of vision; and we hope that these varied perspectives will be as useful as we think they are.

I am indebted for the opportunity to explore some noteworthy attitudes in the arts to Merrill F. Hartshorn, who made it possible for me to participate in the University of Kentucky Symposium on the Humanities when this project was in its early stages. As always, he is energetically dedicated to every worthwhile project affecting the social studies. Acknowledgment is also due for chapters previously printed: "History and Theater," by Martin B. Duberman, is copyrighted by the author and appears as an afterword to his play, *In White America* (The New American Library, 1965); John A. Hague's essay, published as "The Problem of Synthesis," is in *American Studies in Transition*, edited by Marshall W. Fishwick and published by the University of Pennsylvania Press; Maxine Greene's essay appeared in *Teachers College Record*, February 1965; and James F. Warwick's in *Art Education*, February 1968.

Finally, I should like to dedicate this work to a retired English teacher who will be especially pleased with certain of its contents — to my mother, Catharine Easton Powell.

THOMAS F. POWELL

Notes on Contributors

MELVIN ARNOFF, Assistant Professor of Education, Kent State University, directs the Social Studies Curriculum Research Center in Cleveland and writes on curriculum.

ROBERT L. ARNOLD, Associate Professor of Education, State University of New York at Plattsburgh, is directing his third experimental teacher training program and is co-author of a work on social studies curriculum.

JAMES W. BAILEY, Associate Professor of English, Central Connecticut State College, is a student of the novel and co-author of a book on research theory and practice.

KATHERINE K. CARTER, who here collaborates with her husband, taught secondary English for some years.

ROBERT F. CARTER, Associate Professor of History, State University of New York at Oswego, specializes in twentieth century American culture and politics.

THOMAS E. CLAYTON, Professor of Education, Syracuse University, was a director of Inter-University Project I and has written a book on curriculum and method.

LAWRENCE H. DOUGLAS, Assistant Professor of Social Studies Education, University of Rochester, is an experienced social studies supervisor who specializes in U. S. diplomatic history.

MARTIN B. DUBERMAN, Professor of History, Princeton University, is a well-known biographer and playwright as well as a historian.

VERNA S. FANCETT is head of the social studies department, Jamesville-Dewitt (New York) Central School, and teaches methods at Syracuse University.

ERNEST D. GIGLIO, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Villanova University, teaches Constitutional law and has written on censorship.

MAXINE GREENE, Associate Professor of English, Teachers College, Columbia University, writes on American literature and education and is editor of the *Teachers College Record*.

JOHN A. HAGUE is director of the American Studies Program at Stetson University and a widely known writer on American literature and culture.

SCOTT HEYMAN has taught social studies but prefers non-matriculated graduate work in whatever interests him: a disciple of Paul Goodman. He is currently, however, teaching social studies at Roosevelt Junior High School in Syracuse, New York.

WARREN HICKMAN, Vice-President of Eisenhower College, teamed with Roy A. Price in running Syracuse University's Social Studies Curriculum Center and writes on related topics.

HAROLD H. NEGLEY, Assistant State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Indianapolis, Indiana, has served as President of the Indiana Council for the Social Studies and has directed a number of institutes for teachers.

CLARENCE POWELL taught for many years in Watertown, New York, and is a lifelong student of languages.

THOMAS F. POWELL, Dean of Arts and Sciences, State University of New York at Oswego, writes on American thought and culture.

CHARLES E. SCRUGGS, Professor of Education, State University of New York at Geneseo, is a student of the history of scientific thought.

JAMES F. WARWICK, Associate Professor of Art, Queens College, City University of New York, is a long-time art editor of *Eastern Arts Quarterly* and a well-known consultant on design.

W. C. WILCOX is a member of the Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, who writes on logical and ethical problems.

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INTRODUCTION

THOMAS F. POWELL

Humanities and the Social Studies: One Subject, Two Fields

WHATEVER IS DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT and province of the arts and humanities since time out of mind. In modern times, a common and characteristic concern with the distinctively human links the humanities and the social studies. But there are genuine differences of perspective which enable the ancient humanities and the young social studies, alike, to make peculiar contributions to the never-ending enterprise of better understanding human life.

The humanities take their character from that of the creative and performing arts which are their traditional concern, so that their study of man emphasizes any sense in which the individual is discrete. The artist's achievement is preeminently individual; the aesthetic experience of viewer, listener, or reader is unique and personal.

The Ancient Greeks and the Christian Doctrine of Individual Salvation

Meaningful individuality, nowhere more clearly established than in the creative arts, was immortality to the ancient Greeks — which doubtless had a great deal to do with their glorifying the arts. Their philosophy was formulated in terms of an individual goal, happiness, which was synonymous with self-realization. The orientation to life of Greek civilization, and of the Christian tradition that largely grew from it, is individualistic in a crucial way. The goal of philosophy for the Greeks was individual happiness, and since the early ascendancy of Christianity, the idea of the individual soul has been a hallmark of the West. Individual "salvation" in one form or another has been the philosophical and religious preoccupation of 25 centuries, from Socrates through Freud.

The Greeks were empirical enough to know that nothing material is permanent or immutable, and proud enough to resent their own mortality. They reasoned that a human being may overcome finitude or mortality only by defining himself, by establishing his meaning, in terms of what is permanent or immortal. Only ideas, values, and principles can resist and survive time; only a man who identifies himself as completely as possible in terms of these immortal meanings can achieve immortality. In Plato's terms one transcends mere phenomenal existence and achieves enduring meaning by "participating" in the ideal.

What the Greeks saw as overcoming mortal finitude, transcending ephemeral material status, became for Christians the overcoming of original sin, or salvation. Both saw man as having a potentiality for eternal life. To the Greeks this was a distinctively human capacity for commitment to the ideal; to the Christians it was a divine dimension or soul which would come to full realization after death.

The shift from the Greek to the Christian perspective was the popular triumph of theology over philosophy in the West. But in either form, the concept of man *vis-à-vis* the universe pertained chiefly to

the individual as separate and discrete, to man as a social atom. Great religious thinkers like Paul might recognize, as the Eastern sages did, that evil and the "lost condition" are implicit in the very situation of individuated existence: but for the ordinary Christian, religion was simply the undertaking of his own personal salvation.

Existence as separate and different individuals seemed to imply more divergent interests than interests in common. The implications of social being were lost on the ordinary man then as they are now. Life was principally an individual matter. Man appeared to himself as an independent entity, responsible in general for his own personal destiny: and on that basis there took root exaggerated notions of liability, culpability, and blame.

The central Christian idea of *caritas*, the idea that self-interest and interest in mankind reciprocally imply one another, was perfectly clear to the Greek-speaking Paul, who had only to consider mankind as an ideal for such a concept to seem natural and obvious. But human interdependence was not so evident to his contemporaries or putative followers in later centuries. Instead, they devised a sort of moral one-upmanship: if not Hobbes's "war of each against all," at least a *contest* of each against all.

Ideas come forward and recede from view with the ponderous slowness befitting those elements in the universe which are immortal and therefore indifferent to time: and their obsolete expressions vanish only with the greatest reluctance from the arena of affairs. Accordingly, it was not until roughly the Renaissance that the first faint adumbration of change in the prevailing concept of individuality became perceptible. Men are slow to draw the philosophical inferences implied by their own experience, and for centuries the material interdependence apparent in urban culture did not suggest any compelling philosophical lesson. But by the seventeenth century, a revolutionary message gained wide expression. In Donne's familiar words, the Western world was regaining consciousness of the truth that "no man is an island."

**Western Ideas of Interdependence
Affect Humanistic Studies**

The history of the resurgent fact of interdependence is as thorough and complete a history of Western intellectual life in the past three centuries as a single theme could provide. The intellectual history of the modern West can be seen quite accurately as the exploration of what interdependence implies. For example, if everything observable about an individual can be imputed to some concatenation of hereditary and environmental determinants, any human being is largely, if not wholly, explicable as a product of the world in which he lives. If he is healthy and prosperous, it is as member of a prosperous society conducive to health, and not as a triumphant individual. If he is a cultivated man, committed to lasting principles, it is as citizen of a society which has provided him this possibility and successfully trained him to make use of it. His personality is a product of the terms in which his fellow men have led him to conceive himself. His very identity is a product of his social relationships, his deepest commitments predictably falling within a range of alternatives provided him by his civilization. He is a phenomenon of his time and place, his epoch and culture.

In such a context, the humanities, with their ancient purpose of understanding and expressing what is distinctively human, confronted the necessity of analyzing, in Teilhard de Chardin's words, the *phenomenon* of man. One of the distinguishing traits of the race, the modern world acknowledges, is the universal and inescapable interdependence of its members. The meaning of each is contingent on the meaning of all: and individuality must comprise the extent to which the meaning of all is contingent on the meaning of each. A new kind of humanistic scholarship had to be developed: but a kind of scholarship still devoted to the age-old work of the humanities, the study of the human. Man in the modern world must be understood and expressed not only in his uniqueness but in his all-important social context. It was in response to this need that the humanities in modern times developed their major division and complement in giving birth to the social studies.

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The same realization of interdependence that generated the social studies added momentum to the rise of a new kind of thought which was destined to overshadow in influence the traditional moral philosophy. The first age of revolution, which was also the early age of science, beginning in England and spreading to the English colonies, to France and the rest of Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, demanded a change in the emphasis of intellectual life. Among the humanities, formal philosophy was perhaps slowest and most reluctant to acknowledge the necessity of a shift in emphasis. Until the nineteenth century, systematic philosophy consisted entirely of moral philosophy: that is, it was concerned with how the ostensibly independent individual achieves happiness, self-fulfillment, or salvation. But broad social and political change, be it revolutionary or evolutionary, requires the common identification of many men in commitment to unifying ideal conceptions and causes. The new philosophy attending such developments was social philosophy: that is, philosophy which concerns means by which societies establish *access* to individual fulfillment for their members.

Social philosophy has invariably had a materialistic flavor, since access to happiness has generally been taken to mean economic well-being. To the dispossessed and the ambitious of Europe in particular, America's assurance of the right to pursue happiness meant entitlement and encouragement to pursue material satisfaction.

The United States' formal advent as a nation more than accidentally coincided with the genesis of formal economics, and the concrete, material circumstances of life have been a preoccupation of the nation's first two centuries. The nation and social philosophy burgeoned together, historical twins and rivals. Both are materialistic in mood, but they are mutually antagonistic in that the fact of interdependence undergirding social philosophy has generally gone unrecognized in America's competitive society. It is not so much that Americans have generally accepted that competitive rationale of Adam Smith, given to the world the same year as their own Declaration of Independence, as

that Americans typically have not concerned themselves with the general welfare at all. Our institutions have been largely shaped by men of material ambition, and they are conducive to an acquisitive, competitive way of life.

In sum, the individualism of moral philosophy was coupled to the materialism of social philosophy to produce a national life-style emphasizing individual, material access to happiness. Only in the present century, as social philosophy has been systematized and as the social studies have matured, have the limitations and contradictions of individualistic materialism become evident. That systematizing and that maturing have been informed by the humanities, particularly literature, and by the devotees of the ancient moral philosophy underlying them. It has fallen to moral philosophy continually to remind us that access in itself is not happiness or fulfillment, and thereby to humanize social philosophy by showing that interdependence, not material acquisition, deserves priority of consideration in the social studies.

Moral philosophy limits its concern to the individual needs of the man whose social and economic circumstances already permit him to concentrate on fulfillment as a person, on his own self-realization or happiness. But with the advent of modern science and the concomitant accession of the English Parliament to actual governing power on republican principles, with the spread of the Enlightenment faith in the possibility of basic, genuine progress, and the accompanying mutation of the Puritan confidence in salvation through work, social philosophy was foreshadowed as a virtual necessity. The Aristotelian concept of happiness through the work of continuously assessing one's commitments and values gave way increasingly to the modernist concept of common access to happiness through the work of ordering the material environment by organizing social cooperation. The idea of government itself in relation to individual freedom commenced its slow metamorphosis from the negative role attributed to central authority *vis-à-vis* the independent individual to the positive role it assumes *vis-à-vis* the interdependent society. Meaningful individuality and freedom *against* government slowly changed toward meaningful individuality and freedom *through* government. Traditional phi-

losophy, taking for granted free development in a society of independent human atoms, declined in influence proportionately as social philosophy, assuming organized effort toward freedom in a society of interdependent citizens, burgeoned.

Traditional philosophy has been a reliable buttress to social and political conservatism. In fact, moral philosophy has seemed the natural, logical ally of any social perspective involving class, elite, or "elect," because it meets the needs and rationalizes the purposes of the secure and satisfied, those in a position to concentrate their energies on self-fulfillment rather than self-preservation. Even where the idea of self-fulfillment is corrupted in practice to the degree that our American society corrupts it, the individualistic orientation of moral philosophy serves the purpose of rationalizing resistance to change.

By contrast, social philosophy is the natural support of liberalism in its dual modern sense: that is, it supports not only the priority of individual freedom, which is also the basis of modern conservatism, but the possibility of extending that freedom through organization, and particularly republican governmental organization. Social philosophy undergirds and explains the direction of political change in the West since Napoleon's time. Now inseparable from sociology, social philosophy is the rationale that finds expression in the other activist social sciences, most notably economics and political science.

Historically, the humanities have been almost entirely in league with moral philosophy and social conservatism. Classicism in the arts is the aesthetic expression of moral philosophy. Romanticism, the aesthetic tide of the nineteenth century, added force to the same philosophical orientation by virtue of its overwhelming emphasis on individuality. In the superficial form which has always given it popular cogency, romanticism is not only the optimistic Jeffersonian belief that meaningful individuality warrants and can gain expression. It is also the faith that any individual, however limited to mere empirical existence, becomes meaningful in expression. It is a glorification of self-expression for its own sake, and therefore conservative in its solipsistic implication as in its subtle tendency to ruin democracy by making of it an extreme ideology.

But of course social philosophy and social science, which set off recent history from the past as a distinct modern period, are too important not to find expression in the humanities. Their main humanistic dimension is that artistic naturalism which is related in complex ways to philosophical naturalism, the cosmology of social philosophy. Naturalism in the arts is pervaded and dominated by consciousness of interdependence and social determinism, and is therefore as "revolutionary" historically as is social philosophy itself.

ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE MORAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Intellectually, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been a continuous confrontation between what William James called the "block universes" of idealism and naturalism, of moral and social philosophy. James described the former, traditional orientation as comprising the persuasions that human reason unsupported by external evidence is the most reliable guide to a single kind of truth in a universe of divided reality, phenomenal and ideal; and that with such reason in such a universe, the individual creates himself as meaning, based on truth discovered by effort of will, which may triumph regardless of circumstances. These beliefs are characteristically held with piety and dogmatism, and they inform the humanities generally.

The new social philosophy is a second block universe of intellectual and emotional dispositions: confidence that the evidence of sensory perception is man's best or only guide to multiple or ideological "truth" in a universe of neutral, unified reality where ideas, values and principles are data just as are more palpable phenomena; that with such evidence in such a universe, the individual must be shaped by determinants outside his personal control, with meaning entirely dependent upon scientific understanding of his potentiality and organized institutional effort to realize it. The attitudinal qualities typifying this perspective, generally informing the social sciences, are irreverence and skepticism.

Pragmatism

The twentieth century has seen two principal efforts to reconcile these "block universes" or to mediate between them. The first, that pragmatism for which James himself is the best-known spokesman, may well be said to have failed. Beginning with John Dewey and extending to Willard Van Orman Quine, its chief interpreters and theorists have leaned markedly and inevitably toward naturalism, and therefore at least tacitly toward social philosophy. The humanities seem superficially to have become less relevant to questions of life's meaning as specialists on such questions consider them in the modern social sciences. Philosophy, queen of the humanities as mathematics is of the sciences, has been divided up like historical booty between mathematics on one hand and sociology on the other. Its last bastion is ethical theory, whose professors are now careful to point out the they are meta-ethicists: not expert moralists, but experts at describing logically how moral judgments are made. In short, they are practitioners of a descriptive science, abandoning all quest for the decisively prescriptive or imperative, implicitly accepting social philosophy's conception of truth as ideological. Ethical naturalism, the ethical version of Dewey's instrumentalism, is virtually the last trace of the great pragmatic effort at unifying tradition with social science.

Existentialism

The second notable undertaking of social thinkers and humanists is the post-World War II revival of existentialism, which is classical humanism in a naturalistic frame of reference. Existentialism, like other moral philosophies remote and recent, abjures intellectual and moral interdependence. It is individualistic in the old sense of finding each man discrete and isolated, but it is not romantic because it accepts this individuality with grim resignation rather than celebration. Existentialism is classical because it centers on what Aristotle called the work of the ethical will, the effort of the individual at self-definition, through which any meaning in life must be established. But it is modernistic in its recognition that conventional truth is an illusion,

or that truth is ideological; that certitude, not certainty, is man's lot at best.

Existentialism is separated from social philosophy by its insistence upon the nature of life as an individual matter, and upon the absolute responsibility of the individual for what he is and means. In fact, it is this responsibility, or the claim of it, which alone can permit meaning in the life of an existentialist. Clearly this second attempt at mediation or synthesis also fails as a general philosophy. Where pragmatism might have satisfied the more distinctly social needs of man, existentialism may satisfy individual requirements. But neither encompasses both aspects of life. Moral philosophy remains chiefly the concern of scholars in the humanities, while social philosophy is the prime interest of those in the social sciences. As to their respective influence in our time, there can be little doubt that moral philosophy is substantially eclipsed by social philosophy. But this not a triumph of the social studies over the older humanities. Rather, it is a failure of modern man to integrate the wisdom made accessible to him by his own history.

Failures in Solving Basic Dilemmas of Human Life

Two ironies will suffice to illustrate the failure of modern scholarship to solve the basic dilemmas of human life. Social philosophy, allied with democracy and aimed at universal access to happiness, paradoxically creates its own elite in place of the "aristocrats" of earlier times — who were unseated by the rise of social philosophy itself! At the grossest level, where it is construed as a rationale for competitive acquisition, it elevates to positions of power and influence the greediest and most exploitative, establishing a vicious plutocracy. But even in a higher sense, social philosophy ironically vindicates Plato. Social scientists, "social engineers," planners and bureaucrats are its initiates, its elect, its philosopher-kings. Perhaps, after all, a ruling group is unavoidable — and, in a technical civilization with representative institutions, ultimately to be desired. But the irony of

social philosophy overthrowing such a group and then creating its replacement is inescapable.

The second irony is at once more subtle and more resounding. From the original individuality assumed in Greek thought, we have noted how an awareness of man's social nature developed. This awareness led first to the overstatements of behaviorism and then to a refined appraisal of individuality as a quality both social and unique. Originally, the response called forth by realization of human separateness and solitude was anxiety to express and make permanent the self, through commitment to something ideal of whatever is peculiarly or uniquely individual. But this is tautological. What is individual is capacity for particular expression and commitment. What is individual is precisely what cannot be completely expressed or communicated either in action or symbolically. And so a new anxiety is generated by individuated life, tantamount to despair.

What is present for expression is individuality, which seems to make possible the meaning in life: but individuality also precludes lasting meaning because it is just the aspect of a man that is not susceptible of full expression or communication. The human self in its totality is not an objective reality in time. It is not knowable because of the very limitation on knowledge that Kant postulated regarding the thing-in-itself. Ostensibly, one self may be known to another through verbal or other symbolic communication: but on analysis the appearance of communication turns out to be nothing more than an appearance.

As Royce and others have long pointed out, men live in a reality chiefly composed of their own ideas. When I speak to you of complex matters, my idea of myself is addressing my idea of you. At the same time, your idea of yourself is hearing your idea of me. Our putative exchange may include your idea of my idea of you, and so on: but the distressing fact is that my ideas of you and of myself can never correspond precisely with your ideas of yourself and of me. Hence we are, each of us, isolated, condemned to talk to our own ideas, barred from genuine, complete communication with our fellow man.

The existentialist is a kind of representative modern man as well as a classical humanist. Taking into account isolation and futility, he simply asserts the necessity of effort, of commitment. However hopeless or nugatory the attempt, it is necessary to try for meaning.

Men do try to communicate their innermost selves, most notably in the arts: and their recorded efforts are the substance of the humanities. To the extent that the social studies fail to take into account both the common plight of individuals *qua* individuals and the uniqueness of each individual experience of that plight, its exemplars fail to attain their basic goal, which is to extend and communicate understanding of the distinctively human in a social context. It is from the humanities that some understanding of the human condition *as completely experienced by individuals* can be gained.

The social studies *must* draw on the humanities for insight into the non-quantifiable aspects of human life. Social structures and processes are contexts in which particular individuals function. The commonality of those individuals permits the social context: but the uniqueness of each individual renders incomplete the context that commonality provides. In short, the social studies properly comprise not just the study of social contexts, but the study of *man* in his social contexts. In such an endeavor the humanities are simply indispensable. Cultivation, the end of humanistic studies, is after all civilization, the end of social studies.

Part One

From the Humanities...

MAXINE GREENE

Real Toads and Imaginary Gardens

NO PREVIOUS GENERATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE HAS PRODUCED as many mathematicians and theoretical scientists as this one. We have never before seen so many adepts of the calculus or the forms of logic, nor have we seen such a large proportion of youthful experts in fields requiring formal and abstract competencies.

Yet this is also the generation reared in value crisis and discussions of "meaninglessness." Even when we grant the differences between subscribers to the *Scientific American* and enthusiasts of *Howl*, we cannot assume that those who succeed in the more rigorous specialties have escaped the moral predicament of our time. If they show fewer signs of *anomie* or boredom than other young people, they are not necessarily indicating that they are more sanguine about the "good" and the "right." They may simply assume that nothing meaningful can be said about matters which are not susceptible to empirical test. When they confront one of the more troubling moral issues of the day (the "banality of evil" in the Eichmann case, or certain ambiguities respecting civil rights), they may find it no easier

to justify their responses than do the poets of despair or the youth who "play it cool."

To assert that nothing meaningful can be said is to abide by a set of rules governing a particular "game" of language or inquiry. To do the opposite — to say, for example, that the universe is objectively meaningless — is to make, without warranty, a statement that sounds like a factual one. Being empirically unverifiable, it is not, of course, what it seems. Nevertheless, the individual who makes such a claim is very likely to arouse responses of recognition. He may, in fact, find it hard to believe that anyone could seriously disagree. He becomes like Nietzsche's Zarathustra: *"Could it be possible? This old saint in the forest has not yet heard anything of this, that God is dead."*

The Time's Dilemma

We confront, then, an apparent dilemma. The tested and intellectually responsible methods of inquiry cannot help us very much where the really significant existential problems are concerned. The arbitrary or "emotive" methods which arouse such widespread affective responses seem to be intellectually disreputable. There is considerable evidence, however, that the unanswerable moral questions cannot be legislated into insignificance. They nag at young people and eventually find behavioral expression — in aloofness, cynicism, "sick jokes," a fascination with the perverse, or as in Pop Art, with the dissociated "objects" on the surfaces of life. (Or, it might be added, in becoming a fan of the Beatles, a convert to a politician's charisma, or a compulsive devotee to "making the scene.")

Surely, the teachers of the young must attend to phenomena like these and consider what they mean. It is not just a matter of becoming informed and vicariously involved. It is a matter of determining whether there are means of countering the tendency to act as if meaninglessness were ontologically real.

Of Chairs and Unicorns

This essay is an attempt to explore some uses of imaginative literature in meeting what appears to be an acute educational need. There

may be, in authentic literary experiences, some potentiality for developing a sense of meaningfulness congruent with what we logically and empirically know to be "real" and "true." It may be that readers gain even more than what Phenix calls "personal knowledge"¹ from becoming engaged and momentarily absorbed in certain works of art, when they are given opportunities to reflect upon what they have felt and seen. They may be helped in choosing stances to take, actions to perform. They may be helped in defining experiential orders in the neutral universe the sciences describe.

The universe described by the sciences constitutes the only "real" universe there is. To deny this is to give way to what Sidney Hook has called a contemporary failure of nerve.² For him, this failure denotes a "loss of confidence in scientific methods" and, as seriously, a pursuit of "a 'knowledge' and 'truth' which are uniquely different from those won by the processes of scientific inquiry." They are different in that they are undependable, whereas scientific conclusions are not. Undependable, often wish-fulfilling and whimsical, they may subject men to "delusion." When distinctions are not properly made between that which is reliable and that which is not, when methods of finding out are not differentiated, the question of meaningfulness becomes hopelessly obscured. In a world where unicorns are no less deserving of a status in reality than dining room chairs, confusion multiples — and so, in a related sense, does meaninglessness.

A recognition that this is the case appears to be essential for adequate "reality perception" in a scientific age. But such recognition cannot simply be prescribed. Professor Hook blames the failure he speaks of on "a flight from responsibility." It is as if he has no patience with those who find it difficult to grasp scientific constructs or with those who find it hard to accept the notion that the symbolisms used in the various sciences represent all we are now entitled to call "real." It is much as if he were blaming ignorance and incapacity on some original — or acquired — sin. One can only wonder what he would have said if he had been one of the Comforters who came to Job.

Irresponsible, uninformed, fearful, or sad — the particular form of human failure described does indeed account for the "mysticism" of many young people, for their insistence on counting fantasies as true. It must be recalled, however, that the sciences no longer provide visual or verbal models to counteract the pull of private fictions or the personal imaginings defined in response to need. We no longer have Dante's three-tiered universe to serve as external control or the Newtonian watch-universe ticking dependably away in absolute space and time.

Answerable Questions

Oppenheimer, for one, has explained that in each scientific specialty, the terminology is so specialized that it is "almost unintelligible except to the men who have worked in the field."³ In the last half century, the scientific concepts used to order sense experience have become less and less susceptible to formulation in ordinary language. Scientists have become progressively less capable of showing pictures of the regularities they discern, less likely to point to models in the shared, familiar world. Their constructs and equations, therefore, lack the affective power of Ptolemy's and Newton's visualizable cosmic orders. But it is those very constructs and equations which provide the truths which enable us to make predictions, to extend our control over nature, dependably to "know."

The point is that only factual and formal questions are actually answerable. This is because they are framed in such a way that they point toward certain empirical and logical operations which are taken to be the only reliable methods of seeking knowledge of the truth. Since, in these days, the truth finally reached is likely to be most properly expressed in abstract, often "empty" terms, it is understandable that those in search of a stable framework, a *sustaining* cosmos, sometimes lose their "nerve."

It is understandable that some react like the waiter in Ernest Hemingway's "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place" and feel, as he does, that, *It was a nothing that he knew too well. It was all a nothing, and a man was nothing too.* It is understandable that others respond to Camus's description of "the hopeless encounter between human questioning

and the silence of the universe."⁴ The universe seemed dreadfully silent when President Kennedy was killed, when a bomb exploded in a Birmingham church, when three young men were murdered in a Mississippi town. The questions arise, no matter what; and there are no answers. "Why?" people ask. "How could it happen to them — to him?" They want truth when they ask, even when they know there are no answers. Is it any wonder that they speak of meaninglessness? Is it any wonder that, when they hear the silence, they despair?

The difficulty often is that "meaning" is read too narrowly. "*The realm of meanings is wider than that of true-and-false meanings; it is more urgent and more fertile . . .*" John Dewey once wrote. He went on:

*When the claim of meanings to truth enters in, then truth is indeed preeminent. But this fact is often confused with the idea that truth has a claim to enter everywhere, that it has monopolistic jurisdiction. Poetic meanings, moral meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth. . . .*⁵

It is in this wider realm that teachers have an opportunity to work to overcome the failure of nerve. It is here, among "matters of richness and freedom of meanings," that they can make it possible for their students to endure confrontation and at once avoid despair. And it is here, of course, that the literary encounter may serve to counter the sense of meaninglessness — if it is an authentic one, and if the necessary distinctions are made.

Crucial Distinctions

There are two sorts of distinctions: one between the noncognitive and the cognitive, the other between cognitive meanings which are truth-meanings and cognitive meanings which are not. A noncognitive expression or communication is most commonly taken to be an expression or communication of emotion. In the Crocean school of aesthetics, art is said to communicate "intuitive knowledge" without relation to the intellect; and this, while somewhat different from emotion, is equally noncognitive. Then there is the conception of the "unconscious," the "irrational," which is, by definition, noncognitive.

No art form can be totally devoid of emotive content; and it is unlikely that a work of art can be created unless the unconscious ("the well," as Hemingway called it) is crucially involved. It does not follow from this, however, that works of art, by their very nature, lack cognitive content.

This is particularly clear where literature is concerned because literature, after all, is made of words. Henry D. Aiken has said that the aesthetic appeal of literature is largely due to the cognitive meanings conveyed by the language used. Like all verbal symbols, those used in literature function denotatively *and* connotatively. Ideas, interests, memories are addressed; so are moods, feelings, and even fantasies. Aiken writes, *The predominant power of words to arouse, sustain, and project emotion is a function, not of their quality as sounds, but of their meaning — and in this case, their cognitive meaning.*⁶ He has in mind the "wider realm" again, rather than "true-and-false meanings," which are not the prime business of art. To support his point, we need only recall a few first lines — such as these from William Faulkner's *The Bear*, Carson McCullers' *The Member of the Wedding*, and T. S. Eliot's "Journey of the Magi."

Faulkner, to begin: *There was a man and a dog too this time. Two beasts, counting Old Ben, the bear, and two men, counting Boon Hogganbeck. . . .* Then McCullers: *It happened that green and crazy summer when Frankie was twelve years old. This was the summer when for a long time she had not been a member. And, finally, Eliot:*

*A cold coming we had of it,
Just the worst time of the year
For a journey, and such a long journey:
The ways deep and the weather sharp,
The very dead of winter.*⁷

A fragment, at best, can be only vaguely evocative; but the lines selected may make clear that the use of words often makes cognitive meaning inescapable even when "truth" is neither being prepared for nor told. And this makes it all the more important to keep the distinctions among cognitive meanings in mind. The integrity of scientific methods must be protected. Literature must be kept free to

release a world of meanings, to permit wide and complex orders to be made.

A Place for the Genuine

Marianne Moore, in a poem called "Poetry," has said some of this:

*I, too, dislike it; there are things that are
important beyond all this fiddle.
Reading it, however, with a perfect contempt
for it, one discovers in
it after all, a place for the genuine.*

The poem goes on to challenge poetry that becomes "unintelligible," perhaps because it is confused with discursive prose. Then it continues:

*nor is it valid
to discriminate against 'business documents and school books'; all these phenomena are important.
One must make a distinction
however: . . .⁸*

It is as if a refusal to make the distinction threatens both the discursive and the nondiscursive — and a variety of cognitive meanings as well. In this poem, poets are to be "literalists of the imagination" who present "for inspection, imaginary gardens with real toads in them." This suggests what "genuine" signifies; and it brings us back to the nature of literature as an art form, and at length to its potentialities in combating meaninglessness.

The poet's garden may suggest some aesthetic ordering, the form that is created when imagination goes to work on selected particulars in the world. Whatever they are — toads, Grecian urns, or faces in a crowd — these particulars have been selected by emotions that pulled at them, separated them from the density of things, and made them part of a new order, as the surf flows in and carries off pebbles, grains of sand, chips of glass, when it withdraws into the sea.

The sea is analogous to the strange new context in which the perceived toads or urns or faces now exist. It is the artist's context, the consciousness of the poet. The poet's imagination transmutes the par-

ticulars, changes them, gives them symbolic form. Toads or urns or faces are remade deliberately, patterned in accord with the feelings they have aroused.

Transformed, the perceived toads, for instance, become toads more literal, more concrete, than actual toads, once their garden is entered by a reader. In day-to-day life, toads are generally invisible in their singularity. For scientists, they are merely representative of a species. For gardeners or visitors to gardens, they tend to blend with the dust; or they function in the organic life of gardens, or they provoke dismayed recoils. It takes an imaginary garden to make toads horticulturally useless, to remove their power to startle, and to make them significant as forms.

Visions of Possibility

If the toads in works of art are misconceived, if their felt "realness" is confused with veritable existence in the natural world, they lose their significance as illusions, and their expressive power decays. Works of art function as experiences only when they are viewed as presentations, not representations or revelations or commentaries. They are realizations of certain possibilities in the particulars that compose them. They are self-sufficient entities once they are formed; they are organic structures, complete unto themselves. Like John Keats' Grecian urn, each one is a still presence, "a foster-child of silence and slow time." In its presentness, it means nothing except as it is experienced. When it is experienced, meaning may happen, suddenly or gradually. It can only happen in relation to a human consciousness.

The event becomes significant, however, when there is an awareness of the meanings occurring. A literary experience can only be "integral," as Dewey said,⁹ or complete when the consummation reached involves such awareness. An encounter which achieves authenticity, therefore, is one which culminates in a reflective activity of exploration and patterning. That which is explored and patterned is some dimension of the reader's own existential history. Form is imposed upon the flow of concepts, images, and codifications making up that history. The feelings pervading it are formed as well, and the form

is fed by the roots reaching underground. A literary experience is complete, in other words, when a work of literature leads a reader into himself — to reflect, to reflect upon, and to re-form his "image" of his world.

Illustrations may clarify the connections between this process and the nurture of meaningfulness. There is, for instance, J. D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye*, which has so often served to generate intense experiences among the young although it states no verifiable truth, reveals no facts about man's condition in the modern age. It deals with a brief time in the life of young Holden Caulfield, who is seeking candor and compassion in a "phony" adult world. It requires a certain suspension of disbelief if a reader is to enter into Holden's quest and abide, for a while, by its rules.

Once a reader is engaged, however, his consciousness is tapped on several levels as he reenacts in imagination what he reads. He is most likely to "understand" the story in terms of his own recollected adolescence, perhaps in an American city or town. The more he can summon up of adolescent disgust and disillusionment, the more he will be engaged. The more adult observations and ideas he can integrate with his memories, the richer and more complex will become the perspective through which he sees.

Understanding via Feelings

But he has to *feel* what he is undergoing. He has to respond emotionally to an initial tension and entanglement. He has to be free to search for the resolution his own emotion demands. If he is being "taught" the novel, the teacher's concern ought to be primarily for the student reader's naturalness and ease, for his release *into* the work of art. Given enough ability to read freely, there is usually a good possibility that the feelings aroused in a reader will magnetize a variety of energies, perceptions, and ideas to be patterned in accord with the form of the book.

The Catcher in the Rye or any other work of art "means" this variety formed in a manner new to the reader. Since every artistic presentation is in some sense *sui generis* and unique in the world,

awareness of what this novel patterning signifies depends on the reader's ability — and opportunity — to reflect upon what he has seen and felt after the experience is complete. It is here that the teacher and the class have crucial roles to play.

Students frequently do not realize that they have discerned new highlights and nuances in their own histories until they talk or write about what they have experienced in something they have read. The very process of putting the experience into words helps to organize what has been undergone. Once expressed, it becomes a kind of content, a structure which may well give rise to questions never framed before.

Having encountered, say, Holden's fantasy about becoming a catcher in the rye, the reader may well ask (later, when the reading is done) questions which have to do with adolescent psychology. Having moved imaginatively through the city streets, the playgrounds, the park, he may define problems only sociology can resolve. He may thus be led into a search for meanings in several fields, each one characterized by a particular type of methodology, specific cognitive controls.

Choosing to enter into any single field means choosing to accept appropriate conventions. The teacher, helping students to make distinctions as they extend their searching, may be creating occasions for the perceptions of many sorts of meanings and, at once, permitting aesthetic meaning to become clear. The student reader may become clearer about where he stands in a field of distinguishable meanings. Knowing more about what he has been about, he may be enabled to choose himself afresh. He may be enabled to choose a commitment in some defined area and thereby focus his concerns with some authentic end in view.

The Literary Encounter

This constitutes the sense of meaningfulness that may derive from literary encounters. It is surely not accidental that the symbolic action it involves so closely resembles the action of the dramatic and especially the tragic hero: Job, Oedipus, Hamlet, Lear. Also — not accidentally — it resembles the action in certain modern works of fiction: *Billy Budd*, for example, *Heart of Darkness*, *The Plague*, *Catch-22*.

Hamlet may exemplify this most sharply. The beginning, it will be remembered, is obscurity, an atmosphere of meaninglessness, in almost the sense with which we began. The unease of the sentries, the cold darkness of the ramparts, the groping to explain the Ghost — all is mysterious, "A mote to trouble the mind's eye." The uncertainties multiply as the play proceeds. Nighttime and strange sounds are not the only things that confound. Murder begins to preoccupy the mind. Love and restiveness trouble one man; the threat of disorder troubles another. There is the vague corruption overlaying the state, causing things to be "rotten in the state of Denmark" from the heights to the depths.

Polonius, Claudius, Gertrude, and Hamlet frame their hypotheses and test them in action. What they do is determined by their positions with respect to the "sickness" pervading all things. Hamlet, the prince who ought to be king, bears the crucial responsibility to "set things right"; and so it is Hamlet who, by testing and incorporating every guess and gesture made by others, must "by indirections find directions out." He must discover what is real and distinguish it from what is nothing but a projection from his own "bad dreams." He must cease to despise himself for relieving his "heart with words" and move to break through the "seeming" and to act.

It is his action which, at length, sets things right. Once the duel is fought at the end, Hamlet has not only worked his revenge; he has restored health, purpose, and meaning to the community. His death does not alter the fact that he has become a full prince and done what a prince must do. Before dying, he asks Horatio to tell his story in order to clear his "wounded name." Horatio is to let men know what has happened and, by the telling of it, perhaps to make some difference in the world. This may make the events of the Danish past cognitively meaningful for those who have not witnessed them. In a profound sense, however, meaninglessness has already been overcome — in action rather than words, in and through a man's choice of himself and his commitment to do his work.

And this, too, leads back to the contemporary problem of meaninglessness. The point is that there is no factual or rational answer to be

found when questions are asked like those aroused by the death of Hamlet — or the death of John F. Kennedy. To seek such an answer is too often to give way to the failure of nerve because only mystical, visionary answers are available. To deny the need for an answer, however, is to suffer a dreadful apathy, to say "what does it matter?" after all. The alternative, suggested by so many modes of literary experience, is to define one's self against the inscrutable and within one's community — to take action to *create* direction, to become a kind of prince.

The Human Commitment

Tragedy, of course, gives this exemplary form; but many works of literature offer kindred occasions. Even Salinger's novel, concluding with the image of a carrousel, culminates in a need to choose: "*Don't ever tell anybody anything. If you do, you start missing everybody.*" This is not basically different from Hamlet's appeal to Horatio, for Holden has already begun to "*sort of miss everybody I told about.*" He has made contact, almost in spite of himself; he has taken action against the "phony" world by telling. And yet there are no answers, as Holden admits when D. B. asks him what all the stuff he has told about means. "*If you want to know the truth, I don't know what I think about it.*" For him, too, and for the reader, "there are more things on heaven and earth" than are dreamt of in Horatio's — or anyone else's — philosophy.

One must take action, even so. In Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*, the hero may be taken to be Captain Vere, since the Captain is the one who makes significant choices as the tale moves on. A reader cannot identify with the totally innocent Billy or with the evil Claggert, cursed with a "natural depravity." He can only reenact the Captain's tragic choosing, the Captain's encompassing of good and evil in the midst of ambiguous nature, on the sea. Men's allegiance, he knows, is not to nature; and, severe as man-made laws may be, human beings must abide by them. To appeal beyond them — to the heart, to natural compassion — would be, for the anguished Captain, to fail in nerve as well as responsibility.

It is clear to "Starry" Vere where duty lies. It is clear that "measured forms are everything." And there is no sustaining answer to questions about why the Handsome Sailor has to die. "Everything is for a term remarkable in navies." Men proceed, doing their work against oblivion. For the Captain, for the reader, there remains the arch of created forms and meanings, the sole barrier against chaos and the ambiguous threat of the sea.

As in the case of Hemingway's early heroes, one can only do what one has to do "with style," even when one knows that "the world kills everyone, the very brave and the very good. . . ." Like Dr. Rieux, in Albert Camus's *The Plague*, one fights the plague because it is "only logical," even though one knows there is no cure. One says, as Rieux does, "it is my job," because there is no other way to survive. Or, like Yossarian, in the absurd whirl of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, one takes the risk of being called manic-depressive and admits to being "antagonistic to the idea of being robbed, exploited, degraded, humiliated, or deceived." Why? For no sound or defensible reason. Merely because one decides that one is "too good for all the conventions of society" and is committed, therefore, to remaining alive.

Beyond Us Yet Ourselves

Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* may serve as a summary of what it signifies to search for meaningfulness in a world where the constructs of the scientists represent the "real." This is the account of Marlow's journey down an African river, through the Congo and into the depths of himself. Because it is a story of confrontation, a plunge into a darkness that can only be combated by the most deliberately wrought forms, it brings us back to where we began.

"The truth is hidden — luckily." In our own terms, there is no truthful answer to the questions Marlow must ask, to the existential questions. There is the job of piloting the riverboat through a jungle that is inscrutable, past the tempting cries of savages along the banks. And there is the telling about it later — in Marlow's case, to people who are too safe to understand. He tells them they will never really

understand because of the *"solid pavement under your feet, surrounded by kind neighbors ready to cheer you or to fall on you, stepping delicately between the butcher and the policeman. . . ."*

In our case, the pavement is no longer solid for many people. The younger generation cannot step delicately, since there is little protection left. The danger of denial, abstractness, or despair is great. It may be more necessary than ever before to *"fall back on your own innate strength, your own capacity for faithfulness,"* and, still in Conrad's words, *"your power of devotion, not to yourself, but to an obscure, back-breaking business. . . ."*

It is obscure because anything is possible, and because the questions science cannot answer are so ubiquitous in modern life. Nevertheless, our work, our business, goes on. In an important sense, it is the work of searching after truths that are dependable. It is the business of using intelligence to adapt what is discovered by the sciences to the service of mankind. Since the days of Socrates, there has been no more promising ideal than the freeing of the human mind. It is our business now to enlarge its freedom, to strengthen human nerve enough to permit mindfulness to be chosen over bigotry, superstition, wishfulness, and the simplism of anti-intellectual *"common sense."*

And this is the prime reason for making required distinctions, for combating meaninglessness. Nothing can erode the commitment to mindfulness more than the feeling that *"it is all a nothing."* What, then, is the point if it is all *"Nada"*? Yet if we ask for truth-meanings as we search for what it *is*, the only response we can get is *"Nada"* or the *"silence"* of which Camus wrote.

There remains the option of creating forms, since *"measured forms are everything."* There remains the hope of action in the light of created images of dignity, of decency, of work. This is where imaginative literature can help us on our way. Forming experience by means of our encounters with it, we can choose the stand we must take, the gesture we can make, when we confront what cannot be resolved in factual terms. We can *enact* meaningfulness as we shape our illusions of purpose, our images, our forms. In doing so, we can create values as we live, values susceptible to continual remaking — *"beyond us,"* as Wallace Stevens puts it, *"yet ourselves."* And in

"The Man With the Blue Guitar," he says some things about the literary artist or the literary imagination which may serve as last things here, since they may remind us once again of meaning, and the need to seek out meanings, in the service of the truth:

They said, 'you have a blue guitar,
You do not play things as they are.'
The man replied, 'Things as they are
Are changed upon the blue guitar.'
And they said then, 'But play you must,
A tune beyond us, yet ourselves,
A tune upon the blue guitar
Of things exactly as they are.'¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

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³ Oppenheimer, J. R. "Science and Culture." *Encounter* 19: 7-10; October 1962.

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⁷ Eliot, T. S. *Collected Poems 1909-1935*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. Reprinted by permission.

⁸ Moore, Marianne. *Collected Poems*. New York: Macmillan, 1951. Reprinted by permission.

⁹ Dewey, John. *Art as Experience*. New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934.

¹⁰ Stevens, Wallace. *The Man With the Blue Guitar and Other Poems*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937. Reprinted by permission.

JAMES W. BAILEY

Objectivity in Literature

ONE OF C. P. SNOW'S MORE INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS IN HIS famous *Two Cultures* essay¹ is that scientists — he means principally physical scientists — have a greater, or at least a sounder, interest in the social and moral life than most literary intellectuals, and a nearly equal interest in the psychological life. "Social" and "moral" are closely related for now. "Industrialization," he says, "is the only hope of the poor," for it makes choice possible, it frees men from a life in which the pressures of environment are the chief factors in their existence. The social "hope" is, apparently, a hope for the greater *possibility* of a moral life. Insofar as social conditions can be altered to free men, there can be the chance that they will be genuinely able to address themselves to the individual condition.

The scientist's "sounder" moral interest presumably springs from a meritorious attitude toward change. Snow appears to be saying that the weakness of much literature is that it is not "progressive"; a novel such as George Orwell's *1984* is "against the future." But if we look at the literature which typifies the period from, let us say,

1660, the date of the establishment of the Royal Society in England, and a reasonable mark for the emergence of science as a significant kind of knowledge, do we find that such literature has generally been "against the future"? If so, I think one might agree that it would fail as an account of viable moral life. But I do not think the charge is just. The modern writer (a term preferable to the fuzzier "literary intellectual") creates work which is as morally sound and as morally "progressive" as any work of the past. Snow's error is in his assumption that literature is fundamentally subjective. He implies that authors with unprogressive attitudes write unprogressive books. It is an unfortunate and widespread conclusion.

Snow permits us to entertain the Platonic assumption that the writer is blind to the real values and the true nature of the world he attempts to represent. Scientists know the real physical world and their knowledge of it, in this view, makes them good. But perhaps we do not become what we imitate. If the scientist knows the real physical world, it would appear to be because he has the method to discover it. A comparable method is used by the writer who wishes to examine the moral life. Snow's scientist is prepared to be objective, "scientific," about the physical world. If he is good it is as a scientist — good in his practice. For the writer the moral life is a central interest and one about which he is equally prepared to be objective. If he is good in practice he is good in characterization and analysis of his interest. When we speak of objectivity we speak of a state and not of persons. The good and the bad man may be capable of arriving at it. "Scientist" and "artist" are simply roles and they do not constitute the whole man. Within these roles the same, or very similar, method permits discoveries of comparable significance without ever raising questions about the moral integrity of the agent to our discovery.

It may be true that on the average scientists in this century are, as individuals, more hopeful of and more willing to work for a better future than are literary people. Perhaps a given scientist is a "better" or a "sounder" person than a given literary man. Einstein may have been a "better" person than D. H. Lawrence. But even if this is so it does not mean (and it is this which I think Snow misses) that Law-

rence was less objective about the moral life, less capable of giving us an account of its operations than Einstein was about the physical world and its operations.

Differing in central interest, the scientist and the writer have a common approach. Both are engaged in what Kathleen Nott calls a "learning passivity,"² both are "objective." In this chapter I wish to give an account of some aspects of literary objectivity and the kinds of discovery it makes possible.

Literature has its objectivity and if it differs from the kind achieved by the man who calls himself a scientist, it differs in the sense that it is perhaps more nominalistic or conceptualistic. Objectivity suggests detachment, impersonality, freedom from prejudice, and, probably in the minds of most people, a state in which one sees things as they "really" are. But absolute separation is a myth, albeit a useful one, because one never entirely frees one's self from a particular angle of vision. A choice is made, conscious or not, one's own or not. Preference and, consequently, value are constituents of the objective stance. That is to say, one is impartial about chosen things.

Our ability to objectify is *our* ability. Though the external world may not be simply a function of the self, the Cooley-Mead-Piaget conception of the social self teaches us that the detachment of the objective state is a release from the subjective. Since the moral life can exist only when human action is not solely a conditioned response, permanent detachment of the objective self from the subjective self would be fatal in a representation of the value life. Literature, which provides us with what Charles Morris calls value constructs,³ avoids this problem by creating a paradoxical kind of distance or detachment: it insures disinterest and achieves objective reality in and about value by being fictional.

The recognition of the necessary relationship between the subjective and the objective self is made in literature through the twin concepts of "tone" and "point of view," which together make up the angle of vision taken in the literary work.⁴ "Tone" is the author's angle of vision as it is revealed in the work. "Point of view" is the angle of vision which belongs to a character or to a narrator. An author might, for example, use a particular point of view in order to

create a particular tone. First person point of view in Defoe's *Moll Flanders* is modified by and, in a certain sense, creates an ironic tone which in turn makes possible moral discovery. All literary work has angle of vision because, as I have pointed out, some attitude is implied in everything we do and say. In literature the eye is either clearly focused or hopelessly lachrymose. In either event our experience of the work will be objective in the sense that, as it is fictional, we are not obliged to act on or to accept anything presented. In the sense that we participate solely with our imagination, literature gives us a view of life that is impersonal, distant, and free of our prejudices. We need not jam our fist through the television screen, nor rush to the stage during a play to save the heroine from the villain.⁵

An author's failure to control tone and point of view is a limitation on the objectivity he is able to achieve, for whatever detachment does exist is valueless in the sense that we are not shown by the author how values are formed in the environment recreated in the given piece of literature. If value exists it is supplied, rather than found, by the reader. Objectivity is a useful state because it temporarily frees us from prejudice by invoking distance and impersonality. Permanent objectivity is not valuable because values arise only when separateness and detachment are eliminated, or, as in the case of literature, the variables of meaning — subject and object — are united in the work itself. We may wish to know what the world is "really" like, but it is we as subjects who make such knowledge valuable.⁶

Literature, thus, has a reality which is achieved by the distanced representation of the interplay of subject and object. It remains to suggest how such a conclusion can be serviceable to the reader generally unaccustomed to the aims and methods of literature. We may profitably begin by considering in some detail the consequences of the isolation of subject and object in non-literary life. We may then look at the comparable problem in literature: the control or lack of control of angle of vision.

LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY

In the famous second chapter of Charles Dickens' novel *Hard Times*, "Murdering the Innocents," the boy, Bitzer, is called upon by Thomas

Gradgrind to define a horse after Sissy Jupe (girl number 20), whose father breaks horses, fails utterly in her definition. Bitzer calmly supplies the stunning information: *Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.* Prolonged objectivity of this kind leads to derangement. There is some question as to whether Bitzer could identify a horse if he saw one.

We recognize in Dickens' novel an attack on Benthamite Utilitarianism. It advocated, Dickens thought, a type of education that effectively isolates what a student knows from what he as a person is, and which apparently forced John Stuart Mill's spectacular recoil from his original acceptance of the pushpin philosophy — a withdrawal which he tells us in his autobiography was made possible after his discovery that poetry could heal the split in self that had brought him close to suicide.

To the student, learning to be objective may be construed as a way to separate himself from the material presented to him in order to purify and cleanse both the material and himself of subjectivity. If the removal is protracted, the student may lose his capability of creating meaning and value. He himself may become an object. The condition is aptly characterized in this observation of a former student of mine: *College students are what one can call, in the behavioral psychologist's lexicon, "maze-bright" rats; that is, they learn to build a monolith of rationality sufficiently enormous to grind their hearts to bits. They learn to ridicule their meadow impulses; they learn to fence with consciousness as their sabre; to heap enough abuse upon the central anguish of their lives in order that they may succeed in gradual steps to the annihilation of their sensitivity.*

The problem here described does not exist for the student alone. Robert Bierstedt, in his brilliant article, "A Critique of Empiricism in Sociology,"⁷ sees a comparable failure to construct meaning and value in the indiscriminate use of the empirical approach. The sheer discerning of fact without the mediating use of reason as a control leads, he thinks, to a collection of aimless facts and consequently to a value-

less science. When he speaks of the superiority of a "disciplined rationalism" over a "planless empiricism," Bierstedt recognizes in effect what I have called the value of controlled angle of vision. A critique such as he makes of the exclusively empirical sociologist can be made of the writer who fails to control angle of vision.

When they write, the Bitzers of the world — the equivalent of Hannah Arendt's "super-clerks" — write with uncontrolled tone and usually with faulty point of view. Having never established a coherent attitude toward the material they choose to write about, such authors are unable to provide a clear focus in regard to it. They can neither show how someone would actually comprehend the world nor what attitude they wish us as readers to take in regard to their representation of it. Literature of this type may have historical or sociological interest, but in saying that we are saying that interest and value are supplied by the reader rather than represented in the work by the author.

This is a special problem of the popular novel because historically it has tended, along with journalism, to become the kind of literature which pictures common life in a standardized way. Popular poetry, less popular for various reasons, is not less commonplace in its readings of life. The reason for the average reader's acceptance of the wholly conventional appears to be that he wants to avoid any value considerations that may be implicit in the term "reality." He wants to think that whatever is described is real and static in the sense that the point of view from which "reality" is seen is not important. Such readers want art that is either non-representational, non-subversive, as Picasso calls it,⁸ because it permits the audience any response at all, or they want the security of art which is representational on the scale of their own conventional habits of seeing. This type of literature offers the illusion of order, of control, of possibility. It provides no insight into the real workings of the moral life.

This is precisely the kind of literature which is "against the future." The reader is encouraged to embrace a purely static view of reality when an author fails to recreate the value life as it actually exists. But acceptance of such a limited view, as I have attempted to show, is a form of self-denial. In conventional literature, relation-

ships between characters and their environments are purely gratuitous. The reader, like the student confronted with a body of material in the classroom, is encouraged to purge himself of self-interest.

But this is not the literature that disturbs Snow. It is the works of Lawrence, Rilke, Yeats, Pound, and perhaps of Kafka and T. S. Eliot that worry him. Yet these are the writers who control angle of vision brilliantly. These are the writers who do not pander to the wishes of their audience, the writers who attempt to face the genuine limitations on the moral life and the consequences of choice in the modern world.

It is not quite true to say that industrialization is the *only* hope of the poor. Industrialization is in some ways misunderstood by literary people, but one aspect of it they clearly perceive: leisure and affluence furnish the ground for a burgeoning moral life. They do not, by any means, automatically provide people with the ability to tap the opportunities set before them. If they did, there would be no reason to marvel at the moral obtuseness of the middle class — a group which has had sufficient time to show us what it can do with opportunity born from "progress."

All good modern literature attempts to explore the implications of change for the moral life. Jane Austen dramatizes the tortuous search for the good life in an environment which seems almost designed to encourage people to settle for what they have. While she is able to reveal a degree of moral possibility through the release from self-deception, James Joyce, and other naturalists, give us a picture of half-alive people who give up the possibility of a moral existence, because they fall victim to the "moral" precepts of a class which wishes the class beneath it to fail. T. S. Eliot funereally moves before us a middle class in an environment which deadens rather than awakens the moral impulse. Dostoevsky and Nathaniel West thrust us into the incredibly difficult position of trying to construct a meaningful ethic for ourselves in a world which denies the same possibility for others, thereby destroying the meaning of our own achievement.

In the work of every one of these writers we witness a fine assessment of the problems which complicate choice in an infinitely complex world. It is true that in their private lives some of these authors

exhibit attitudes we do not find attractive. But in their work they are "objective." They have the vision of a world in which men can function as true moral agents. Literature is not against the future. It is not science that disturbs Huxley in *Brave New World*, Orwell in *1884*; it is the gap between technical change and education change that worries them into believing that perhaps man narrows his moral perspective in the name of progress. The disparity between vision and reality means simply that the job of joining subject and object is a difficult one. Yet how much more difficult it would be without the vision.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Snow, C. P. *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

² Nott, Kathleen. *The Emperor's Clothes*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958. p. 12.

³ Morris, Charles. "Science, Art and Technology." *Kenyon Review* 1: 415; 1939.

⁴ These terms are used chiefly in the analysis of fiction, but "tone," at least, is also an important aspect of poetry. The reader might bear in mind that the novel does not come into existence as a completed form until the eighteenth century, and when it does it attempts to provide an image of reality which reflects, generally, the Cartesian assumption that truth is an individual matter. For fuller discussion of these matters, see:

Watt, Ian. *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957; and

Wellek, René. "The Concept of Realism in Literary Scholarship." *Concepts of Criticism*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963.

⁵ I speak here of ideal responses. There are indeed times when people lose distance and treat art as if it were life. The lack of control may be the fault of the artist, just as, if such distance is not maintained in science, it may be the fault of the scientist. I think particularly of some of the breakdowns in communication in discussion over the fluoridation of water. Usually, however, the loss of distance is due to the failure of the audience to comprehend the function of disinterest. I suspect that some such misunderstanding gives rise to the "mad" scientist and "crackpot" artist stereotypes: the idea of a purely detached interest is incomprehensible to many people.

⁶ Snow seems dimly aware of this for he says that the scientist's lack of interest in imaginative literature is "self-impoverishing."

⁷ Bierstedt, Robert. "A Critique of Empiricism in Sociology." *American Sociological Review* 14: 584-92; 1949.

⁸ See, Gilot, Françoise. *Life with Picasso*. New York: New American Library (Signet edition), 1966. pp. 65-66.

MARTIN B. DUBERMAN

History and Theater

Come, sit down, every mother's son, and rehearse your parts.

SHAKESPEARE
A Midsummer Night's Dream

I SUSPECT THERE ARE MANY BESIDES MYSELF WHO FEEL THAT historians are not communicating as well as they could, and that dramatists are not communicating as much as they might. It is the argument of this essay that the deficiencies of history and theater might be lessened if each would pay some attention to the virtues of the other.

First, however, I should make clear an underlying assumption: I believe the past has something to say to us. This may seem a truism, but an opposite view can be, and has been, cogently argued — the argument, if not the cogency, summed up in Henry Ford's statement, "History is all bunk." It is not my purpose to enter here in detail into the long-standing debate on whether history is or is not relevant to contemporary needs, can or cannot be objectively reconstructed, will or will not reflect the temporary bias of the historian and his culture. For the moment, I want only to make explicit my own premise that a knowledge of past experience can provide valuable guidelines,

though not blueprints, for acting in the present. Those who do not share this assumption will hardly be concerned with the argument based upon it; there can be no wish to increase our awareness of the past if one holds that the past has no present meaning. And in the same way, those who believe that the theater is already rich enough in ideas and perspectives will have little patience with my further argument that its range needs amplification.

But to begin with history. Professional historians do, of course, worry about the shortcomings of their craft, but their dominant concern is with the difficulty of reconstructing past events "objectively." Handicapped both by the paucity of evidence and by the distortions in it which their own preconceptions introduce, historians have fits of self-doubt as to whether they are re-creating the past or merely projecting onto it their own, and their society's, transient needs. Yet few historians are concerned with shortcomings of another sort: whether their findings have much meaning for modern man. Too often today the academic historian seems to think his job is over once he has wrestled with the problems inherent in assembling data. He is, he would say, a scholar, not a policy adviser or a communications expert; it is up to others to draw and transmit the relevance of his findings.

Not only is the historian himself likely to be indifferent to the contemporary significance of his research, but suspicious of others who emphasize it; they are thought to be "propagandists." It is right, of course, to be on guard against any attempt to distort past evidence in the service of some present need. Yet such vigilance must be discriminating; a distinction should be made between reading contemporary meaning *into* the evidence, which is reprehensible, and reading it *from* the evidence, which is not. To do the latter is only to make explicit those conclusions already suggested by the data. The overt attempt to read "lessons" from history can, of course, be treacherous, but no worthwhile goal should be abandoned because it is difficult to attain. The effort to extract from the past something of use for our own experience is all that saves historical study from antiquarianism, the accumulation of detail for its own sake. If the past cannot be used — however conditionally — as a guide for the present,

then its study is difficult to justify, at least to serious men. Historical writing becomes esthetics, the arrangement of past events in "pleasing" patterns, which, of course, can carry values of their own — except that historians have never been very good at esthetics. In asking them instead actively to search for "lessons," it should be stressed that no necessary threat is posed to historical objectivity. We would not ask historians to distort their findings, but to evaluate them, to be as eager to serve the living as the dead.

Assuming, then, that the past has some relevance for us, and that it is among a historian's proper functions — my own feeling is that it should be his preeminent function — to search for that relevance, it then becomes necessary to question the effectiveness with which such relevance (when found) is communicated. Since the invention of the printing press, the record of the past has been largely transmitted through the written word, the writing, a rational way of ordering and clarifying experience, makes an essentially intellectual appeal. Not always, of course, at the expense of the emotions: where the wish and skill are present, the writer can do much to evoke and engage our feelings. But the arousal of feelings is generally frowned on by the historian; emotion is thought to be an enemy rather than an adjunct of mind. Not surprisingly, therefore, historians have shown little regard for those literary skills best calculated to engage emotions. The majority of historians today eschew "lively" writing as a means of communication in much the same constricting way that they eschew relevance as its end. "Style" is thought to be an impediment to analysis, a frivolous sugar-coating repellent to those tough-minded heroes of the mind who prefer their ideas "straight."

Even were the historian more sensitive to the evocative potential of the written word, in immediacy he still could not rival the spoken word, which benefits from the direct confrontation of personality. In its beginnings, of course, the historical record *was* transmitted orally; in that sense, history began as theater. While no sensible person would advocate a return to this tradition, we may still wish to recapture something of its emotional impact. If we could bring the spoken word's immediacy and emotion to the presentation of history, a new richness of response, a new measure of involvement with the past, would be possible.

Almost all combinations of history and theater have been made by dramatists, with the result — as in Shakespeare's *Richard II* or John Osborne's *Luther* — that historical episodes have been used, shaped, and embellished for imaginative purposes. The past event becomes the occasion for a statement not in itself strictly historical. This is in accord with a writer's usual procedure; he transposes the raw material of experience, he makes it his own and, if he has sufficient insight and artistry, everyone's.

But the imaginative reworking of historical data is fundamentally inimical to what the professionals regard as "proper" history. The historian knows that his personality influences his interpretations, but this is not the same, he would say, as advocating such influence; as virtue should not be made of necessity. Control and restriction of interaction between the subjective historian and his "objective" materials is essential. This intellectual fastidiousness may severely limit the opportunity for speculation, but it also minimizes the risk of contaminating the data. The professionals, in short, prefer to emphasize information rather than informing.

Yet the contrast between the historian's "objective" presentation of the past and, say, the novelist's subjective reworking of it, is overdrawn. It describes the historian's intention more than his result, for in a real sense he too necessarily indulges in imaginative combinations of fact and opinion. Historical writing is never merely litmus paper, recording an exact facsimile of past events, but always consists to some degree of one man's idiosyncratic interaction with the data. It may be, too, that if the historian is ever to make widely relevant statements, he will have to become more consciously and extensively the philosopher *commenting* upon historical materials.

But if the contrast between the writing of history and fiction has been overdrawn, it is nevertheless a contrast the historian cherishes. He would protest being asked to play philosopher speculating on human ends, or psychologist investigating human needs, or novelist describing human conditions. He defines the role of a historian as simply one of collecting and recording what survives of past experience, *not* commenting upon it. Given this self-image, he objects especially to the "distortions" which a writer like John Osborne makes in the historical record when converting it for the stage. This,

the historian would say, is adding immediacy and emotion to the past at the sacrifice of accuracy and intellectual subtlety.

An historian myself, I am sympathetic to these professional scruples even while not being fully convinced by them. Despite the risks, it seems to me worth searching for valid ways to combine history and theater, and not only to enrich historical presentation, but also to revitalize theatrical statements. For the benefits of a union between history and drama would not by any means be all on one side. If theater, with its ample skill in communication, could increase the immediacy of past experience, history, with its ample material on human behavior, could broaden the range of theatrical testimony. And there are grounds for believing that the theater's present range is badly in need of amplification.

The current mode of dramatic writing has been variously called the theater of the absurd, the theater of revolt, the mechanical, the brutal, the apathetic — these are the dominant themes of contemporary theater. And they may well be the dominant themes of contemporary life. Perhaps today's playwrights, whose personal lives, we are told, have often been so melancholy, overdo the importance of these themes, confusing their own sorrows with the world's decline. But if the modern playwright has overdrawn the disintegrative aspects of modern life, it is not by much, judging from what we see around us. And the evidence of our senses is corroborated by the evidence of science. The portrayal of human behavior in the theater of the absurd closely resembles the description provided by sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Man, these behavioral scientists tell us, *is* a creature who flees reality, who prefers comfortable deceptions to hard truths, whose yearning for approval drives him to think and act as his society dictates, whose libidinous instincts can propel him into brutal, selfish, destructive behavior. Thus the behavioral view of man seems to support the current theatrical view of man. If, therefore, we take the function of drama to be the accurate reflecting of contemporary life, the state of our current theater must be judged satisfactory. Or, if unsatisfactory, only because our playwrights have not described the modern predicament with sufficient skill; the failure, according to this canon, would be one of execution, not intent.

It is possible to suggest, though, that the intent as well is too restricted. There is no inherent reason why drama need be limited to describing what *is*; it could also become concerned with what *might be*. One function of the theater should obviously be to reflect the actuality of life, but another might be to change it. Instead, by presenting man largely as brute, child or fool, the current theater fortifies and perpetuates those qualities. If men are told that they are at the mercy of impulse and irrationality, they become more likely to behave accordingly. Like it or not, the theater, partaking as it does of self-fulfilling prophecy, is a social force, though at present an inadvertent and negative one. Man's destructive qualities are real enough and must be faced. But other qualities — or at least potentials — are real as well, and they too should be brought to attention. At present they are not. Theater audiences see little to counteract the view that self-deception, hysteria, and savagery are synonyms for human nature.

Once again, the perspective of behavioral science is useful. Just as its findings validate the theater of the absurd, so they also support the need to supplement it. Psychologists and sociologists have made abundantly clear the immense plasticity and enormous adaptive power of human beings; if social demands and emphases are shifted, human action shifts accordingly. Thus, if we would not today celebrate man's innate goodness, we should be equally ready to recognize that nothing predetermines him to be cruel, vacuous, and selfish. As Berelson and Steiner point out in *Human Behavior*, man's "*evil comes from frustration, not from inherent nature . . . he seeks acceptance . . . more than he seeks political power or economic riches, and he can even control his strongest instincts, the libidinous side of his nature, to this end.*"¹ Man is not only a social creature, but also a social product. If challenged to do so, he is capable of using reason and will to develop integrative, and control destructive, impulses. Why should not the theater put such a challenge to him? Why could it not help to alter the destructive behavioral patterns it now merely describes? There is no inherent reason why drama cannot be an agency of amelioration as well as a voice of despair.

We need not be sentimental about all this and emblazon Victorian mottoes like SHINE IN USE on our play bills. I am certainly not suggesting that the theater of absurdity be supplemented by some crude theater of "positive thinking." I am suggesting only that since integrative experiences exist in our lives, they should also have some representation in our theater. Though despair and disintegration may well characterize the dominant mood today, they do not tell the whole story either of our present condition, or, more significantly still, of our potential one. The theater, by making room for a demonstration of other aspects of human nature, could help to see that the current mood of disintegration does not become the permanent one.

One way (though certainly not the only one) of demonstrating man's potential for a wide variety of experiences and behavior, is to put more history on the stage, either in fictional or documentary form. Both approaches have their drawbacks. Those characterizing fiction, (*à la* Osborne), have already been discussed; my own experience with the documentary approach may serve to illustrate the special problems of that form.

In wanting to tell the story of being black "in white America" with maximum impact, I thought it worth trying to combine the evocative power of the spoken word with the confirming power of historical fact. Yet I did not wish to sacrifice historical accuracy in the process. And so I tried staging the raw material of history itself rather than a fictionalized version of it. The two modes of procedure, of course, are not entirely different — as I argued earlier. Using historical documents — letters, news reports, diaries, and the like — does not guarantee objectivity; it would be naïve to think that in selecting, abridging, cutting, and juxtaposing the materials of history, I was not also transmuting them. The past does not speak for itself, and the ordering intelligence that renders it, necessarily injects some degree of idiosyncrasy. The advantage of the documentary approach (if one is primarily interested in historical accuracy) is that it does at least minimize subjectivity and restrict invention. Its disadvantage (if one is primarily interested in making statements about experience) is that it circumscribes reflection and generalization. Instead of confining myself, for example, to the actual words John Brown spoke at his

trial, I might have invented words to represent what I guessed to be his thoughts and feelings during his speech. In not doing so, I suspect that what I gained in accuracy I lost in insight. Truth of fact has less durable relevance than truth of feeling, for a fact is rooted in a particular context, whereas a feeling, being universal, can cross time.

There are, then, inherent difficulties in putting history on the stage: fictionalization can caricature the past, documentation can straitjacket it. Yet both techniques seem worth experimenting with, for history and theater, though the union be flawed, can contribute much to each other.

The great virtue of history, one the theater stands in need of, is that it counteracts present-mindedness — the belief that what *is* has always been and must always be. To have historical perspective is to become aware of the range of human adaptability and purpose. Thus the ancient world (and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment) saw man as a creature capable of using reason to perceive and follow "virtue"; the Christian view saw man capable of love as well as sin; the Renaissance believed that man's energy and will were sufficient to control both his personal destiny and his social environment.

Such views, of course, were philosophical models of what men could be, not necessarily what they were. But the dominant outlook of any period reflects actual as well as ideal behavior, for men build their self-images out of their experience as well as their aspirations. At any period, to be sure, ideal behavior is only approximated. Enlightenment France may have believed in the possibility — and necessity — of a rational life, but it was hardly free of sophistry and corruption; moderns have neither invented nor discovered man's capacity for the irrational and the vicious. But in other eras such qualities were not considered sufficient descriptions of human nature or insurmountable barriers to human aspiration; men could, they were told, resist their destructive impulses, could lead more than merely instinctive lives.

No doubt most of us today proceed on similar assumptions in daily life. But the assumptions get less formal recognition than they once did. We are not encouraged — in our culture generally, in our theater particularly — to recognize that human nature is malleable, capable

of many forms and many goals. We are not encouraged to see that "absurdity" is only a partially true description of the way we live, and even more, that it tells us little of how we *might* live.

It is not the responsibility of the Albees or the Becketts to show us what we might be; their responsibility is to their own, not to all possible, visions. But for those concerned with the future as well as the present, something more in our theater wants saying. To recognize that human beings are curious, do strive, will reason, can love, is to wish for a theater that might express and encourage this kind of human potential — precisely because that potential is scarcely visible today. We need the theater of the absurd to dramatize our weaknesses and failings, but we also need theater which might indicate our potential strengths and possible successes.

Putting history on the stage is hardly a cure-all. Not only does the technique, as I have argued, hold intrinsic difficulties, but it is true as well that historical theater would not necessarily be a theater of "affirmation"; undoubtedly much in man's past experience would underscore, rather than counteract, present pessimism. My only point is that the totality of past experience does include more than despair and defeat; there is material in history which chronicles achievement and possibility. Such evidence is around us today as well, of course, but we seem unable to use it; it may be a case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. This is exactly why an historical context may be needed if the "positive" aspects of human experience are to become accessible.

Merging the competencies of history and drama, therefore, could help to diminish the parochialism of both. Currently, historical study is fixated on past patterns and the theater on present ones; neither is sufficiently concerned with the future. If the variety of past experience could be communicated with an immediacy drawn from the theatrical idiom, both history and drama might become vehicles for change rather than only the recorders, respectively, of past and present attitudes. In being more fully exposed to the *diversity* of past human behavior, we might come to see that men (even if only *sometimes*) can give purpose and structure to their lives; can use the tensions of existence creatively, or at the worst, accept them with

dignity; can, without sacrificing self-interest, treat others with respect and compassion. Such an awareness could be a useful corrective to the current penchant for underestimating ourselves, which, after all, is but one way of excusing and indulging our defeats.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Berelson, Bernard, and Steiner, Gary A. *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.

W. C. WILCOX

*Philosophy and ? : Social SCIENCE
or SOCIAL Science?*

LET US GO NOW, YOU AND I, AND WATCH THAT MAN OVER THERE. See, he is walking down the street, whistling to himself, looking around, when all of a sudden he trips over the root of a tree and falls, unceremoniously, on his new straw hat.

What will our reactions to this unfolding spectacle be? I submit that many are possible, ranging from tears, at the conspiracy of natural forces against their helpless victim, to laughter, perhaps the more usual response. But notice our companion, a physicist. He is not laughing; he is not weeping. Instead, lo and behold, he whips out a slide rule and a notebook, begins furiously computing distances and velocities, all the while mumbling mathematical formulae to himself. I further submit that only a physicist could find the misfortune of our walking, whistling, stumbling man to be intellectually stimulating. For him, and *for him alone*, does this spectacle provide any knowledge.¹

Why, we wonder, is this the case? And the answer is soon forthcoming: to our physicist friend, the clumsy oaf across the road has had something *happen to him*. He did not choose to do this; it was not (unless he is, perhaps, a clown) a piece of human behavior. Things that happen to people are not things that people do, and things that happen to people are, theoretically at least, no different from things that happen to planets or atoms. A human stumbling, then, is on a par with a planet being pulled from its orbit or an atom being "split." As these are fit objects of study for the physicist, so are stumbling or falling human beings.

Human beings *do things*; things happen to physical objects. This is the crucial distinction in my chapter; it is the distinction I shall argue for, and it is one with important consequences for the social (behavioral?) sciences.²

Let us take another, and more illuminating, example. My wife and I have a private joke. When I am moving my cigar toward an ashtray, and the ash falls on her newly waxed floor, she says, "Why did you do that?" When she is reaching for the salt, and spills her glass of water, I will say, "Why did you do that?" When my son trips at the top of the stairs and falls, head over heels to the bottom of said stairs, we say in unison, before rushing to his aid, "I wonder why he did that?" A little of this is funny; there is the incongruity of asking for a reason "why," when there is no such reason to be had. "But," my son objects, "I didn't do anything; it was an accident."

A third example will, perhaps, suffice. Imagine our buffoon who cannot walk down the street without stumbling, or my poor, persecuted son, deciding to end it all by leaping from the top of a tall building. It makes perfect sense to ask, "Why did he jump?" but none at all to ask, "After he jumped, why did he fall?" There is no "why" for his falling; that is not something he did. It just happened to him.

Someone almost has to object at this point that, of course, the reason *why* he fell is the law of gravity. This is an acceptable answer, for a physicist, but from this point of view there is absolutely no difference between my son and a rock. The law of gravity does not give

the purpose of the falling boy, nor of the rock, for that matter. The answer to the question, "Why did he jump?" must state what purpose he had in mind. It must state a *reason*, and not a *cause*. If a human being does something, as opposed to merely having something happen to him, the "Why" question calls forth a reason, or an explanation in terms of purpose. The things that people do are purposive, or *teleological*, in nature. "Why did he jump?" means, "What were his reasons for jumping?" "Why is he falling?" means not, "What are his reasons for falling?" but, "What is the cause of his falling?" The same kind of question, "Why?" calls for different classes of answers in the different contexts.

Generally speaking, "human behavior" is that class of events which consists of things that people *do*, as opposed to what happens to them, and a knowledge of what people are doing presupposes a knowledge of what people think they are doing, or what end they have in mind. Here are some people whose bodies are moving up and down, in a somewhat regular fashion. What are they doing; what kind of behavior is this? Maybe they are not doing anything at all. Perhaps there is an earthquake, and they are being thrown about as those trees and rocks are. They have no purpose in mind; their bodies are not in their control. *They* are not *doing* anything.

There is no earthquake. Let's get at their behavior; simply "describe" what they are doing: dancing, taking part in some religious ceremony, trying to shake ants from their loincloths. But all of these activities, or kinds of behavior, are *described* in the same way: people bouncing up and down. To call some collection of bodily movements a dance is not simply to *describe* it, it is to *explain* it in terms of what the people think they are doing. To say that they are dancing, or taking part in a religious orgy, is to say that they are bouncing up and down for some purpose; they are doing that *for a reason*. And until we know, or think we know (for, of course, we might be wrong), we cannot get at their behavior in any way that would be of interest to a social (behavioral) scientist. A person whose body is moving up and down, insofar as all we know of him is that his body is moving up and down, could be of interest only to a physicist, or some other nut who would be equally interested in a tree or rock which was

moving up and down in accordance with some natural law. An anthropologist does not study the way that earthquakes roll people down hill; he studies the behavior they use (headlong flight, and so forth) to avoid earthquakes, or the behavior they use (dances, ritual performances, and so forth) because they think it will prevent earthquakes. (As if nature could be talked, or sung, into changing its mind.) When the dance is unsuccessful (because nature does not "change its mind," at least not for those reasons) and the earthquake comes, the anthropologist flees, because there is nothing more he can *do* to prevent something bad *happening to him*.

Perhaps I have overly belaboured this point, but let me say it one more time: human behavior is purposive, and when it is clear that humans have no purpose we don't call what happens a piece of human behavior.³

THE DILEMMA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is a commonplace that physics came of age when it began to treat nature in a non-purposive fashion. Planets, rocks, and atoms do not have purposes. We can describe their movements, and predict their movements, without asking them what they plan to do. The kinds of explanations that the physical scientist gives need no notion of purpose, and hence the physical scientist has no use for the concept of behavior.⁴

The consequences of all this for the social sciences must by now be clear. We are faced with a dilemma, neither branch of which seems particularly happy: either the subject matter of the social sciences is human behavior which is purposive in nature, in which case they are like Aristotelian physics, poetic and beautiful, but with little or no power to describe and predict; or the subject matter of the social sciences can be treated with no reference to purpose in the same way as any other class of objects. Here we have the analogy of post-Aristotelian physics (as a matter of fact we *have* post-Aristotelian physics), non-poetic and mathematical (and beautiful after another fashion), capable of describing with great clarity and predicting with great precision.

If we choose the first horn of the dilemma, the social sciences are not *sciences* (in the sense in which the natural sciences, and especially physics, are sciences). If we choose the second horn of the dilemma, then the social sciences are not *social*. Rather, *there are no social sciences*. If human beings are just things, like any other class of things, then we can get along nicely with those sciences which deal with things: the natural sciences. In this sense, there is only one science: physics.

What do we do now? I am not sure, but perhaps I can suggest an answer.

What the natural scientist is going to do, or try to do, is quite clear. He is going to try to "reduce" all the social sciences to psychology, psychology to neurology (biology), biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics. And I have no doubt that, in some sense, he will succeed in this; it is merely a matter of (not too much) time. But this doesn't make the social sciences scientific in the way that physics is scientific. It simply does away with them. It makes them like physics by *making them physics*. In this sense of science, there is, and can be, only one science.

ALTERNATIVES AND SPECULATIONS

The social sciences, as independent disciplines, must establish themselves firmly along the lines laid down by Aristotle.⁵ It is not enough to describe and predict what my body will do, I must also explain and understand my behavior. That this cannot be done in a precise, quantitative fashion is no reason for not doing it in an imprecise, qualitative fashion. The physicist will deal with bodies in motion, not in their role as people, but in their roles as bodies. Human behavior need not enter into his theories, but it will still be there: a great class of phenomena to be understood and explained. Purpose will not be removed from the world: it will merely be, for some purposes, dispensable.

We will need to choose; we will have purposes in our lives. Physics cannot deprive us of this, nor can it relieve us of it, as hard as it is to make some choices. This comprises a vast subject matter for the

social sciences, an area not accessible to the physical scientist. Human beings are this subject matter. Physics cannot deal with human beings because (I will say this one more time) human beings not only have things happen to them, they do things.

The social sciences, then, will have to be inexact. Aristotle's virtue of "equity," the knowledge of when to take exception to a general law, is the social scientist's prime virtue. Inasmuch as it is human behavior, it needn't have been that way. No general law completely covers this, or any, case. No general law will enable us to predict what someone will *do*.

If you choose not to call these endeavors scientific, well and good: they are not scientific. But whatever they are called, they are legitimate endeavors. They are there to be done, and if the social scientists refuse to deal with them, or leave them undone in their efforts to become physicists, then someone will do them. The poets and novelists will fill the void, in much the same way that the social scientists have taken over normative ethics, following the philosopher's abdication of that realm. And, I fear, the results will be every bit as disastrous.

Philosophy and the social sciences. That was the topic that was set for me. What can philosophy do for the social sciences? The answer is not clear. What precedes this is an example of philosophical analysis. Does it help the social scientist at all? It certainly must seem like chopping off heads to save souls, but let's, in a spirit of charity, look at it as a case of slapping hands to prevent their being burned.⁶

FOOTNOTES

¹ In a sense we can obtain knowledge from the accident which will help us to govern our future behavior, but as I shall show, this is literally the exception that proves the rule.

² Actually, it is easier to show that my arguments apply to "behavioral" sciences than to "social" sciences, but the difference is, from the point of view of this chapter, merely one of nomenclature. If there is a difference between them, then I claim that my arguments apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to both.

³ When there is no *reasonable* purpose, we sometimes invent one: a sub-conscious purpose, or something of that sort, saying, "He did it; he must have had a reason (purpose, goal, end, motive), even if he is unaware of it." He must have

had a reason for what he did; we cannot understand it without a reason. Or even better: the case of the rationalization. Even he didn't know the real reason for what he did. The reason he gave doesn't explain his behavior, but he did it and so must have a reason, so we proceed to supply one that does explain his behavior. Don't people have reasons for *everything they do*, even if they are not aware of these reasons, or at any rate of the real reasons?

⁴ Except sometimes. And even here it is used in a metaphorical way, being mostly used to talk about the "misbehavior" of a physical object. As, "the behavior of the planet is not in accordance with our predictions; it is as if it had a mind (and purposes) of its own."

⁵ Aristotle's mistake was in treating planets as if they were human. Our mistake is one of overcorrection.

⁶ In what precedes, all the out-and-out blunders are, of course, mine, and I proudly claim my usual excesses; but, alas, I fear that little more than these is original. As the concept of teleology becomes once again respectable in philosophical circles, such analyses are becoming more frequent in the journals and books. Such a book is by A. R. Louch [*Explanation and Human Action*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.], who in class and in many discussions led me to my present position. The connection of this problem to the problems of free-will and determination, and emergence and reductionism in Biology, is, of course, apparent.

JAMES F. WARWICK

Social Art

THE INTENTION HERE IS TO OUTLINE WHAT ART, AS A STRONG humanistic and personal source of interest, offers to the social studies; but one cannot avoid mention in passing some of the unique problems art faces in education today. It may seem unfair to address what art can offer the social studies and preface this with an admission that art itself has problems. But if art and social studies are to be engaged then their interest in each other means they both must recognize and share art's problems if their marriage is to be fruitful.

These problems as they are noted here reflect particularly on art but they are endemic to any educational interest that holds a personal and social emphasis. It is altogether too simple, certainly superficial, and probably false, merely to list the measures of art values, outline a few of the relationships that can be made to social studies — and leave it go at that. What art offers, or what it can offer, to the social studies is a much more complex consideration. Most assuredly art cannot contribute much if it is considered a handmaiden, merely an-

other teaching aid, somewhat in the nature of an overhead projector. Such an approach only compounds the abuses art is now subjected to, without regard to any relationship with another area.

Many of these abuses, in their most immediate forms, can be traced to the tremendous impetus scientific education in the United States has received in recent years. It is easy to point to Sputnik as the spark, but perhaps not as easy to recognize that the challenge it provoked stemmed more from its affront to this country's sense of superiority than from the fact that it existed. The challenge has since been met but the burning implications which that bright little metal ball ignited have not diminished. The consequences have been profound for the sciences, for the humanities — and for art. Science and math have continued to receive the bulk of public and private monies, in enormous amounts. They have also received some unfair criticism from the humanities.

Science wisely, when accorded a feverish national interest, undertook a thorough study of its educational program and redesigned its offerings to satisfy this interest. As a result science and math courses are undoubtedly the most contemporary and professionally realistic subjects in the curriculum today.

This forced reappraisal and improvement both of many other subjects, as to content and manner of presentation. In spite of this the humanities have been strangely immune. A revolution is taking place in secondary education, but the humanities are not participating. As G. Scott Wright has noted, *There has been almost no demand for change in the humanities from within the education profession.*¹ He continues, and the point is especially important here, *The most notable silence has come from the music and art departments.*² Art has no one to blame but itself. It is getting — or not getting — what it deserves.

One view would suggest that art, having survived in the face of the competition that science has made for public attention, is doing a good job. Another view, perhaps harsher but more direct and meaningful, would have to acknowledge that art has survived through no effort of its own. Indeed, it may be said that art owes its existence to a benign sufferance by educational administrators largely indifferent

to it. Even more unfortunate, art teachers in turn appear equally indifferent to their status, and the status of their subject. With very few exceptions art is not considered to have any particular importance in the over-all school program.

Art teachers seem content to operate within the framework of what have been their traditional educational considerations. This is not to say that these considerations may not be, by themselves, entirely appropriate. For most, however, this is a severely circumscribed delineation. Art teachers have not raised strident voices in reaction to increasing compromises.

When a choice is to be made between art and, let us say, an enhanced scientific program, it is art that places second. Parents still want their children to have, however it may be phrased, "culture," "taste," or "esthetic experiences," but not, one can be sure, if they are then likely to make lower college board scores. School boards and school administrators, just as surely, weigh their programs in light of these parental (and community) concerns. Put another way, good schools are considered to be those from which a high percentage of students go on to college. By popular implication — and current practice — this has come to mean those schools in which the curriculum provides "solid academic" training — and seldom is art, music, drama, or dance considered in this category. Languages and literature, interestingly enough, are usually included.

It must be admitted that art may be found at all levels of education, but this is liable to be a misleading indication of the value in which it is held. As Harry Broudy has pointed out, *Virtually all public schools offer some instruction in art and music, but in fewer than 15 percent of our secondary schools are music and art required for graduation. This is a rough but not insignificant measure of our success in making music and art first-class citizens in the curriculum domain; the mistress has not yet become a wife.*³

Depressing still further any hope that art can surface is the heavy millstone most colleges have bound to it by denying art as a suitable admissions experience. While few colleges give any credit to art for admissions, most, paradoxically, require that it be taken once a student is admitted.

If the values of art are certain then this must extend to all secondary students and not just the few now involved. The solution does not lie merely in making art a requirement for all high school students. One must agree with Foshay when he said, *The teaching of art in these times will have to consist of the same combination of evocativeness and disciplined activity that is characteristic of the best contemporary teaching in the rapidly reforming academic fields.*⁴

ART AS AN EDUCATIVE FORCE

However its educational values may be expressed, be it George Bernard Shaw declaring that "art is the only teaching except torture" — or the college student claiming that the value of art lies in its "capacity to impart ascendingly sophisticated levels of awareness" — art clearly possesses values, and clearly belongs in the school curriculum. No one seriously disputes that art can be an enormously powerful educative force. Susanne K. Langer has suggested the fundamental strength of this force. *All thinking begins with seeing; not necessarily through the eye, but with some basic formulations of sense perception, in the peculiar idiom of sight, hearing, or touch, normally of all the senses together. For all thinking is conceptual, and conception begins with the comprehension of Gestalt.*⁵

Art teachers may differ amongst themselves as to the relative importance of particular objectives, but few have any basic disagreements over the broad tenets of art education. Which is to say that it must serve as a vehicle for the development of individual creative potentialities. What has not been resolved of course is how best to do this nor, with any certitude, the number, title, and order of various art purposes. Indeed, listing, labeling, categorizing, enumerating, and reaffirming "goal" in art education has long been a trend for writers in the field. Some of these writers do so ably, directly, and sensibly, while others are wont to frame their message in an embarrassing tone of religiousity. Ann Jones is among the former, and has listed a half dozen reasons why art should be taught.

1. *Serve primarily the purpose of appreciation in general.*
2. *Develop taste for the things that have been recognized as outstanding in art, particularly paintings and sculpture.*

3. Lay the groundwork for the development of fine and commercial artists.
4. Explore possible interests and talents in various fields of art.
5. Develop interest in skills in one or more media of artistic expression that would carry over to leisure and hobby aspects of life.
6. Develop an intellectual understanding of the place of art in civilization — its history and contributions, including the types of art in the various cultures.⁶

Threaded through these six reasons are numerous abstract *raisons d'être* for art. It is these intangibles that provide the grist for much of the material in professional journals. They can be all-embracing, open-ended, posed, posited, and praised or punished without fear — although not without some folly. No cynicism is intended; most writers are undoubtedly sincere in their themes. The point is, merely, that art is not without certain reasonable limitations in classroom practice. This is even more apparent when it is correlated with other subjects. It ought not to be considered man's grand solution, the sole, whole answer. An argument is made here for holding conscious only a few selective, major values. Before noting some of these values, and why they might be selected, two reasons are advanced here for limiting the number employed.

The first is drawn from an observation Edwin Ziegfeld — one of the most able spokesmen in art education — has made: *In general, art education is responsible for perpetuating the values of a culture. At the present time, the values implicit in art education complement — or even oppose — current values, rather than support them.*⁷ His comment is not without substantial basis.

The past few years have witnessed some of the most significant events in history. We have seen underscored the magnificence of man's achievements, and his capacity for irrational stupidity and execrable behavior. Man has developed thermonuclear power, which can be employed to ease the burden of millions or to extinguish tens of thousands of lives in one horrendous flash. Given these "choices" man proceeds, at the quicker pace, to design still larger devices of destruction. We rightly lauded the discovery of a polio vaccine, but then haggled over its distribution. More recently, when two astro-

nauts were in danger of losing their lives, some of the most vocal reactions were from television viewers complaining of the news coverage. This had prevented them from viewing their favorite TV programs, among which, ironically, was one titled, "Lost in Space." Art cannot guarantee that it will be instrumental in producing more responsible citizens. But to the extent that it can develop personal sensitivities, which presumably find some reflection in a more humane sense of responsibility — then it may. With the conviction that the values in art are proper, and that many of those widespread in society today are not, art must rigorously hold to its convictions if it, and society ultimately, is to survive.

The second reason, abiding the need of the first, would limit the values used to those contiguous to the purposes of the program planned. Efforts to subscribe to all of the values attributed to art are liable to entail attention to some that parallel others. A few, positive in themselves, may work as counterforces in operation. For example, art may be said to have an interpretive value and also have a recording value. When both are in effect it is difficult to interpret and record without risking a dichotomous confusion. Finally, a few values ascribed to art, quite frankly, would have to be considered negligible in certain contexts.

The catalog of art's values — or the personal qualities it draws from the individual — is a full one. It is important to note that while some may be passive inherent factors in art, considerably more influence is exerted by those requiring the individual's active involvement. Art provides a means for expression, communication, interpretation, discovery, awareness, etc. It intensifies, clarifies, unifies, and it requires perception, spirit, and sensitivity. All of these in turn mean that involvement with art should be enthusiastic and dynamic. Obviously only a random few values have been mentioned here. Which of these from among the many should be chosen for special emphasis depends on the purposes of the particular program. It is doubtful that any one could be inappropriate to most learning situations.

For illustration two of these are noted. Both would seem to afford the basis for an unusually beguiling course correlating art and social studies. These two are the premiums placed on 1) intuition, and 2)

individuality (or uniqueness). Art depends heavily on intuition. This is one of its most attractive features. While art has no corner on this particular market, it is probably fair to say that it has polished this facet in more glittering fashion than any other creative activity. In art the individual can function successfully on an almost entirely intuitive level. Unlike other creative means, be they drama, literature or, to a slightly lesser extent dance, art does not require a subscription to a large body of codified, technical, and often rigid study of basic mechanical skills. This is not to say that art does not have a storehouse of considerable skills — as witness the facile abilities of a good commercial artist. It is quite apparent that it does require, at certain levels, highly skillful performance. Rather, it is to suggest that the foundations of art activities, as distinct from the judged product, don't demand typical training in "motor mechanics." One may participate in art with great enjoyment and a measure of success without formalized study. It has been suggested that one widely familiar academic approach may be self defeating.

The historical approach is the easiest way to teach a humanities course and the most academically respectable. It is also the least effective. This is not to say that we ignore history but the implications of humanities courses are not to teach history but to humanize people, and the arts touch and move people when they are involved not only with their minds but with their senses and their feelings.⁸

It is for this reason in part that the art work of children captivates adult interest. Interestingly enough this adult interest is based on criteria for which the child is wholly ignorant and uninterested.

The second of these is individuality — which is still another of art's strengths. Art places a high order of value on the expression of individuality and its corollary, uniqueness. It is a conspicuous requirement in virtually every form of art. Its value seems self-evident. A vehicle through which man may employ his individuality offers him an unparalleled opportunity to come to know himself, and to appreciate his uniqueness.

Having noted some of the problems art faces in the curriculum, and its value otherwise as an educative force, one may turn to consider what art offers to the social studies.

THE CORRELATION OF ART AND SOCIAL STUDIES

Few teachers of social studies and art would deny that there is a valuable relationship between their respective fields. Each would say that either art or social studies can offer an enormous fount of support and direction to the other, and in so doing aid itself as well. These relationships between subjects — the contribution each is said to be able to make to the other — have developed into a kind of sacrosanct litany in educational discourse. Like so much in education it is hollered more than hallowed, voiced more by habit than with any serious intent to be honored.

Not surprisingly, few have addressed the relationship between art and social studies in any planned and protracted program. In spite of all that may be said outlining the value of art and social studies as subject interests deeply interrelated with social and individual concerns, little has been done to fuse these areas in classroom practice. The typical school administrator, like the teachers of one of these subjects, rarely gets beyond wishful speculation. The reasons, lamentably, are simple enough. It takes more than expressed intention to relate these fields meaningfully for learning purposes. Even within the most accommodating circumstances it is not easy.

A good working relationship takes considerable effort and energy. Further, and this point, with what has preceded, is important for what follows, it takes planning. It is absolutely imperative for any social studies course endeavoring to incorporate art to weave the art values to be utilized tightly within the structure of the program. For example, the aforementioned opportunities art offers for developing intuitive reasoning, and its emphasis on expressions of individuality, might be exercised. Most desirably, all of art's values (and problems) must be underlying conscious concerns in planning and in operation.

Any contribution of effective art to social studies requires that three factors in planning be recognized and resolved. First, the enthusiasm that usually attends the initial proposal to incorporate art in the social studies program has to be strong and self nourishing. This means that while the proposal will gain greatly from administrative support, it is much more important that the teachers involved sincerely want to join forces. At this stage much depends on the extent

to which the art and social studies teachers agree that an educational value exists in their relationship. Merely acceding to a proposal to incorporate because it is novel, or administratively possible, isn't worth the time it takes to voice an agreement to try it.

The second factor is a close reflection of the first. Strong enthusiasm by itself is not enough. This must be tempered with a willingness to establish and maintain a cooperative, long range, continuous, and flexible plan of programming.

The third factor is perhaps not quite so obvious. The program that is ultimately formulated should posit goals that are both reasonable in expectation and attainable within the particular educational environment. Whatever these goals are they should be defined in the planning, and diligently sought for in the program. In addition progress toward these goals should be clarified at stages throughout the program. Without some sort of measure, both preassessed and in progress, the combination runs the risk of developing apathy.

Failing any one of the three factors mentioned (and these are only the most general) will likely mean a failure of the program. In view of the effort required to meet all three, it is not surprising that few educationally sound and workable programs correlating art and social studies can be found. Many plans inflated only with high hopes have not been able to get off the ground. A few that have, improperly ballasted, never returned. Briefly reiterated, the contribution art is able to make to the social studies depends heavily on these planning factors being met. Then, as it is employed, art should hold to a few simple considerations for maximum value.

Art ought to be used as an active involving aspect of the social studies class. That is, students should work with art in some media that oblige them to undertake some kind of physical execution. By implication this means that little time should be spent in passive slide presentations, or overhead projections, etc. Unfortunately, when art is a physical activity in the class, the manner in which it is used often abuses what value it has. Instead of being a contributing force it negates social studies learning.

For example, having students paint with popular, commercially prepared oils or tempera, in the "style" of African natives may be a well intentioned requirement, but it is a superficial one. It is false to art

and it is false to social studies. An imposed style is foreign to art, it is undoubtedly foreign to the student, and the medium being used is clearly foreign to the culture being studied. There is very little chance that the student gains anything from such an exercise.

Even more blatantly superficial than "style guides" are the cute, teacher-directed evidences of creativity. Some of these teacher "suggestions" have entailed the construction of Indian villages with "teepees" made from conical soda cups, and "pioneer" forts made from ice cream sticks glued on end — and so on. Not only do these impose on the students' desire for individual expression, but they severely tax any chance the student has, through art, to develop an intuitive grasp of the area being studied.

It would seem more appropriate to study in depth a single facet of a minor part of one tribe. With this approach then make a head-dress or leggings with thong and bone. So also, investigate the layout and construction of pioneer forts and Indian dwellings, and discover what is peculiar to various dwellings of various times in various cultures. Is there a unifying factor? Does this find reflection in a social structure — and finally, can this be illustrated? Rather than have students make model forts have them investigate the nature — and design — of the tools available at the time. Could the student then make one of the more simple tools, or attempt to redesign and improve one of these tools? Wouldn't this kind of art activity foster an intuitive sense of historical or cultural relationship? Wouldn't it also profoundly impress upon the student both particular and general learnings?

Without doubt the widest use of art in social studies is found in the making of pictorial murals — and perhaps this is suitable enough. But one can't help but wonder about the potential for student interest — and learning — with the pictorial concept projected slightly. Imagine, for example, a class in government following step by step through the stages of candidate for public office covers, with the class preparing promotional material: posters, bulletins, billboards, booklets, press releases, etc. Besides involving research into voting groups, election patterns, etc., it would also entail study of the ways in which a candidate could best be "promoted." It could easily include the study

of ways in which candidates have been promoted, and ways in which they are now being promoted. Obvious in this study would be the changes that have taken place from the past to the present. Also, when actually preparing material, one sees much more clearly the reasons why issues, or "approaches" that may be important in small Midwest towns are unimportant in large metropolitan areas in the East. Needless to say, all of these concepts would take on added significance if the project were undertaken with a real local or school elective office. Finally, but not incidentally, why not have students prepare and illustrate their own book for a subject, that would otherwise be rendered as a mural? One may conclude that having used art in this way students would not soon forget the reason for its use.

Rather than have students make cardboard outlines of states how much more telling might the art use be if they were to devise from their studies a model showing all of the requirements for an ideal port. Rather than coloring — on a teacher prepared mimeograph — "all the corn states in yellow," why not attempt a mosaic made exclusively from actual fragments of products from the areas studied? One could go on; the examples — the possibilities — are endless.

Some of these suggestions may seem to bear little relation to art as it is widely viewed, and typically used. Whether they do or do not correspond to a popular concept is not the point, of course. The broad illustrations cited are offered here as support for the belief that art can make a contribution to the social studies. Further, if art is to be used it must be employed in a more educationally germane fashion, and without violating certain basic values in art.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Wright, G. Scott. "A Direction for the Arts in High School." *Eastern Arts Quarterly* 2: 15; No. 3, January-February 1964.

² *Ibid.*

³ Broudy, Harry. "Aesthetic Education in the Secondary School." *Art Education* (Journal of the National Art Education Association) 18: 24; No. 6, June 1965.

⁴ Foshay, Arthur W. "Art and Its Relationship to the Other Disciplines." *Eastern Arts Quarterly* 2: 16; No. 4, April-May 1964.

⁵ Langer, Susanne K. *Philosophy in a New Key*. New York: Penguin Books, 1942. p. 216.

⁶ Jones, Ann. "Art in the Curriculum." *The High School Curriculum*. (Edited by Karl R. Douglass.) New York: The Ronald Press, 1964. p. 510.

⁷ Ziegfeld, Edwin. "Emerging Trends in Art Education." *Eastern Arts Quarterly* 1: 8: No. 3, January-February 1963.

⁸ Ziegfeld, Edwin. "Guest Editorial." *Art Education* (Journal of the National Art Education Association) 18: 2; No. 8, November 1965.

CLARENCE POWELL

Words

SINCE LANGUAGE IS THE MAIN SET OF TOOLS USED IN ATTEMPTING to develop an awareness in individuals of their significance in the social order, we should place it under close scrutiny with the aim of capitalizing on its potentialities and also of realizing its shortcomings. "Language barrier" and "communication problem" are not just terms which apply to a session of the United Nations; they apply to the labor meeting, to the classroom, and to the argument between Jack and Betty. In short, they apply to any situation where there is an attempt to transfer ideas among human beings. "Exactly what do you mean by that?" is invariably a legitimate question. Just as beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder, so meaning lies in the mind of the speaker or writer, and there it is likely to remain unless the language skill employed is commensurate with the complexity of the idea.

We can only guess at the impact of linguistic misunderstandings among nations on the course of history; all we know is that it has been terrific and tragic. Equally tragic on a smaller scale are the mis-

understandings caused by ignorance or misuse of language in our everyday affairs. One of the important factors in the development of a person is the manner in which he interprets his language experiences; his attitudes and subsequent actions are strongly influenced according to his understanding of what he has heard and read.

In the process of transferring an idea, it would seem that the responsibility for success or failure must rest on the party with whom the thought originates. It is up to the instructor to seek and find a common ground of understanding, to compensate for any language deficiency on the part of the students by more skillful manipulation of his own language capabilities. This responsibility varies not only with the importance of the idea, but also with the number of people involved; so for the teacher it becomes most imperative that ideas be well defined. Since each art and science, each trade and profession contributes its own dialect to a modern language, the result is a vocabulary of such scope that it is hopeless for the teachers of language to do more than deal with the common ground. Therefore it is up to each discipline to assume responsibility for its own terms and their uses, clarifying them to newcomers and outsiders as the need arises. In the field of social studies, as in some others, this presents a most difficult problem because so many of the terms are open to such a variety of interpretations. The term "factoring" in mathematics designates a definite concept, universally shared by students in this field; but this is not the case in the use of such a term as "freedom." Here the user of the term is obliged to define his understanding of its implications with further terms that are more familiar.

At first glance it seems obvious that every reflective person is aware of the problems of language, but this is a presumption which is true only in part. There is a common tendency to recognize problems as they exist for others but not as they exist for ourselves. Our meaning is clear to us when we transmit a message; if it is not received with perfect understanding, we are inclined to place the blame on the other fellow's language deficiency. The same holds true in reverse; if we fail to "get the message," it is because of incoherency or poor choice of terms on the part of the sender. The many scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of language have left cer-

tain signposts and warning lights to guide us in this eternal struggle to make our meanings known. By observing them, the social studies field could approach its own problems with the assurance of more satisfactory results.

RELATING LANGUAGE TO EXPERIENCE

In order to convey any meaning, whether it be the semantic meaning of a single word or the complicated syntactical meaning of a large group of words, language must be related to experience, using the latter term in its broadest sense. Herein lies one of the major difficulties of language usage. "Pain" would have no meaning to one who had never experienced it except the idea of unpleasantness which language could convey, nor would "green" have meaning to anyone who had been blind from birth. We are involved in an endless round of situations in which language becomes just so many sounds because it is not tied in with experience common to both parties. The layman is frustrated by the doctor's explanation of an illness; the customer, by the garageman's diagnosis of the car trouble. This particular difficulty cannot be classed as a fault of modern language; rather, it results from failure to make use of language in an effective manner.

Because he must deal with so many abstract concepts, the social studies teacher is forced to use considerable ingenuity in handling language if he is to relate the terms used to the experience of his class. The problem here is further complicated because of the variance of individual experiences and the urgency to touch on one which is common to all individuals in the class. Too often the problem is dismissed with the introduction of definitions which are also meaningless to the individual and accomplish nothing more than to test the memory span. If the new word "arbitration" is defined as "mediation" and there is no concept of the latter term, it is simply the senseless substitution of one unknown for another, and certainly the matching of the two terms on an examination question is no proof of understanding.

Let us examine some of the well-known but often overlooked devices whereby modern language can bridge the gap between ex-

perience and a new concept. In order to make their contents understandable, social studies texts in general rely mainly on a choice of vocabulary suitable to the grade level; presumably they leave to the teacher the responsibility of translating difficult concepts into the range of pupils' experience. Like any technician or mechanic, we should know the tools of our trade. However, just to know a tool is inconsequential if this knowledge is not accompanied by the ability to recognize situations where it can be employed to greatest advantage.

USE OF SIMILES AND ANALOGIES

The use of similes and analogies is one of the most valuable aids which language can offer in establishing the relationship between a new idea and experience. The beatniks have abused the word "like" but we must give them credit for recognizing the power of the word. Many of the terms which social science uses lend themselves readily to this technique.

Children are introduced at an early age to such concepts as "containment," "coexistence," and "reciprocity," and are personally involved in situations exemplifying these concepts. The particular *labels* may be unknown, but the fundamental understanding of the concepts is there and provides a base of experience which can give meaning to the new terms when there are analogies drawn. We can give shape to the concept of "arbitration" by pointing out the similarity between arbitration of a labor dispute and the settlement by a referee of an argument in a ball game. Likewise, the word "caucus" acquires some significance when we show it analogous to a group of students discussing potential candidates for a school or club office.

In contrast to definition by citing meaningful parallels, it is sometimes expedient and effective to define a term by exclusion, to assign meaning by showing what the term does *not* mean rather than what it does mean. Our language is replete with words which embody negation by means of prefixes. Many of these words have acceptable synonyms, but others like "imperceptible" and "non-partisan" do not. "Perfect health" is well described as a state of being not subject

to any physical or mental disorder. "Free enterprise" can be defined as business which is not state-owned.

In modern language there is a flexibility which permits expression of most ideas in a wide variety of terms and syntactical arrangements. Consider the following ways in which a relatively simple idea can be expressed:

Every citizen should exercise his voting prerogative.

No one should be apathetic to the election of public administrators.

Voting when possible is a requisite of good citizenship.

Failure to vote is a rejection of citizen responsibility.

There is an obligation for each citizen to vote.

It is every citizen's duty to use his voting privilege.

If it is possible to vote, you should do it.

Everyone ought to vote if he can.

This is but a beginning; there seems to be no end to the possibilities of re-phrasing without straying too far from the fundamental idea. Obviously, in selecting from any such range of expression we must consider the experience of the group addressed and also which expression is likely to carry the maximum emphasis. The fate of the message would be uncertain if we were to presume that eighth or ninth grade pupils would have a clear conception of such terms as "prerogative," "apathetic," or "requisite;" conversely, these terms might have greater impact on students with more language experience.

Some abstract terms can best be exposed by describing their purpose or function, or by describing the conditions which the terminology implies. This type of term usually stands alone without benefit of synonym to accurately describe it. The necessary explanation is not always as complicated as in the case of philosophical "-isms," where one or more volumes might be required. But it is difficult to get across the meaning of "diplomacy," "filibuster," or "embargo" except in terms of purpose or function. Likewise, "protocol," "boondoggling," and "impasse" demand definition by a description of the conditions which the terms represent. We could say that "protocol" is a kind of etiquette and that "embargo" is a kind of prohibition, which would give some general meaning to the words; however, to pinpoint the meaning, there still remains the need to differentiate

among the various forms of etiquette and the myriad types of prohibition.

We could describe our own language as being "synonym-happy" because it is unsurpassed in this respect. Whether this is a boon or curse is debatable. There are so many meanings traveling under so many aliases that they often go unrecognized. Each of us has his particular pets in these synonym families and at times is guilty of putting meaning in jeopardy by a selection of words which disguise rather than expose the idea that he is trying to convey. Frequently we can connect a word of doubtful meaning with one of its better-known synonyms, thereby ensuring a better chance for recognition and at the same time teaching vocabulary. The sense of the phrase "parochial viewpoint" would be lost to many people; "parochial or restricted viewpoint" would reach a greater number, and probably "parochial or narrow viewpoint" would reach the vast majority.

However, this technique has its limitations. A writer or speaker cannot be continually listing all available synonyms for the words he uses; it would sound like a recitation from the thesaurus and the continuity of thought would be lost. On the other hand, when a reader or listener is confronted with too many unknown terms, not only the meaning but usually some or all interest in the topic under discussion is lost. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is that a knowledge of the language experience of any group addressed is of prime importance.

PROBLEMS IN VOCABULARY

Since he is constantly introducing or interpreting new words or phrases as a necessary means to an end, the social studies teacher must consider himself as a part-time teacher of "foreign" language insofar as vocabulary is concerned. An unknown is an unknown in any language, and estimates place at least 95 percent of English words in this category for the average native adult. Whether or not the new word to be learned is English, French, or Latin, fundamental learning techniques are equally applicable.

Using New Words

In modern language study the most effective technique for vocabulary building is not to concentrate on word lists *per se*, but to make use of new words in exercises which provide a normal and meaningful setting. This technique can be tailored to fit almost any type of instruction or testing in social studies. It does not demand any sacrifice of time to course content if the exercises are based on the topic being studied; it merely emphasizes the new terms so that they may become part of the working vocabulary. In other words, this is nothing more than giving a "new look" to the age-old technique of repetition.

In line with the modern philosophy of education, we are trying to inject some meaning into words which are meaningless when they stand alone. We can dispose of the word "vacillating" by the dictionary definition "uncertain, wavering, indecisive, irresolute," but the question persists: Irresolute what? The mind cannot grasp a state of pure "irresoluteness." Something has to *be* "vacillating" for the word to have any meaning. When it is linked with Congress, Southeast Asia policy, or the State Department's attitude toward NATO, the word comes to life.

Every teacher of any experience is aware that repetition is the essence of vocabulary building, but we are inclined at times to overlook the fact that a new word or phrase may have to be used or encountered several times before it becomes a permanent fixture. Unlike many things, new words cannot be tucked away for safekeeping. We cannot just introduce a new term today and expect it to be recognized weeks from now unless there has been some use made of it between times.

Prefixes and Suffixes

Any time given to a study of prefixes and suffixes is well spent because some vocabularies, notably English and German, contain such a large percentage of words using one or both of these devices. They are not so numerous that they require a prohibitive amount of time to learn. A knowledge of prefixes can serve as a key to unlock the

meaning of countless new words without recourse to the dictionary.

In this area of language, teachers of social studies may be justified in any feeling they might have regarding language deficiency on the part of their students; not enough time and emphasis are given to it in relation to its importance. The following words were noted in a short space of social science reference work: consensus, ambivalent, aberrant, counterforce, intermediary, disparate. Certainly the prefixes mean nothing in themselves, but if there is any knowledge of the stem meanings, they give us a clear sense of direction as to how those meanings are applied. The learning of prefixes is one of the few short-cuts to vocabulary; learning to dissect the words containing them will pay satisfactory dividends for the time invested.

In order to realize the greatest benefits possible and to reduce misunderstandings to a minimum, social science teachers must keep in mind that language is by no means a perfect instrument for communication. In spite of its great flexibility, the coinage of new words to meet new situations, and the borrowing from one tongue to another, there remains an inadequacy which defies remedy.

The faults are not too consequential in our everyday affairs where repeated contacts have established mutual understandings about certain terms; in this area language is generally sufficient. But the fallacies of language are pronounced in the realm of abstracts and effectively set up blocks to understanding which no amount of skillful manipulation can entirely overcome. An abstract concept in one mind cannot be transmitted to another mind without some distortion. The argument here is: not only should social studies teachers maintain a constant awareness of the equivocal nature of the terms of language, but also it is their responsibility to develop this realization in their students. Much of the confusion in communication could be cleared up by a universal acceptance of the fact that concepts cannot be neatly packaged and labeled like items in a supermarket.

Mental Images

Interpretation of meaning is dependent upon experience. Since no two people have identical experiences, the mention of an apparently simple term can convey countless different connotations to as many

people. Even though two people may share in a common experience, the resulting emotions may be entirely different, and therefore any term referring to that experience will take on different shades of meaning. Psychiatry makes good use of this fact in attempting to define an individual's emotions.

When we consider the ambiguity of even the simplest words, we must wonder how we understand each other as well as we do. A simple auxiliary word like "of" has several varied meanings; it may convey the idea of place, time, material, or possession, and this list is not exhaustive. Everyone knows what the word "tree" means. That is, he knows what it means to *him* in the light of the experience. To the lumberman it may mean board feet; to the birdlover, a sanctuary for his pets; to the farmer, a source of revenue from its fruits. It cannot have the same connotation to a man accustomed to enjoying its shade that it does to a man who has just rammed his car into it.

When a simple word like this, denoting a familiar concrete object, can effect such a variety of mental images, it gives us some idea of the latitude of interpretation possible when we advance to terms more complex and controversial. It cannot be taken for granted that, when certain terms are loosely passed around, they are going to make the same exact impression on any two minds.

Let us poll a class; one representing an economic cross-section, on the question: What is your idea of a living wage? "Living wage" to a youth who has had an abundance of money to indulge his whims may mean just that; but to the fellow from a large family with low income it may mean only a modest amount above the absolute necessities. There are always stock answers to poignant questions like this one, answers which substitute one equivocal term for another. We may talk about a good standard of living and agree that a "living wage" is one which provides for the maintenance of this standard. However, the definition does not evoke a common mental image because "good standard of living" implies a nonexistent agreement on the point where necessity ends and luxury begins.

Syntactical Meaning

When we put ambiguous terms in a setting where syntactical meaning is also involved, meaning can become as elusive as a greased

fig. This is evident each time the Supreme Court hands down a split decision. Here we have a small body of men with proven capabilities and extensive experience in their field, and yet they are unable to agree on the interpretation of our laws.

It has been claimed that we respect the sovereignty of other nations. Whether or not the claim is valid depends on the interpretation. Let us take a closer look at the statement "We respect the sovereignty of other nations." First, do we mean that we occasionally, usually, or always respect the sovereignty? Next, what do we consider to be a nation? Does Red China fall in this category, or did the Congo at the moment of independence? Then, what do we mean by "respect?" In examining this word for meaning, we will by-pass for the moment the matter of degree, the question of whether we have an insignificant amount of, a little, some, a considerable amount of, average, much, a great amount of, or complete "respect." We now go to the dictionary and substitute the meanings given for the word:

We observe the sovereignty of other nations.

We are concerned with the sovereignty of other nations.

We venerate the sovereignty of other nations.

We value the sovereignty of other nations.

We treat the sovereignty of other nations with deference.

We esteem the sovereignty of other nations.

We consider the sovereignty of other nations worthy of reverence.

We honor the sovereignty of other nations.

We still have not established the meaning of "sovereignty," which is no easy task, nor have we considered the implications contained in the word "respect" due to cause. If the "respect" is generated by fear, we can add: We are afraid of the sovereignty of other nations. But, by "other nations," do we mean "some other nations" or "all other nations?" The combinations possible allow for a host of interpretations between these extremes:

Occasionally we have a little regard for the sovereignty of certain other nations.

We always completely honor the sovereignty of all peoples who are politically organized, who are bound together by a common heritage, and who inhabit a common area.

When the statement which we have been examining is applied to specific situations, the interpretation may be influenced by prejudice of one kind or another; the meaning to different individuals will vary according to the emotions which the statement may evoke.

Exact Degree

Language is predestined to be inadequate for expressing an exact degree of many of its terms. We can say that a certain solution is 30 percent saline and there is a definite understanding concerning the nature of the solution; furthermore, accuracy can be confirmed by chemical analysis. But we have no such convenient yardsticks as percentage to measure many conditions; the extent or degree to which the conditions exist can be shown only as relative to some other degree by the use of a few vague words of comparison.

The way the words "integration" and "poverty" are used, one might think that there was a common understanding as to just what extent a society must be unified to merit the adjective "integrated," and to what extent a family must be economically lacking to qualify as "poverty-stricken." The words "desegregation" and "tolerance" are passed around as though "desegregation" signified an area with well marked boundaries and "tolerance" denoted a quality of invariable value.

We cannot reach agreement either on the point of origin or the ultimate limit of many terms like "tolerant"; therefore it is not surprising that language has no terms to describe accurately the infinite degrees between the extremes. Most of the attributes which can be applied to individuals or groups of people are of such broad scope that they are practically meaningless unless they are qualified. The expressions "tolerant society" and "desegregated society" can be interpreted to mean almost anything. Not only do they fail to indicate the areas to which the attributes apply but also the degree to which they apply. Every society or no society is "tolerant" and "desegregated" in certain areas and to certain degrees.

Time Dimension

Many of the terms of language have a time dimension. As new generations revise values and standards, they assign new meanings to

the old terms which are used to describe those values and standards. In this constant state of flux, old overtones of meaning serve their time and are replaced by new ones. The "courteous" man of today is something different from the "courteous" man of yesterday, and the "modest" girl of today is not the counterpart of her "modest" mother or grandmother. In times past, "speed" meant to ride behind a good trotting mare, and later, to open up the Model T Ford to 45 miles per hour. "Day's work" used to mean at least ten hours and this did not include a prolonged coffee-break; and a hand pump in the kitchen was considered a "convenience."

Some terms have been so abused by modern advertising that their old meanings are barely recognizable. Almost everything is now "super" and we "save" by spending our money. There is an unlimited list of these terms which are effectively communicable only when they refer to a specific point in time in a society's age.

Not only do old terms acquire new meanings but also many old concepts are expressed in new terms, aliases which are used to disguise some unpleasant aspect of the concept or at least to sugar-coat it. The reasons for this switch in terminology are varied but are usually motivated by commercial profit. The unpleasant connotation of "interest payable" has been softened by labeling it "carrying charge"; more proper respect for the dead is suggested by replacing "cemetery" with "memorial park"; sometimes "inflation" is referred to in terms of "expanding economy."

It is evident that an awareness of this time characteristic of language is of utmost importance in translating messages from past eras. There is a shift in the connotations of many words in a single generation, and this shift seems to be accelerating rapidly in step with the other phases of our existence. Failure to recognize this shift in meanings can result in the paradoxical situation where two parties are using the same terms but speaking different languages. It is very apparent that difficulty of translation mounts as the gap in time widens. We do not know exactly what the authors of our Bill of Rights had in mind by "freedom of the press"; we interpret the phrase to meet the exigencies of *our* time.

MISUSE OF LANGUAGE

Syntax is a tricky business and accounts for most of the misuse of language. It is a constant menace which threatens to give an ambiguous twist to our well intentioned meanings. A poor choice of auxiliary words, or a phrase misplaced or omitted often gives meaning a very ludicrous aspect. For example: "The Tories fought with the British." In this statement, "with" is a poor choice; it can be taken to mean either "beside" or "against." "The Senate is now debating on missile bases" suggests a barnstorming session of that legislative body.

Of the other misuses of language, verbosity is a matter of such importance that it demands mention here. When an idea is buried under a mass of verbiage, language often ceases to be an aid to communication and becomes instead a lethal weapon which can kill any interest in the message. It would be advisable for each teacher to read occasionally the restricting clauses of his insurance policies to remind himself of the virtue of conciseness. In this game of hide-and-seek-the-meaning, emphasis is the perennial loser. Meaning can never achieve greater emphasis than on the occasions when it can be presented stark naked.

INCORPORATING LANGUAGE IN TEACHING

Language is every teacher's business. To incorporate its teaching with the teaching of other disciplines is simply a matter of expediency; by raising the level of communication, we profit by a higher level of understanding of our own particular areas of endeavor.

SCOTT HEYMAN

And Music

THERE CANNOT REALLY BE ANY ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THE inclusion of the characteristic musical expression of a region can enrich any social studies curriculum. But the consensus, at least until now, seems to have been that its importance is secondary, not fundamental.

A similar onus has been thrust upon most areas of study which center on man's more personal side — the humanities, social history, the creative arts in general. Matters such as institutional and organizational evolution are dealt with strictly on the plane of their *least* personal implications. Any suggestions which they contain about man's search for himself and for values are shunted as secondary, or if not secondary, too difficult. If the social studies cannot find a way to include the substance that justifies their existence in the schools, then whom are we kidding by retaining their forms and titles?

Political science, economics, history, the behavioral sciences — these are the obvious social studies. The act of dividing social "sci-

ence" into these categories gives teacher and student a helpful focus which should make it easier to grapple with whatever seems basic and meaningful. Yet, the focus often becomes an obsession. Matters literally charged with meaning go begging while rote detail becomes a preoccupation.

Although music is no substitute for other avenues of investigation it does express man's reaction to individual and common experience. Its origins are deeply personal and individual (this is part of the definition of creativity), but composer and performer will always reflect their own society to some degree. There is a universal and a particular to all music; respective weights vary, but both are always present. If they are interpreted cautiously music can open the door to an entirely new dimension of social personality.

Artists in every genre have shown great concern during this century with the deceptive, even reversed, meanings which the tools of their art take on with the passing of time. Novelists have re-assessed the words they took for granted for so long. Hemingway tried to unclutter novelistic prose. Dos Passos, in *U.S.A.*, lamented the perversion of the words that rang true in the Declaration of Independence. Painters have challenged the tyranny of familiar shape and form. Musicians, in their turn, felt and absorbed the shock wave coursing through all areas of creative and analytical thought. But music was in a curious position, and an enviable one. It had, by its nature, a head start in the trend toward the abstract: *An imaginative mind is essential to the creation of art in any medium, but it is even more essential in music precisely because music provides the broadest possible vista for the imagination since it is the freest, the most abstract, the least fettered of all the arts: no story content, no pictorial representation, no regularity of meter, no strict limitation of frame need hamper the intuitive functioning of the imaginative mind.*¹

Fortunately for us all the absence of words and the minimizing of form have not seriously hampered the evolution of a rich, expressive body of works. What is more, the absence of linguistic barriers has permitted music to function as a broader mode of "speech" among men than any other form. Though the music of Africa, the Orient, and the West are easily distinguished, the medium nevertheless en-

joys an absence of divisions into language pockets and national sovereignties which stilt the most sincere efforts in other fields.

There is a wonder that has attached to all artistic creation through the centuries, and none greater than that which music has inspired. It is akin to the wonder that springs from every serious reflection by man on the curious thing called life and the curious world in which it occurs. The ability of patterns in sound to create drama, evoke emotion, and stimulate thought will never yield to the probes of the analyst — they will always be shrouded in the farthest reaches of the "imaginative mind." The children of the American commercial system are seldom anxious to be shown the wonder of the musical tone. But the act of *attempting* to make them anxious is its own justification.

The process of examining the musical creation of a society and of determining what basic characteristics and outlooks are revealed by it is *part* of the larger process of assessing the quality of life fostered by the society. Music, after all, must have *some* relationship to the community from which it emerges — even if its relationship is reversed. Therefore, evaluating it must involve social viewpoint.²

As an obvious example of this, life in the United States and the Western world generally is characterized by a heavy overlay of commercialism and desire for material melioration. This has affected the music of these regions in many ways. If it is judged that commercialism and materialism have not reached unhealthy proportions, it would logically follow that their reflections in music are signs of vitality.³ But if it is felt that a legitimate desire for a better life has been overdone and even perverted to a depersonalized, highly-organized scramble for super-abundance, then it would likewise follow that the same musical developments are unhealthy; some sort of avant-garde movement against the prevailing banality would then be in order.

Most persons who enter the field of education for motives which are not venal (such as security, ease, etc.), see a gap between the world as it is and the world as it could and should be — and they act to close that gap. They therefore would fall into the latter of the categories described above. In consequence, they could deal with the

various phases of, say, American music and be highly critical of some of what they saw.⁴

There is nothing wrong with teaching the body of a society's musical expression through a series of descriptive phrases beginning with "good" and "great"; but to do so involves taking the position that the society itself is "good," etc. This is not to suggest that a society which is largely banal cannot produce works of great merit. But when that which is crass has become the accepted mode of expression, the fact should be brought out. Only by making this distinction can we come to recognize music's natural warmth, beauty, and insight when they do occur.

MUSIC IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM

In music the attempt is made to communicate the infinitely variant shades of drama implied by human life. The forms and rubrics which embellish it, the echoes which artists employ to affirm their fellowship with other artists, the patterns within which it functions — these are merely the externals which aid in this attempt.

The teacher of social studies is in a very direct sense an artist. He, too, attempts to evoke the passion of human life. He seeks to impart to students some of the drama of individual man living in common with others. He strips the social activities of their apparent function and of the apparent motivation which called them into being and (with his students) tries to identify *actual* function and motivation. Teacher and student thus are enabled to confront the human animal as a real being possessing a spirit and a material condition whose drama is as deep as the mind can extend.

Daily affairs hardly seem as charged with meaning as is suggested above. Common life in the twentieth century has seen the isolation of self from inner meanings and the alliance of self with the "busy" world of material melioration within large, faceless organizations. It has frequently been suggested that the failure to grow out of the barbaric cycle of wars dictated that this would occur in an advanced technical age. Passionate expression seldom avoids conflict, a luxury

we cannot afford. So the argument goes. The result is a supreme folly of human history: the tools of destruction are kept and proliferated, and non-material values are sacrificed to them.

In regions which possess the media for mass communication the intense, personal, yet supremely simple melodies of a folk culture and the refined originality of high culture tend to be drowned out by the squawk of "pop" culture. Societies which are obsessed by business and military operations on a monumental scale serve as a poor home for the musically imaginative mind. The boom in construction of cultural centers does not lessen this fact — the arguments which result in their being built hinge on their ability to improve the "climate for business" and new things are seldom attempted in them after their plush seats and massive stages have been dedicated.

Literary men have for several generations been pointing the finger of accusation at the quality of life we foster. From T. S. Eliot to the present, serious writers have asserted that we do not live, or die, or love, or earn a living with any of the grace that the nature of these activities suggests. For saying this they have been labeled "pessimists" but of course they are great optimists since they deem man to have a higher calling. I, too, am highly optimistic. I think young people in their well-publicized search for values will prove receptive to an analysis of their own lives which takes account of man's dignified nature. The musical resources available to the teacher undertaking such an analysis are vast.

All societies have a rich folk musical strain somewhere in their past or present. Recordings of folk music can be played as coordinated parts of lessons which deal with the world's culture regions. They can serve to illustrate the sameness and the variance among the culture areas. They will introduce students to a kind of popular sentiment that enables that which really is noble — work, love, resignation to a different lot — as contrasted to the ennobling, in popular culture, of that which is merely common and base.

Popular music occasionally manages to remain tasteful and somewhat less often even manages to flirt with a deep and dramatic idea. The very feature which separates it from other forms, however, is its

commercialism and its frequently crass employment of mass media to maximize profit potential. The musical play in America and elsewhere shows some signs of evolving a rich lyric form. Serious dramatists are now filtering into the Broadway musical scene. But works such as "Porgy and Bess" and "The Most Happy Fella" which hint of a popular American operatic mode are unique: they appear and several decades pass with no attempt to travel down the paths which they have opened.

Serious forms bring music to a logical full development of its potential. The melodies and rhythms utilized so simply in folk music are refined and developed in the artist's mind. They then are embellished (in Western music) by the tapping of instrumental, harmonic, and structural resource. Twentieth century composers have revised their art to a striking extent. An unfortunate result of this is the common overemphasis on the nineteenth century, central European works, since their melodies are "prettier" and fit the traditional conception of music's function better than the modern forms. Modern orchestrations are not as lush, their harmonies are stubbornly dissonant. Rhythmic innovations, percussive instrumentation, atonality, all are difficult to become accustomed to in a single hearing.

But modern music has paralleled the other plastic and performing arts in its ability to explore the new and untried. It relies on originality of expression rather than on familiarity of mode. It reflects the pulse, and often the chaos, of current life. It sheds a bright light on man's spirit by virtue of its precise command of orchestral resources and by its ability to transcend traditional form.

The complexity of modern works often throws the casual listener by the wayside. Although this is not necessarily a good thing, it is not as bad as if perceptive listeners were being repulsed. But this complexity is highly overrated. Many pieces, e.g., much of Copland's work, are actually simple. But even the most difficult pieces can yield a rich fund of insight to persons without a thorough grasp of techniques. The *avant-garde* of the present would not seem to offer the student much. The clanging of garbage cans and the breaking up of furniture seems uniquely non-musical. But the underlying assumption that music is the progression of sound in time is not violated. No

artistic effort should be disparaged simply because it fails to provide immediate entertainment.

Composers also are currently engaged in the classical problem in art of personal attitude toward the society in which the creative work occurs. Much art is the *expression* of the spirit of its society; about an equal amount is forged on the anvil of *opposition* to its spirit.⁵ This fascinating colloquy could enliven any class discussion. Neither outlook is correct all the time — regardless of the situation — and both are necessary in the long run.

At this point some mention is due of the placing of music in the social studies curriculum. My predilection is for a free-lance approach, i.e., for including bits and pieces whenever they seem relevant. At some point students must be brought to some generalized understanding of technical matters — tonality, form, etc. But none of this *must* occur in a special separate lesson. I shall not press this point, however. If an imaginative approach can be developed in a unified lesson, well and good. Method must suit the individual teacher and the particular situation.

If this chapter seems to have proposed a great deal, I would ask if teaching can legitimately attempt less. The questions which interest scholars and artists are the *only* questions important enough to justify laws which force children to go to school. They are the only questions which look toward an understanding of the human condition, and of the music that encompasses its wonder and mystery.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Copland, Aaron. *Music and Imagination*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. p. 17.

² The whole matter of viewpoints, i.e., approval or disapproval of a society's mode of living, becomes more intense as the student becomes more familiar with the society. In American classrooms criticism of other societies will generally occur only on a superficial level. I would argue that whenever it seems marginally possible, pertinent criticism should be attempted — criticism of the society and of its music. Knowledge without evaluation makes little sense.

³ See, for an example, Lerner, Max. *America as a Civilization*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957.

⁴ An illustration is in order. The state of American music is a matter of hot debate. The consensus is that while it fails to produce enduring masters of the art its over-all health is nevertheless excellent. Yet, the image of the disc jockey ladling appointed "hits" down the throats of obedient teenagers hardly is a healthy phenomenon.

⁵ The flowering of literary culture in Ireland at the turn of the century was sparked by opposition to the heavy hand of the British in the going scheme. Examples of works which are lyrical in their reaction to the prevailing spirit are Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* and Dvorak's hymns to the "new world."

Part Two

...To the Social Studies

88/'89

HAROLD H. NEGLEY

Drawing on the Humanities

THE CHAPTERS IN THE PRECEDING SECTION CONCERN SUBJECTS through which pupils may study the ideas, concepts, and emotions to be found in the humanities. These subjects, along with history, law, and comparative religions, constitute the humanities as the area has been defined.¹ For the most part, the subjects fall within the arts rather than within the sciences. Indeed, most of the impetus for committees on the humanities as well as for course titles containing the term "humanities" has come from cultural arts groups in schools and colleges. Until recently, few teachers of history or the social sciences were involved in restoring the humanities to prominence in the curriculum.

It is in the best humanistic tradition, then, for social studies teachers to examine possible contributions from the humanities with skepticism. Why should the social studies teacher draw on the humanities for ideas, attitudes, or information? Is there an advantage not yet taken? And if reasons to extend the humanities ideas to the general

body of pupils become established, does a question concerning "how to utilize" emerge?

WHY DRAW UPON THE HUMANITIES?

Before deciding to draw upon the humanities (or upon anything else) it seems necessary to define or characterize the social studies and to restate the purpose of their inclusion in the curriculum. A lack of unanimity in defining and in establishing purpose follows any attempt to become more specific than "teaching citizenship." Inculcating citizenship, both in the sense of public participation and in personal observation of rules and restraints is of course the goal of social studies teachers; but sometimes the diffusion of social studies and of citizenship studies so obscures the process through which desirable socialization may take place that almost any activity by social studies teachers seems admissible. There do seem to be several paths through which, it is argued, the direct object of inducting young pupils into our public life may be met.

To a small proportion, the presence of social studies courses in a school's schedule equates with an opportunity to affect behavior through group guidance, sociometrics, or occupational orientation. However, the two philosophic avenues traveled by most social studies teachers proceed through either a social science orientation or a humanistic orientation. In practice, these appear in the typical curriculum alternately or loosely mixed. Like dabs of green on a field of red, there emerge some grey spots and some distinctive borders of green while some of the red field remains.

Within both orientations there are those who speak of the social studies and those who speak of "history and the social sciences." One often cited position is that of Engle.

The social studies begin where the social sciences end. Facts and principles which are the ends in view in the social sciences are merely a means to a further end in the social studies. The goal of the social studies lies not merely in information but in the character of people. The goal is the good citizen.²

Engle's determinations seem clear. The social sciences furnish facts and principles. Facts and principles are utilized in promoting character changes in pupils. The goal of the character change is improved citizenship.

By contrast, Charles Keller says that

*... "social studies" is not a subject. It is a group or federation of subjects: history, geography, political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, often merged in inexact and confusing ways. Furthermore, too many social studies teachers have emphasized the creation of good citizens rather than the content and discipline of their subjects.*³

Keller seems to be emphasizing that improved citizenship is a goal undertaken by all elements of general education and that social studies can bear only part of the burden. The social studies which Keller prefers is humanistic in its orientation; and as he repeatedly says, *"The humanistic approach puts man at the center of things."*⁴

Both writers may be taken as representative of rather loose schools of thoughtful social studies teachers. Both emphasize history. But there is an observable difference in their outlooks. The social science approach is concerned with applying scientific methodology to social questions, and social questions are public in a classical sense. *Public* matters are communicable within groups and between groups. There is little that is unique to a specific individual, and if man is "at the center of things" when social sciences are being utilized, he is there as a member of a particular cultural group exhibiting all of the group characteristics which fit him for being classified. Scientific attempts are made to generalize from the data identified in the conditions, situations, or processes which are examined. Within this orientation, history is useful as an integrating medium for data assembled from social sciences.

The humanistic orientation is more private. History is a record of a series of men, largely Western, with whom each individual can identify. The feelings and facts which emerge from the content of the humanities are intended to unite us across the chasms of time and space much as the shared idiom or insight strengthens a friendship.

The two orientations are not mutually exclusive. Both seek truths whether through intuition or through formal logic. Each relies upon a high degree of abstraction and symbolization characteristic of formal knowledge. And in each orientation, practitioners feature some form of inquiry. The following statement by Tucker seems to capture the essence of both orientations:

What then characterizes an inquiry-centered social studies classroom? *Inquiry connotes an active as contrasted with a passive approach to learning. Such a class is characterized by a seeking, questing, searching attitude. There is an air of excitement which is engendered by confrontation with indeterminate situations. The inquiry classroom is engaged in the positive, forward moving, self-generating "act of discovery."*⁶

It would be no departure from current practice to expect to see two approaches within the same curriculum; for in most courses of study there is history, usually outlined and implemented by history teachers, and social science, implemented by geography, economics, and sociology teachers.

Social studies teachers may justifiably continue to draw upon the humanities. Full cultural treatment of a regional study contains humanistic material. Music, art, and literature combine with social science content to provide a more affective and even different picture than one gets from studying only social order and disorder through sociology, geography, and politics. Ideas and concepts concerning conscience and character emerge from the study of literature and history. Indeed, many of the concepts made explicit in the Great Books Program are there for youthful discoverers in history and the social sciences.

There are some points at which a humanities orientation is superior to all other approaches. Spiritual view-points can be appreciated without being quantified and categorized. Complex and contradictory tendencies of men or of man may be speculated upon. Motives may be inferred. Situations involving group relations, so often more than the sum of their factors, may be viewed holistically. With wisdom, the use of humanistic materials may help us to escape our culture-bounds; but without judgment and foresight, it may simply make our bounda-

ries more enveloping. Philosophy and law may be included in the course of study as fully as the fine arts or the social sciences. Perhaps most importantly, a humanities approach can facilitate an awareness of values.

To be effective, pupils must be made aware of value-choices, of a hierarchy of values as a concept, and of the need for deliberating over value choices as rationally as they can. Of even more importance is the awareness that man must choose courageously, even when choice is fraught with danger. In this connection, the teaching of humanities and social sciences alike have taken on meaning and cruciality since scholars have begun to lead in the social actions of recent years. Conflict and emotional attrition are realities which accentuate the social issues of other days and other places, bringing them closer to us.

Perhaps also a study of the humanities increases the number of perceptions of social situations which a given student may experience from time to time. Caricature and surrealism enlarge upon photographic realism in art. Terms such as *understanding* and *appreciation* have a communicated symbolism which is not so sharply inferred from political history. Increasingly common words in the social studies, as *insight*, for example, can be sharpened in meaning and thus come closer to conveying a particular grasp of intricate interrelationships.

WHAT CAN THE SCHOOLS DO?

An intention to teach the lessons which may be drawn from the humanities leads surely to a discussion of "how to" teach such lessons. This leads in turn to a decision concerning *which* lessons from the humanities. Is the humanities field consensually defined? Is it the content or the spirit of the teacher that predominates in determining where the field lies? These questions are important to educators who believe that course and curriculum decisions may be interrelated with how and what is taught. How anything is used or arranged in elementary and secondary schools is affected by law, custom, and leadership. The experience, training, and indigenous leadership in the faculty limits or enhances the chance for a multi-disciplinary course or

articulation of courses. In general, the attitude and education of the principal will influence the academic climate within a school. A sensitive but unsentimental leader can make a liberal arts tradition acceptable and perhaps desirable.

The question of scheduling and organizing is the same when applied to the humanities as when applied to several other desirable curricular inclusions. Should humanities content be placed in a separate course? Should there be added units within existing courses? Should some form of articulated integration with existing courses be attempted at various grade levels? Don't the usual problems of "broad fields" courses apply here?

A pointed recognition of the humanities orientation accompanies the creation of a humanities course. Here the emphasis cannot be easily diffused and important concepts cannot be neglected without notice being taken. And if the practices of induction, reflection, and analysis-of-situations are to be kept in focus, the integrative field should be either history or literature while art and music become the supportive fields. Literature lends itself to the role of the integrative field because it can be used whether the course is organized around selected eras or selected themes. The choice of history as integrative probably means that the course will eventually become a social history of selected nations or states. Time is likely to do violence to humanities courses through time restrictions upon the choice of content; and time lapses are a burden to curriculum workers, for not long after the course is commenced, there is often only a course title to mark original intentions. In addition, the problem of able teaching at an average cost is too prominent to belabor.

A course organized around several themes is probably most feasible. For example, a humanities course, organized around the themes of *Freedom, Order, Justice, Beauty, Peace, and Love*⁶ offers important social studies themes and recurring literary themes. So long as course planners resist the notion that all fields need treatment in every theme, their planning may avoid efforts that produce contrived content choices. A noticeable problem even with a limited number of themes is the selection of appropriate course content. For example, *Freedom* as a theme could easily be the basis for a semester course. In addi-

tion, content within a course should have continuity of units or topics. Moreover, to treat a theme chronologically may or may not be sensible. The *development* of freedom, when defined in terms of government action, religious practice, and societal taboos makes sense; but does the development of themes commonly found in cultural arts need a chronology? Perhaps the artists and the anthropologists should decide how Love, Beauty, etc., should be presented as subjects of study.

After a group cooperatively develops a separate course, the survival of an intellectual methodology and of the intended emphases of the developers passes into the hands of the teacher or teachers of the course. Cultural arts persons as a group have been predominant in supporting the humanities revival, but their interest and training in inductive thinking and in historiography is usually small. They emphasize projection and their views of the term *appreciation* usually include a feeling that "art is for art's sake" which is incompatible with the deliberate use of the past to understand the present. On the other hand, the essence of much of literature is in "lessons" though they are more often personal than social.

A second way to facilitate learning in the humanities is to organize a sequence of related and relevant courses. Courses in history, art, music, and literature may be arranged in a scheduled sequence during the day. Each course may include common themes, also arranged sequentially, so that pupils study the themes from the varying standpoints of history, art, music, and literature. This kind of articulation is likely to break down unless the school's leadership is very interested. It requires the construction of syllabi which are correlated. It requires close communication between the various teachers. The best place to start planning for such an articulated series of courses, however, may be in the materials center or library where records, films, books, and other materials may be assembled. Then, the courses may be improved by team teaching or by a television program at intervals or by both team teaching and television.

A potential danger in this approach again lies in the teaching process. So much emphasis has to be placed upon the mechanics and organization of such a coordinated set of courses that emphasis upon discovery and induction may give way to emphasis upon thorough

ground-covering of the related content. Guides and bibliographies will not insure that inquiring takes precedence over acquiring facts.

A less sure and less intensive effort to provide a humanities orientation may be made by providing a common guide containing certain concepts, themes, and principles to be found in the humanities area. Departments in the fine and liberal arts would then assume responsibility through separate, autonomous actions for keeping the common concepts or themes before the students enrolled in their respective courses. This approach might have some chance of making an impact upon pupils if the teachers engaged in periodic in-service training sessions deliberately aimed at accentuating and articulating selected concepts from the humanities. A small advantage in this approach lies in the natural facility of in-service training sessions for re-emphasizing the process of induction, generalizing, and analyzing. On the other hand, there is the usual opportunity for the guide to be put away once its community relations value has been exhausted.

An exciting possibility exists in vesting the cultural arts committees being formed throughout the nation with a school-community. Ordinarily these committees do not appear to take account of the place of history — and of history teachers — in considering their new-found opportunities. However, history teachers might become acceptable in many cases and might cooperate in enhancing the comprehensiveness of the committees' efforts. In company with the personnel in libraries, museums, athenaeums, orchestras, and television stations, the committee could conceivably construct a Humanities Center. Efforts to provide information and to inculcate awareness of the humanities could be undertaken, combining school resources and others. Field trips could be coordinated with television specials, thus permitting a combination of total and visual sensory approaches to arts and artifacts, symphonies and symposia. In many instances, new funds bring new approaches within credibility. However, as before, great effort would be needed to stabilize such a complicated arrangement and to keep a focus upon social questions and their examination. "The humanities," featuring "man at the center of things" and emphasizing shared experiences across time and space is not synonymous with the cultural arts. Cultural arts are useful in providing the humanities with socializing and sensitizing thoughts and feelings.

Finally, a social studies teacher may simply prefer to offer a history or "studies" course. Whether the course fulfills the measure of a humanities course depends less upon its title (e.g., World Studies) than upon the practices of the teacher. Is the history material selected to enable pupils to understand themselves and their contemporaries through understanding similar and dissimilar values and practices of other eras? Is there a willingness to use *any* pertinent facts or principles from whatever field if the meaning thus becomes clearer? Is there a respect for the arts and sciences beyond wars and politics? Does the teacher simply describe and interpret relational aspects of economic and social life or does he invite analysis and discovery by students? Are law and philosophy integrated into the course content? Is there an interest in having pupils relate to as much of the world they are growing into as they can comprehend?

Perhaps all these requirements — relatedness, a widening interest in and respect for other disciplines, and a facility in analyzing — are too much to expect of the would-be humanist. But there is yet another requirement. The status of the world may not always seem to inspire hope. Reality at any instant may seem stark for the individual or his group. Hence, one of the tasks of humanists has always been to convey a touch of Utopia, a small dream of an improved world.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Keeney, Barnaby C. "Proposal For a National Foundation for the Humanities." *School and Society* 93: 211; No. 2259, April 3, 1965.

² Engle, Shirley. "Decision Making: The Heart of Social Studies Instruction." *Social Education* 24: 301-2; November 1960.

³ Keller, Charles. "Needed: Revolution in the Social Studies." *Saturday Review*; September 16, 1961. Cited in Massialas, Byron G., and Kazamias, Andreas M. *Crucial Issues in the Teaching of Social Studies, A Book of Readings*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Quoted by permission of the publisher.

⁴ From an address to the National Association of Secondary School Principals in Chicago on February 1964, reported in the *Bulletin of the Association* 48: 60; No. 291, April 1964.

⁵ Tucker, Jan. "A Classroom Challenge: Teaching A Method of Inquiry." *California Social Science Review* 4: 28-30; No. 3, May 1965.

⁶ Some courses have themes almost completely associated with social studies content. Cf. Gibboney, Richard. "The Pennsylvania Humanities Course." *Phi Delta Kappan* 46: 58-62; October 1964.

ERNEST D. GIGLIO

The Law and The Social Studies

HOLMES ONCE SAID OF HIS COLLEAGUES THAT THEY HAD "FAILED *adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.*"¹ Just as the judges of the late nineteenth century were indifferent to, or did not recognize existing social and economic inequalities, so, too, it might be said that teachers of secondary social studies have failed adequately to recognize the relationship between their discipline and other fields of learning, and their potential to provide more effective teaching methods.

It is not the purpose here to debate the relative merits and disadvantages of the interdisciplinary approach in teaching the social studies. Rather, the intention is to discuss one field of learning still relatively neglected in the secondary social studies curriculum: the law.* Even a cursory study of the law reveals that it embraces, and

*EDITOR'S NOTE: Some progress has been made in recent years in the social studies field through courses in government, history, and problems of democracy courses. A recent survey made by the American Bar Association shows that many state and local bar associations are cooperating with school systems in preparing materials, and furnishing personnel, to assist in teaching an

is embraced by many fields of learning, among them literature, philosophy, sociology, and economics. It can therefore be shown to have affinity to the humanities as well as the social studies.

The failure to explore adequately the law's potentiality as an aid in effectively teaching the social studies may be partially due to the fact that teachers, like laymen in general, share the lawyer's view of the law as essentially a body of authoritative doctrine: rules and regulations, statutory or other, which circumscribe official behavior.² Such a conceptual view of the law is unnecessarily restrictive and leads to the fallacious notion that the scope of the law is limited to statutes, constitutions, judicial decisions, and executive-administrative orders. Even Holmes' cryptic description: "*The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law,*"³ is negated by his own comprehensive view of the law.

It is in the broader sense of being a science, a philosophy, an art, and literature that the most effective use can be made of the law in the social studies curriculum. The law is a science of observation when it focuses on the empirical realm of the "is," namely, when it concentrates on the interactions between the behavior of law officials and the behavior of laymen, and when the observed data are related to the prevailing patterns of behavior, not as the observer wishes them to be, but as they really are. As industry and society became more complex in the late nineteenth century, the correlation between law and the social sciences became correspondingly manifest. The growth of the school of sociological jurisprudence was a response to industrial and social changes. Brandeis, in his famous "brief" to the Supreme Court in *Muller v. Oregon*,⁴ included over 100 pages of

understanding of the role of law in our society. In addition, the study shows that many local school systems have been revising their courses of study to include more about law in the curriculum. Some materials on the subject for secondary school use are now appearing from commercial sources. The *Judgment* series of Supreme Court decisions in the form of case studies, published by the National Council for the Social Studies, is another example that indicates some increase in teaching about law in the school curriculum.

documentary evidence on social and economic conditions which had led the Oregon legislature to pass a ten-hour work law for women in certain industries. Holmes, too, was cognizant of the relationship between law and the social sciences when he prophesied: "*For the rational study of the law the black letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.*"⁶ The use of social facts in litigation had a profound influence upon the course of judicial decisions, and the law as a science of observation provided the factual basis for arriving at a determination of what the law "ought" to be.

The realm of the "ought" represents the law as philosophy, where the emphasis shifts from what the law "is" to what the law "ought" to be. Here the law renders judgments on social objectives to be attained in a universe constantly in flux. But the application of the law as philosophy is constricted by the law's concern for regulation and constancy rather than change and flux, a dilemma which Pound summed up in this phrase: "*Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.*"⁶ The need for uniformity and continuity in the law is exemplified by the principle of *stare decisis*, or let the decision stand. The principle is useful; as Justice Douglas noted, it insures the integrity of wills, contracts, conveyances, and securities, it insures that certain rules of law will be applied equally in the morning as well as the afternoon, it provides men with guidelines by which to carry on their economic and daily activities, it serves to eliminate the capricious element in the law, and it assures social stability by relating the present to the past.⁷ While the principle is necessary to the law, its usefulness can be abused, as when judges render decisions on precedents, but contrary to empirical knowledge.

Absolute adherence to precedent may perpetuate the barbarisms of the past. Consider, for example, the reasons underlying legal punishment. The theoretical justification for punishing those who commit crimes against the existing social order is to protect the community. However, the forms which the punishment assumes depend largely upon the objective to be achieved through the instrument of the law. Originally the root of legal punishment rested solely on the natural impulse for revenge, and its satisfaction was at first achieved by the

injured party or relatives in the event of his death, a function later assumed by the state.⁸ For centuries the state imposed the harshest penalties in retribution for the wrong done to the social order. As late as the eighteenth century, all thefts, with the exception of petty larceny, were construed in England as felonies, punishable by death.⁹ With the development of modern penology, the emphasis gradually shifted from retribution to restraint, rehabilitation, and deterrence. The latter approaches were not only supported by data from the social sciences, but were the result of changing cultural values which had come to reject retributory punishment as the sole means of insuring community order. Jefferson counseled us that "the earth belongs to the living" and that future generations should not be bound by the past, lest a civilized society "remain ever under the regime of their barbarous ancestors."

Those who share the responsibility for the determination of whether punishment will or will not be imposed are the practitioners of the law. Their knowledge, ingenuity, and craftsmanship often provide the margin of difference between acquittal and conviction. The practice of 'law' by professionally trained men provides us with another view of law as the art of advocacy. Our trial procedure employs the adversarial system whereby truth theoretically will emerge from the conflict between opposing forces.¹⁰ It is at this point that the lawyer's command of the language, and his knowledge of other fields of learning is most crucial to him and to his client.

Words are the raw material of the lawyer's profession, and the proper choice of words in the right order can have the power of magic. No less so for the judge, who, if he is to acquire the title of "learned," needs to go beyond the statutes and law reports. The stature that Chief Justice Marshall attained within the realm of the law is largely attributable to the fact that he was a man of letters from which he drew the strength, inspiration, and judgment for his decisions.¹¹ He practiced what Justice Cardozo described as the "magisterial or imperative" form, eschewing ornaments, illustrations, and analogies, and arguing with the persuasive conviction of his own ability to arrive at the truth. Marshall's opinions in *Marbury v. Madison*, *Gibbons v. Ogden*, and *McCulloch v. Maryland* are all in this

magisterial or imperative style, presented without doubt, apology, or uncertainty.¹² There exists a close affinity between literature and law, and the lawyer who desires to practice his art well would be wise to heed the advice of Counsellor Pleydell in Sir Walter Scott's novel, *Guy Mannering*, when he points to the books on his shelves, describes them as the "best editions of the best authors and in particular, an admirable collection of classics," and says to Colonel Mannering: "These are my tools of the trade. A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these he may venture to call himself an architect."¹³

We have at last arrived at the final consideration; namely, the association between the world of literature and that of the law. The relationship can be viewed from two perspectives: the law *as* literature and the law *in* literature.¹⁴ It has been commented that Disraeli found the law depressing but literature exalting; the commentator observed, however, that the two terms are not disparate, if by literature is meant a judgment as to the quality of writing. If the form and substance are of a high order, than a large quantity of court proceedings, judicial decisions, testimonies, arguments, pleas, and discussions of legal theories qualify as literature.¹⁵

Great literature withstands the judgment of time if its substance deals with the human condition in universal terms and if its form is clear, concise, and persuasive. Great literature excites and inspires us, partly because of what we bring to it, but also because it has that quality that Cardozo classified as "magisterial or imperative." We have previously referred to the quality evidenced in the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall; this same quality can be found in the writings of Holmes and Brandeis. The closing portion of Holmes' dissent in the *Abrams* case has been adjudged by one of his admirers to be the "greatest utterance on intellectual freedom by an American, ranking in the English tongue with Milton and Mill."¹⁶ The classification is justifiable, as is readily apparent in the following excerpt:

Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by

speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.¹⁷

Similarly, Brandeis' indictment against wiretapping and his prophesy that the state would utilize electronic devices to impose an Orwellian world upon a free people has not been surpassed to this day:

*The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrence of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.*¹⁸

The world of law is full of such examples, too numerous, in fact, to be fully explored. A very small sample of writings whose excellence qualifies them to be ranked as literature would include among others: Plato's *Apology*, Boswell's *The Life of Johnson*, Camus' *Reflections on the Guillotine*, Emile Zola's "J'accuse" . . . , Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, and Robert Jackson's "Closing Address in the Nuremburg Trial." They are all in part, if not in totality, writings about the law, and they all are literature of a high quality.

A second approach is to view the law in literature, and it is this aspect of law which the social studies can best utilize as an effective teaching tool in the classroom. Literature provides the teacher with a vast storehouse of dramatic "threshold inquiries" from which a subsequent transition to fact can take place within the classroom. Suppose a teacher is to discuss the law as a body of authoritative doctrine, for example, individual freedoms guaranteed to us by our

Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Rather than utilize the traditional method of memorization in a totally abstract framework, it is suggested instead that a case study approach similar to the method employed in our law schools be adopted, with the difference, however, that the social studies teacher rely first upon a fictional presentation to be followed by a factual one.

At this point the reader may question the necessity of considering a new technique of teaching an established subject. The more pertinent question, however, is whether the traditional approach has been effective. Two recent results would indicate the contrary. A national survey conducted last year revealed that most Americans know less than they should about their duties, responsibilities, and rights as citizens.¹⁹ The findings of a second survey give greater cause for alarm, since the sample was drawn exclusively from our high school population. Results gathered since 1951 by the Purdue University Division of Educational Reference from its annual attitude surveys demonstrate that our young citizens believe in freedom in the abstract, but when these beliefs are tested through application to specific factual situations, their responses indicate either a general lack of comprehension of constitutional guarantees or an indifference to them. The excerpt below illustrates the inadequacy of the teaching of fundamental concepts, such as constitutional rights, by the traditional method:

One out of four United States high school seniors believes that "the government should prohibit some people from making public speeches." Sixty-three per cent of these graduating teenagers would not allow Communists to speak on the radio in peacetime, and 42 per cent agree that the police or the FBI may sometimes be right in giving a man "the third degree" in order to make him talk.²⁰

These young citizens are not the product of a totalitarian society; they represent the future generation of a free society. The situation can be remedied, in part, by a more effective use of the potentialities of the law in literature. For illustrative purposes, let us consider a classroom discussion of what constitutional rights are afforded an accused under our system of criminal procedure, drawing first upon the world of literature and following with recent factual case studies.

There are any number of fictional trials and cases, but let us use the "Trial of the Knave of Hearts" from Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. The issue in the trial is: who stole the tarts? The King, who is also the presiding judge, asks the jury for its verdict even before the evidence is presented. The Queen is willing to dispense with the trial altogether, insisting that the sentence should precede the verdict. The White Rabbit, however, reminds them that there are witnesses whose testimony must first be heard by the jury. While the King does allow the hearing of testimony, he intimidates the witnesses. At one point he warns the Hatter: "You must remember . . . or I'll have you executed." When a piece of paper containing a set of verses is offered in evidence, the King is convinced that the Knave wrote it, even though it is unsigned and not in his handwriting.

"Please your Majesty," said the Knave, "I didn't write it, and they can't prove I did: there's no name signed at the end."

"If you didn't sign it," said the King, "that only makes the matter worse. You must have meant some mischief, or else you'd have signed your name like an honest man."

"That proves his guilt, of course," said the Queen: "so, off with . . ."

The absurdity of the Knave's trial does not detract from its usefulness in initiating a discussion on the rights of the accused under our system of justice, making reference to the Bill of Rights and to judicial decisions in specific cases. Students should be encouraged to analyze the trial critically, asking themselves the following questions: (1) What generally is wrong with the trial and why? (2) What specific wrongs are evident in the trial? (3) What guarantees do we have under the Bill of Rights to protect us from these wrongs? (4) What judicial opinions in specific cases guarantee us against these wrongs? (5) Why are these guarantees important, not only to the person standing trial but to our democratic way of life?

The ensuing class discussion under proper guidance will afford an opportunity to shift from the fictional situation to the factual, to explore constitutionalism and constitutional rights and their relationship to democratic values. The teacher's presentation might proceed as follows. Essentially, the trial portrayed by Lewis Carroll is devoid of "due process of law," a concept which Justice Frankfurter characterized in this manner:

Unlike some legal rules [due process] is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process.²¹

Primary to our constitutional system and our sense of justice is the principle that an accused is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden of proof lies with the state. Our value system would prefer that a guilty man go free than that an innocent man be unjustly convicted. That is why we are especially concerned that the accused receive a fair trial — free from prejudice and the taint of constitutional violations.

However, what has constituted "fairness" in the trial procedure is not an absolute standard, but one which has changed through judicial determinations. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights applied solely to the federal government.²² It was not until 1925 that the Court held the first amendment guarantees to be applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.²³ Twelve years later, in *Palko v. Connecticut*,²⁴ Justice Cardozo enunciated the Court's "selective incorporation" theory, whereby only those constitutional rights which are deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and which are so "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental" would be made applicable to the states.

One right not considered to be "fundamental" was the right to counsel, until, that is, the Court's decision in the *Gideon*²⁵ case. Now if an accused cannot afford counsel in a noncapital case, the court must appoint him one. This right is important to the accused, for in

Gideon's case, having counsel meant the difference between conviction and acquittal.²⁶ Subsequently, in *Escobedo*,²⁷ the Court extended the right to be guaranteed counsel to a suspect whenever criminal proceedings shift from the investigatory to the accusatory stage.

The guarantee of counsel is also significant because it assures that the accused will be informed of his rights, and because it affords protection against possible violations of other constitutional rights, such as the fifth amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination²⁸ and the fifth and fourteenth amendments' protection against coerced confessions.²⁹ Extorted admissions of guilt are inadmissible not only because they violate constitutional rights, but also because they are considered unreliable evidence. Similarly, all evidence at trial is subject to the test of credibility through the process of cross-examination, although illegally obtained evidence procured through a violation of the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment is also inadmissible.³⁰

The above is not meant to convey an all-inclusive presentation, for the discussion may take different paths, and the teacher may wish to stress other considerations. The point to be emphasized, however, is that the utilization of the fictional trial or actual case in the hands of an imaginative teacher becomes an effective teaching tool. The vast potentialities of using law as we have described it is only restricted by the teacher's factual knowledge and intellectual creativity. We can help rectify the former,³¹ but the latter depends largely upon the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the classroom teacher. The comprehensive nature of law, with its affinity to and dependence upon both the humanities and the social sciences, awaits further recognition in the social studies.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. "The Path of the Law." In Max Lerner, *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*. Modern Library edition. New York: Random House, 1953. p. 81.

² The comprehensive view of the law which follows is taken from ideas developed by Llewellyn, Karl N. *Jurisprudence*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. Especially chapter 3, pp. 77-100.

³ Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁴ 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

⁵ Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁶ Quoted by Cardozo, Benjamin N. *The Growth of the Law*. New Haven: Yale University, paperbound edition, 1963. p. 2.

⁷ Douglas, William O., "Stare Decisis." *The Supreme Court: Views from Inside*. (Edited by Alan Westin.) New York: W. W. Norton, 1961. p. 123.

⁸ Judge Stern describes the four theories advanced as the basis upon which society imposes legal punishment in *Commonwealth v. Ritter*, Court of Oyer and Terminer, Philadelphia 13, D. & C. 285 (1930).

⁹ Paulsen, Monrad G., and Kadish, Sanford H. *Criminal Law and Its Processes*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962. p. 632.

¹⁰ "In the Anglo-American tradition we employ an adversary system—a system based upon the idea that truth will emerge out of the struggle between two contesting parties presenting their case to an impartial tribunal. Each man's lawyer will do his best to establish a case for his client and to destroy the case that his opponent is trying to make. The system is a commitment to the notion that the right result will emerge out of conflict." Quoted by Paulsen and Kadish, *op. cit.*, p. 993.

¹¹ The close association between books and lawyers and the work of the law and the world of books was largely taken from Birkett, Sir Norman. "Law and Literature." *The Lawyer's Treasury*. (Edited by Eugene C. Gerhart.) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. pp. 127-39.

¹² Cardozo, Benjamin N. *Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1931. pp. 10-13.

¹³ Quoted in Gerhart, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

¹⁴ The idea comes from London, Ephraim, editor. *The World of Law*. 2 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. I: *The Law in Literature*, xi.

¹⁶ Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

¹⁷ *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).

¹⁸ Dissenting opinion of *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).

¹⁹ Using a five-point system on the 33 questions scored in the national test sample, the highest possible score was 165. The sample breakdown, however, was as follows:

Score	Rating	Percent of National Sample
135 points or more	Excellent	10
125 or 130 points	Good	10
115 or 120 points	Fair	19
110 or less points	Poor	61

CBS News Editorial Staff. *The National Citizenship Test*. New York: Bantam Books, 1965. p. 108.

²⁰ Quoted by McKenney, J. Wilson. "Teaching the Bill of Rights in California." *Saturday Review* 49: 68; No. 12, March 19, 1966.

²¹ Concurring opinion in *Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath*, 341 U.S. 123, 162, 163 (1951). Justice Jackson dissenting in *Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1952) said: "Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedures matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices."

²² *Barron v. Baltimore*, 7 Peters 243 (1833).

²³ *Gitlow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

²⁴ 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

²⁵ *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

²⁶ For a case study, see Lewis, Anthony. *Gideon's Trumpet*. New York: Random House, 1964.

²⁷ *Escobedo v. Illinois*, 378 U.S. 478 (1963).

²⁸ The guarantee was made applicable to the states in *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

²⁹ In federal cases, the fifth amendment applies, for the defendant would have been under compulsion to testify against himself. For state cases, see: *Brown v. Mississippi*, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); *Chambers v. Florida*, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); *Ashcraft v. Tennessee*, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); *Leyra v. Denno*, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); *Spano v. New York*, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

³⁰ The exclusion of illegally procured evidence through an unreasonable search and seizure in federal courts was established in *Weeks v. United States*, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule was extended to state criminal trials in *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

³¹ The state of California has instituted a comprehensive program to insure that future generations of high school graduates will be better informed citizens through more effective teaching of the Bill of Rights. The California program is the united effort of the State Board of Education, the State Department of Education, and the Constitutional Rights Foundation (a private nonprofit organization), which in its operational approach has integrated students, teachers, private groups, leaders and citizens of the local community, nearby colleges and universities, and the state educational system into its various programs. These include: 1) the publication and distribution to 11th- and 12th-grade social studies teachers of a guide manual, known as the *Bill of Rights Source Book*, which relates the appropriate provisions of the Bill of Rights to current constitutional issues; 2) the creation of an annual Bill of Rights Teachers Contest to reward those teachers who have developed the most effective classroom techniques in presenting their students with an understanding of our constitutional liberties; 3) the sponsorship of college and university summer workshops for teachers who desire to improve their knowledge and instruction of the Bill of Rights; 4) the

sponsorship of community conferences and institutes to encourage local support for teachers who present controversial constitutional issues in their classrooms; 5) the sponsorship of a Bill of Rights teaching program at the elementary level; and 6) the sponsorship of weekend discussion sessions for students from six senior high schools in the Watts section of Los Angeles in a camp-type environment. See McKenney, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 ff.

JOHN A. HAGUE

American Studies

IN 1959 SIR CHARLES SNOW DESCRIBED BLUNTLY A SEPARATION OF cultures which existed "all over the western world." He suggested that the scientists who were in the process of constructing the culture of the future and the intellectuals who were dedicated to the task of preserving and transmitting the traditional culture were not only the victims of a serious breakdown in communication, but were often positively contemptuous of one another. The lack of interchange between the two groups, he thought, could spell disaster for the free world, and he saw the situation as getting worse, not better. Sir Charles felt that the only way out of this predicament lay in rethinking our education.

If we educators are to rethink our curriculum and methodology, we need to analyze with some care the factors which have impaired our ability to communicate effectively with one another. Perhaps in the process we will discover that the breakdown is both more extensive and more profound than even Snow's analysis would lead us to be-

lieve. We may also gain some insights which will be helpful to those who feel that all intellectual efforts, at their best, must be related to the whole range of human experience.

OBSTACLES TO COMMUNICATION

From the vantage point of those who are concerned with the preservation of a rich and complex cultural heritage, effective communication appears to be hampered by several developments. The rapidity with which the world is changing and growing makes it hard for such men to keep standards of critical analysis and inquiry relevant to the needs of their contemporaries. In short, the historian and the humanist are today likely to find themselves on the defensive in much the same way that the classicist has in the last hundred years.

Secondly, the growing body of knowledge with which these scholars must deal forces them to become specialists at the very moment that both science and current events are urging them to cope with a universe whose vastness almost defies imagination. The student of nationalism, for example, who now must come to grips with movements of people in Asia, Africa, and South America, may well wonder whether he possesses an intellectual structure which is sufficient for his task.

Finally, the awakening of "the masses" has called forth new elite groups while isolating and destroying many of the old ones. Many of the new elites, however, are paralyzed by their fear of failing to maintain the approval of the very groups that have brought them to power. Anyone, therefore, who tries to communicate standards and values may find himself cut off from the support of an elite or an aristocracy which in previous generations might have undergirded his efforts.

On the other hand, the scientist, even though he feels an identification with the culture of the future, is also apt to worry some about the problem of communication. A physicist recently told me that he thought all of the major contributions in his field were being made today by people under 35. He thought that the discipline was growing

so rapidly that the older members of the craft, whose graduate training was a dozen or more years in the past, had little chance of keeping abreast of current developments. Moreover, many of the striking advances now involve bridge areas, so that the struggling physicist, for example, must keep up with a variety of developments in chemistry and biology. The scientist is therefore likely to feel that he does not have sufficient time to communicate effectively with those whose research is directly related to his own, let alone bridge the gap of which Snow complains.

Such factors are, however, somewhat misleading. By concentrating on conditions which explain the divorce between the scientific and the humanistic cultures, we may be tempted to ignore other causes which have disrupted communication among virtually all branches of inquiry in the modern world. Moreover, these additional causes may tell us even more than Snow's analysis about the gaps which must be closed if we are to educate people to live in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

In 1919 Sherwood Anderson published *Winesburg, Ohio*, one of the seminal books in the development of modern American fiction. Winesburg was a small town caught between the traditions that had shaped the older agrarian American and the forces which were creating an urban, industrial society. Anderson called his book "the book of the grotesque," and explained that individuals who tried to possess truths became grotesque. As the stories unfold it becomes clear that one of the things that makes the characters grotesque is the fact that they can't communicate with each other. The hero's mother hopes that her son will not accept his father's rather conventional and shabby definition of success but she cannot tell him what she wants him to be. Over and over again individuals in the book struggle to communicate a truth and find that they have not the strength or the imagination to do so.

KNOWLEDGE AND RECONSTRUCTION

A story by Thomas Mann, "Death in Venice," sheds some light on the awkward silences which pervade *Winesburg*. In the Mann story a

middle-aged writer sojourns in Venice and becomes enamored with a teen-aged boy. He does not actually converse with the lad, but he worships, from a distance, the boy's youthful beauty. When a choleric plague strikes the city the writer stays, thereby choosing death, rather than forsake the opportunity to view once more his young idol. An air of decay hangs over the tale, and the reader feels pity rather than compassion for the plight of the writer. The artist lacks the strength and the self-discipline to accept the transitory and perhaps foolish aspects of his romantic infatuation. He is hypnotized, not by fate, but by his own capacity for idyllic dreams and fantasies. The sojourn, which was supposed to refresh and invigorate the writer, led instead to a gradual sapping of his will and capacity to live.

"Death in Venice" appears to make two significant comments about nineteenth-century romanticism. The romantic movement insisted upon a turning inward; upon the necessity of exploring the inner world of one's own spirit. As a consequence it often discounted or even repudiated the allegiance to form, the tradition which characterized the rationalism of the Enlightenment. The romantic artist proclaimed the necessity of relying upon eternal forces which gave life and breath to man's soul. Men like Thoreau deplored the tendency of individuals to rely unduly upon social and political institutions, and they applauded Emerson's assertion that *"Every spirit builds itself a house, and beyond its house a world, and beyond its world a universe."* Mann, I take it, recognized the source of the romantic's productivity; it was the self-discipline born of the vision which he relentlessly pursued. If for any reason he lost this self-discipline, he was doomed. Dreams keyed to the internal life of the soul and divorced from sustained work brought chaos and death. Thomas Wolfe recognized the accuracy of Mann's insight more clearly than any other modern American writer. Working at a frenzied pace Wolfe seemed to know that if he ever stopped he could never get started again. And indeed, when he finished his novels he died.

Mann's second insight has to do with the substance of the dreams which the romantics pursued. Some, of course, hoped for a radical reconstruction of the social order and committed themselves to various utopian schemes. Others hoped for a radical reconstruction of

human nature and hoped for a race of men that would perform heroic deeds and achieve superlative literary and artistic triumphs. Closely examined, the dreams amounted to types of infatuations which affected all levels of meaning. The romantic, according to this analysis, was in the end betrayed by his own vision, a vision which offered death rather than life.

At this point the social scientist might well insist upon a few questions. In what kind of an era did the romantic flourish? Did his dreams reflect the era or the society in which he lived? Has the romanticism of the nineteenth century affected in any basic way the capacity of men in the twentieth century to communicate with one another?

First, it is obvious that from the standpoint of the western democracies the nineteenth century was a period of enormous expansion. New lands were opening up, industries were developing with extraordinary rapidity, and vast numbers of people were on the move. Small wonder that it was an age of optimism; man seemed capable of attaining new heights of material prosperity and spiritual well-being. Secondly, the newly released energies and the growing productive capacity which society contained gave birth to a multitude of reform movements, utopian visions, and personal ambitions. In short, a pluralistic world was coming into being, and the creative efforts of nineteenth-century artists everywhere testified to the fact.

Ironically, however, most of the writers and artists who can legitimately be identified with the romantic movement had their roots in communities which retained a strong sense of homogeneity. The pre-Civil War transcendentalists and the post-Civil War regionalists drew inspiration and support from the communities in which they lived and worked. They did not have to search for common things of the mind and heart because they already possessed them. I think it is significant that a twentieth-century writer, such as William Faulkner, prized especially the homogeneity of the South. Finally, it seems evident that many writers were able to communicate effectively in the nineteenth century precisely because they were members of communities which seemed to possess common traditions and common hopes. The fact that the pragmatists thought metaphysics was a waste

of time provides further evidence to the reality of a belief in progress which seemed clearly attainable. John Dewey did not need to argue about ultimate truths because they seemed to him as "self evident" as they had at an earlier time to the Sage of Monticello.

This analysis suggests that individuals coming to maturity at the close of the nineteenth century may have failed to recognize the pluralism that was inherent in the very fabric of the exploding culture. Moreover, the extent to which communities retained a sense of homogeneity and shared an implicit faith in a self-evident progress probably obscured for many people the terms upon which effective communication rested. The result was that people who thought they understood each other completely discovered, under stress of war and poverty, that the lines of communication extended only to superficialities. Randolph Bourne's attack on John Dewey when he discovered that Dewey had renounced his pacifism in the First World War is a case in point.

More than he realized, the nineteenth-century writer had mirrored with great sensitivity and fidelity the conditions of his society. When his search for meaning caused him to hold up a mirror to twentieth-century culture, he saw reflected the hollowness, the anonymity, and the alienation which seemed to bedevil the modern world. At the same time he found himself cut adrift from supporting social structures and in open rebellion against a past which had betrayed him. In defense he became more and more introspective. As a consequence, his writings gave fresh illumination to the tragic and poignant facets of human existence. Men discovered depths beneath depths, but the discoveries did not provide their own cure. Like Mann's writer who went to Venice, we have fathomed the nature of the plague which is sweeping the land, but whether we possess the will and the intelligence to deal with it is another question.

Meanwhile a great many social scientists have recovered from the brief period of disillusionment in the 1920's. They have accepted with open arms the liberation from nineteenth-century absolutes which scholars in a wide variety of disciplines effected. They know that individuals, groups, and institutions must be judged by their performances, and they have found stimulation and excitement through the

discovery and refinement of techniques which measure behavioral responses with more accuracy and greater subtlety. The large questions which excite the humanists frequently leave the social scientists cold. They are finding significant answers to more limited inquiries, and they ask no more. They understand that a science of behavior must grow out of the efforts in which they are currently engaged.

The fact that these efforts are frequently described in language which seems to defy intelligibility should not mislead us. Although the social scientist who entitles his articles "Instrumentality and Emotionality in Family Interaction," or "Status Congruence and Cognitive Consistency," alienates a great many potential readers, he is nevertheless attacking important phenomena. His "jargon" is, in part at least, a search for more precise language in a culture grown sloppy in its treatment of words. The specter of bright students who are as "word deaf" as others are "tone deaf" provides sufficient testimony on this point. The social scientist is also conscious of the complexity of his subject matter. He must analyze a great many facets of experience, and he needs a technical language to assist him. Ultimately, he needs a mathematical language which will enable him to communicate with computers, and which will enable him to absorb and correlate the vast bodies of information which his colleagues are producing.

The social scientist might do well to remember that the past is rarely a definitive guide to the future. Even a perfectly programmed computer can only provide adequate predictive data to the extent that the past provides direction for the future. Nevertheless, it seems clear that we are in the midst of a large-scale revolution which will vastly enlarge our understanding of power structures, group dynamics, social stratification and mobility, and a host of related developments. The fact that Washington University of St. Louis has established a project to translate significant research in the social sciences into English should remind us that social science "gobbledygook" is not simply "much ado about nothing."

The Washington University project testifies to another obvious breakdown in communication. The breakdown is serious because there is no guarantee that additional knowledge will provide more extensive or effective involvement for educated citizens in their society.

The difficulties which President Kennedy encountered in trying to give the public an elementary education in economics prove that knowledge must be communicated on many levels to be effective. In *The Mind of the South*, W. J. Cash stated that never before had so many Southerners known so much about the South, its problems and its needs, and never had they experienced greater difficulty in communicating their knowledge to the grass roots of society.

C. Vann Woodward, in an article written for *The New York Times Book Review* on July 28, 1963,¹ observed that mid-twentieth-century historians have not yet offered us new syntheses to replace the old ones. They have pointed out fallacies in previous generalizations, and their work has, according to Woodward, paved the way "for more positive contributions," but they have not inspired men to accept new responsibilities. As a result we see our past more clearly and we are probably more familiar with a larger segment of it, but this understanding does not always lead to an acceptance of or involvement in the struggles and hopes of present-day society.

THE NEED FOR SYNTHESIS

Clearly enough, there have been many significant inter-disciplinary studies in recent years which have involved effective communication among the various academic disciplines. What has been lacking, however, is the kind of synthesis that relates a knowledge of present day society with a comprehension of its heritage and an understanding of man's inner torment in a world which finds itself cut adrift from the moorings that have structured existence for previous generations. The result is that we find it hard to see life whole. We do not wish to accept our past, which is to say our limitations, nor do we wish to accept our future, which is to say our death. Therefore the present frightens or bores us. Joseph Heller, in *Catch 22*, has caught perfectly this aspect of modern existence. One of his characters, who knows that he must die, does everything which utterly bores him in order to prolong his existence. And the central protagonist offers a point of view involving personal courage but rejecting an involvement in the ordinary society of selfish mortals.

Robert Penn Warren's *All The King's Men* attempts the kind of synthesis which I think offers hope for the future. Jack Burden is a student of history who finds himself in the middle of Louisiana politics. His doctoral dissertation involved the study of an ante-bellum southern family, but he could not complete the thesis because he could not accept his own past. As long as he rebels against the past he is, paradoxically, bound by it. Ultimately Burden discovers that one cannot hope for the future until he accepts the past because the future must evolve out of the past. This is a point of view which allows him to accept the ambiguities of the present without being defeated by them. He can forgive those who have compromised with values while understanding what the results of the compromises have been. Understanding himself and his society, he can make sense of history and indeed of life itself.

The type of synthesis which Jack Burden achieved allows him to understand in depth the problems of his society. He thus illustrates an old truism; one cannot achieve real depth without breadth. Too often we have assumed that American Studies, because of its synthetic nature, necessarily sacrifices depth to breadth. Nothing could be further from the truth. To the extent that it forces students to make the right journeys, it will help them to think, write, and act in a responsive and responsible fashion.

What are the right journeys? Ralph Gabriel argues that every individual must face two questions "as a condition of conscious life." He must consider the nature of his relationship to society and also to the "mystery that envelops him." Involved in both inquiries is the task of self-discovery. It seems apparent, therefore, that the serious student must take three related journeys. Moreover, many of the scholarly tools which he needs are now available. First he must travel inward, exploring the dilemmas and anxieties which confront all men. Literature, the arts, psychology, philosophy, and theology can all help him here. Secondly, he must travel outward, exploring the nature and structure of society and culture. Men *are* culture-bearing animals; they only achieve greatness or meanness in a specific society. Ultimately, therefore, no matter how many other societies the student studies, he needs to come to grips with his own.² Finally, modern

cultures, at least, are never static; they can only be understood in terms of their history. In order to move forward one must first go back. The third journey must involve a search for an understanding and acceptance of one's cultural inheritance.

No one can guarantee where the journeys will lead, or indeed that the roads will meet. One can hope, however, that students who travel this way will at least acquire a measure of self-discipline; that they will become articulate; and that they will base their hopes for the future on a mature understanding of what the past will permit. Detachment *and* involvement may then characterize their ongoing search for wisdom and understanding. In a society which has premised many of its undertakings on the assumption that the search for truth is never ending, this would be no small achievement.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Woodward, C. Vann. "Our Past Isn't What It Used To Be." *The New York Times Book Review*, July 28, 1963.

² An interesting experiment in this direction is *Sociology Through Literature*. (Edited by Lewis A. Coser.) Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. For example, the problem of "Anomie" is studied through selections from John Donne, William Butler Yeats, Alfred de Musset, Denis Diderot, Fedor Dostoevski, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Charles Dickens, and Ambrose Bierce.

LAWRENCE H. DOUGLAS

"Foreign" Studies

If we are to understand the emerging peoples, we must study not only their problems of today, but the achievements of mind, spirit, and handicraft they wrought yesterday. We must also listen to their dreams for improving their lot tomorrow and help them in every way we can to make these dreams come true for now their future is also our future.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

SCENE: TOO MANY SOCIAL STUDIES CLASSROOMS:

CHARACTERS: One experienced teacher and several students.

PLOT: The study of virtually any foreign area or country.

DIALOGUE: Unfortunately, as follows:

TEACHER: *Now that we've covered this area, I think a review of the high points of our study is in order. Remember, these are important*

items so be sure to take proper notes. Tom, what are the major products of this area?

STUDENT: [after some hesitation] *Tin, hemp, and sugar cane.*

TEACHER: *I think you may be a bit confused. Last week we learned that hemp and sugar cane come from the first area we studied this year. Remember?*

STUDENT: [Obviously pleased that he had guessed even one product correctly] *Oh, yes. That's right. I've got it now.*

There now follow similar exchanges concerning growing season, climate, historic dates, etc. Another student speaks:

STUDENT: *My father worked there for a while and brought home lots of pictures and souvenirs. Could we talk about the people that live there? I know how to count in their language, and I could bring in some of the things from home.*

Class evidences general agreement and requests to see pictures and learn to count in that language.

TEACHER: *Well, that would be nice, but we really don't have the time if we are to cover the rest of these countries. And you all know that you won't be asked to count in this language on the final exam.*

Bell rings signaling the end of the period. Class departs. Teacher reshuffles lesson plan in preparation for next instructional period.

Imaginative? Not too. Similiar scenes are reenacted countless times every day throughout this nation's schools. For a moment there was that spark of genuine interest that can serve as the springboard to learning. But the opportunity is gone all too soon, and what is probably the most important and certainly one of the more interesting aspects of studying a foreign area — its people and their culture — is neglected once again and relegated to the collection of "should have dones" that is soon acquired by all teachers. It seems as though the social in social studies has been de-emphasized in favor of something more easily understood and taught. Thus, teaching about the other people of the world in our schools is, in a sense, a foreign and unfamiliar area to many of the teachers involved in this particular aspect of social studies education.

This problem and the reasons for its existence are not unknown to educators. There are numerous programs concerned with improving the teaching of foreign areas and countries which have been initiated and carried on by independent school systems, universities, and state departments of education but many of the teachers who are "on the line" remain untouched by these programs and their suggested innovations. The principal vehicles for teaching this material continue to be the heirloom or hand-me-down methods such as the "weather report" type of exercise (usually given in some detail as to rainfall, growing season, topography, etc.), the "cargo manifest" technique (i.e., a listing of the major products of the area or country in question), and, of course, the martial or drum and bugle method of teaching the history of the country. These methods, in company with the country by country travelogue approach, remain the most utilized weapons in the educational arsenal of many social studies teachers.

These methods are not without value if they are used as part of an instructional approach to this material. If, however, these methods and their concomitant overly-factual content constitute the total program within the classroom, it is obvious that any meaningful application of such information and the resultant learning will be very meager indeed.

THE NEGLECT OF THE HUMAN

To teach — and learn — about the millions who share this planet with us in this way constitutes an error in both priority and emphasis. If exposed to different cultures in such a manner one learns only about places and things. Unfortunately, the people who inhabit these places are seemingly of secondary importance and become only another "thing" that is too often not studied at all. In the grand transition that occurs between their habitat and way of life and our classrooms, the people who comprise these cultures somehow lose the ability to speak, to live and to die, and to create. The total and real environment is often ignored and only selected areas — physical, economic, and perhaps political — are chosen for presentation. Selection is, of course,

necessary. At the same time, however, the instructor has a responsibility to the people or culture involved to edit the material in a manner that permits a full and fair presentation from which the student may evolve his own interpretations.

In making such usually expeditious choices we are guilty of two faults. We take away from millions of people in the world the one thing so distinctively human — their culture. And at the same time, we deprive our own students of the exciting and very rewarding experience of learning about people and the culture they represent. If better understanding of the world of man is a goal of the social studies, then the instructional methods and materials employed to attain that end must present all aspects of a society — not just the concrete and quantifiable but the elusive and intangible as well. We must attempt to provide at least some answers to the question, "Why?", and it is through an introduction and integration of the humanities — the human expressions of a culture — with the more traditional elements of the social studies that we may best attain this objective.

In teaching about our own country an obvious goal is to construct attitudes that support the basic experiences, beliefs, and assumptions of the American "way of life." A question one might ask concerning our approach to teaching about foreign areas is, "Do we present material to the student that will permit him to gain the basic insight and understanding necessary to comprehend and accept — not just condone — the way of life of others?"

Students in American schools are repeatedly presented the story of our Pilgrim forebears, our proud Puritan heritage, and the meaning that these and countless other events have for our country today. We learn of the magnificent variety that is America by studying its heroes and its literature and art in their diverse forms.¹ Later in the educational process the moral and social philosophies that have been adopted and adapted by various American spokesmen are examined, questioned, and reexamined in the search for a *rapprochement* between ideas and action.

In dealing with the other peoples of the world, however, we seem to have forgotten many of the lessons learned in educating students about our own country and culture. What we find all too often in

foreign area education is a disjointed array of unrelated facts presented in a numbing fashion that quickly submerges even the most intelligent and interested students in a sea of boredom. Even when an attempt is made to present material which is illustrative of the culture in question the necessary synthesis between "our world" and theirs is often missing.

The attempt to learn about and to understand a cultural group different from our own must involve the use of the external manifestations of the culture being studied. Students — and teachers — should be exposed to the cultural products (e.g., literature, art, music, religions, and philosophies) of the particular area or country. The historical antecedents from which these cultures have evolved should also be presented but not to the extent that there is no time for discussing these areas under the revealing light of contemporary events. The causes as well as the here and now evidence of such cultures must be surveyed if our students are to attain the goal of understanding.

How, for example, does one explain the "kaleidoscope of contrast" that is India or even the major stereotyped characteristics of the nation (e.g., belief in reincarnation, the holy cow, caste, and non-violence)? The easy way out of the dilemma is to offer only a cursory or perhaps no explanation, thereby perpetuating the stereotype in the minds of the students. Such beliefs do not just happen! There are reasons of an historical, geographic, political, and economic nature; but most important are the human reasons why such value orientations exist. The student should have cognizance of and acknowledge the fact that reasons for a certain belief or behavior pattern exist in other countries just as they do in our own. To study India without sampling the hymns from the *Rig-Veda*, or the *Bhagavad-Gita* is to provide only the empty shell of the Indian world. The works of Kalidasa — the Indian Shakespeare — and Rabindranath Tagore (winner of the Nobel Prize for literature) constitute the very essence of Indian literature and would give both student and teacher an insight into the Indian culture that cannot possibly be obtained from any textbook. Similarly, an understanding of the India of today is virtually impossible without reference to the teachings of the great and revered

Gandhi as exemplified in his *Satyagraha* (Truth Force) which restates the Indian belief in *ahimsa* or non-violence. Literature is only one of the areas from which teachers may draw the necessary resources. Various vehicles of cultural expression such as the dance, art forms, and music may also be used to bridge the gap that exists between classroom and culture.

Perhaps the most obvious (but often neglected) element of a foreign culture that can be used to great advantage in the classroom is the language of the particular people being studied. Learning and using the foreign language equivalents of familiar words, greetings, and simple phrases generates interest and establishes a common bond between the diverse worlds of the student and the subject culture. In addition to giving the student a feeling of almost immediate accomplishment and familiarity or acquaintance with the people and their culture, this type of experience produces an element of concreteness that is so necessary in establishing student identification with the material being studied.

Other overt expressions of a culture such as art, music, and drama should be as much a part of a teacher's resource material as history and geography. For these are the things that form the cloak of culture with which the people of the world clothe themselves. The distinction between knowing about as opposed to understanding and appreciating another culture is most important. Simply knowing about other people does not, unfortunately, lead to the respect for others that is engendered by understanding the reasons why an individual or group of people behaves in a manner seemingly contrary to our own. A superficial acquaintance with just the "facts" may reinforce existing misconceptions or give rise to stereotyping which is, in fact, exactly what we are attempting to eradicate by teaching about foreign cultures.²

An examination by teachers and students of the different solutions of various cultures (as evidenced by their cultural products) to such fundamental problems as the spiritual and physical necessities of life that are shared by all men would develop within both groups a greater comprehension of man in relation to his total environment that could be utilized in studying virtually any area. This application

of Bruner's concept of structure³ could be most beneficial for our programs of foreign area education because of the ever increasing emphasis that is being placed upon such endeavors in this country.

By incorporating the humanities in our teaching of other cultures we will help the students realize that right and wrong — as applied to various daily practices of life, types of government, social and religious beliefs, and interpretations of beauty and art — have as many manifestations as there are cultures. Our teaching should foster a willingness to know and understand the differences that exist among the many modes of living in the world today.

Pope's famous dictum that, "The proper study of mankind is man," may be interpreted in a number of ways, but for the individual who teaches about foreign cultures in this country's schools one meaning in particular should be clear. If we, as educators, are to make a meaningful contribution toward at least explaining some of the manifold problems that continually plague man in his relations with his fellow, we must better understand not only our own country and its people but the other people of our world as well. We must understand them not just as a statistic or a shaded area on the weekly current events map, but as the producers and representatives as well as the products of their cultures.

The humanities represent and give evidence of the human aspects of man's existence in this world and as such cannot be excluded from the social studies. It is through the integration and correlation of the humanities with the social studies that the goals of understanding and establishing respect for other cultures will be more rapidly achieved.

Hopefully, through continued effort directed toward educating both student and teacher, those areas of teaching so foreign to many of us at present will become foreign areas in the sense of geographical relationship only.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The American history example is used only to utilize a common frame of reference for most social studies teachers. This is not to say that the methods

employed in teaching about our own country are exemplary. Many of the comments concerning choice of methods and materials made above may be applied to this area as well.

² See Brown, Ina C. *Understanding Other Cultures*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

³ Bruner, Jerome. *The Process of Education*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

CHARLES E. SCRUGGS

The Behavioral Sciences and the Humanities

OVERVIEW

THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION IS TO ACCOUNT, IN PART, for the theoretical rationale undergirding much of the thinking that characterizes the current reformulation of the social studies curriculum. To achieve this purpose, the following manner of presentation will be used:

First, the discussion will be concerned with tracing three essential elements in the methodological rationale of the behavioral sciences. These three elements, humanism, rationalism, and scientific empiricism, have converged in the work of the behavioral sciences and serve as the basic touchstones of the why, what, and how of the behavioral sciences.

Second, there will be an attempt to show that the behavioral scientist's views concerning theory construction, concepts, principles, generalizations, the structure and the interrelatedness of knowledge are

mostly derived from the principles of modern rationalism and scientific empiricism.

Third, there will be an attempt to show that the current attempts to formulate a theory of teaching, indeed, to establish education as a discipline of study in its own right, are drawing heavily upon concept formation, the structure and interrelatedness of knowledge, and theory construction as they are being developed in the behavioral sciences. Hence, the attempts to formulate a theory of teaching are directly and indirectly drawing on the behavioral sciences and are using modern rationalism and scientific empiricism as their ultimate frames of reference.

Fourth, there will be an attempt to show that the nascent theoretical constructs in the emergent social studies curricula are based on notions of concepts, principles, generalizations, and structure and interrelatedness of knowledge. Therefore, many of the revisions and recommendations in the social studies are drawing heavily on the work being done in the behavioral sciences and, as a result, the new programs are incorporating into the new curricula basic principles of modern rationalism and scientific empiricism. Finally, the role of the humanities and how the behavioral sciences can draw on the humanities will be discussed in terms of the emergent social studies curriculum.

HUMANISM

The behavioral sciences represent the convergence of elements found in three historical developments — humanism, rationalism, and scientific empiricism. Historically, humanism was a reaction against the rigidity of the Scholastics and represented an intellectual and cultural movement that initially emphasized the study of man and of human interests, rather than the natural world or religion. Humanism was a change in subject interest but not a change in methodology, in that, like Scholasticism, it relied heavily upon rationalism as a frame of reference. The behavioral sciences are concerned with man and share this interest with the humanities.¹ There is also a sharing of rationalistic methodology. But the primary methodology of the behavioral

scientists is the study of the behavior of man in a systematic, empirical way.²

HUMANISM AND EMPIRICISM

The earliest convergence of humanism and scientific empiricism occurs in the philosophy of positivism and its immediate antecedents. In advancing the inductive method of modern experimental science, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) anticipated many of the basic notions of the positivists. In the Preface of the *Novum Organum*, Bacon wrote, *Now my method, though hard to practice, is easy to explain, and it is this. I propose to establish progressive steps of certainty. I start . . . with simple sensuous perception. . . . The mind itself (must) be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but (must be) guided (by the inductive method) at every step.*³

Bacon advanced several rather basic suggestions defining and describing the inductive method as a means of achieving certainty of knowledge. His major recommendations concerned: (1) the method of empirical observation, (2) the function of scientific generalization, (3) the fundamental design of empirical experiments, (4) the use of concepts and principles in empirical inquiries, and (5) the necessity of analyzing the language of science.

He was highly critical of the scholastics and objected to their heavy reliance on deduction as it was derived from Aristotelian logic. Bacon offered four major arguments: (1) that the syllogism, in emphasizing deduction of particular statements from more general statements, resulted in an indifference toward the problems of how general statements are determined, (2) that generalizations derived from particulars as developed in scholastic logic were superficially and unreliably derived, (3) that the method of induction by simple enumeration, that is by simply listing what is seen to occur together in nature, was in error and had to be replaced by a method of induction based on systematic experimentation, and (4) that scholastic logic was primarily a method of recording and ordering existing knowledge but did not contribute to the discovery of new knowledge.⁴

Because of the limitations of the deductive approach, Bacon suggested the inductive method as a means of discovering new statements of fact. He advocated an empirical, experimental method based on the observation of particular things and events. The observational findings, then, were progressively developed into broad generalizations so that the investigator moved progressively from the concrete to the abstract. He was insistent, however, that the investigator not classify things simply on the basis of superficial or apparent resemblances. He argued that the classification system used *"should be based on those dimensions in nature which are the most far-reaching and systematic."*⁵ In aphorism 106 he wrote, *If we do not observe these principles, generalizations will be merely designed to fit the facts already known and will lead to no new discoveries. They are useless unless they have greater logical power than the particular statements on which they are based, that is, unless they imply that certain observations will be made outside the domain from which the generalizations are derived.*⁶

Bacon recognized that it is the wide applicability of scientific theory that gives it its power and usefulness. His recognition of the *"importance of 'putting to nature the question' systematically and in pursuit of general hypothesis, rather than merely recording observed facts on no consistent principle,"*⁷ was taken up by subsequent writers; in particular, it was given systematic application by the positivists. In the *New Atlantis* Bacon wrote of the bright future of humanity under the guidance and control of the methodology and findings of the natural sciences, but the Baconian vision of making science the basic instrument of human progress was not developed in any systematic way until the writings of Auguste Comte.

Although Comte (1798-1857), wrote over a hundred years ago, he is relevant for the educational behavioral scientist today in two immediate respects: first, he recognized the importance of scientific methodology as a system for the verification of both organic and inorganic facts, and second, he identified the inseparability of science and values in the construction of a viable educational system. Comte, as a scientist, saw in history the basic source for the concepts, generalizations, principles and laws that could guide man's behavior if

these laws were identified by the strict objective tenets of the scientific method. Comte at one point in the *Discourse de l'ensemble du Positivism*⁸ outlined six concepts as involved in the term positivism: *relatif, organique, précis, certain, utile, réel*. He later added a seventh dimension which he called *sympathétique*. In the Comtean system *réel* governs all the others in that the others all qualify knowledge while that which is *réel* suggests the whole system. *Certain* and *précis* describe the approach to method, analysis, and explanation of physical and human nature. *Organique* suggests the unity of the system which encompasses all the disciplines of knowledge in a constructive and logically meaningful system, and the *relative est le caractère qui fait passer de positif à positiviste*. In his theory of positivism, Comte sought to synthesize all knowledge. He believed that he had discovered in the *physique sociale* the structure, the processes, and the methodology of the social sciences. He argued that social physics was only now possible because of its necessary dependence on the development and subsequent findings of the foundational disciplines. These, however, had now progressed sufficiently to allow for the proper development of a science of man. Progress and order, wrote Comte, were now at hand, and through positivism a new level of attainment for humanity could be achieved.⁹

A key point in understanding Comte is his assertion that something was to be learned about concepts from their historical setting. This view and the processes involved were for Comte questions of social change; i.e., he believed that change could be accounted for if one treated history as a science. Applying this approach, he insisted that positive philosophy provided a law of three stages which served to make historical facts meaningful — the theological stage, the metaphysical stage, and the positive stage. In the first stage, says Comte, men invent gods, and societies are theologically oriented to a priestly ruling class; in the second stage, reason is elevated and religious authority is challenged with the result that the social responsibilities that were religiously determined are abandoned; in the final stage science provides, for the first time, certainties about physical and social reality that lead to a primacy of social concern based upon empirically determined social consensus. Stated another way, in the first

stage values are determined theologically within a mythical frame of reference; in the second stage there is a loss of values with a subsequent search for values within a rational frame of reference; in the final stage values are securely re-established on empirical, verifiable grounds with scientific methodology serving as the final frame of reference. It was Comte's view that the natural sciences, as well as men and societies, have all passed through the theological and metaphysical stages. Now, said Comte, in the 1840's, for the first time in history, the third stage, scientific positivism, was being achieved. Further, Comte argued that not only did all disciplines go through the three stages, but the various disciplines were related by their degrees of complexity and shared a hierarchical dependence upon one another. The order was mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, and sociology (social physics). He concluded that social physics was directly related to the natural sciences and could be studied in much the same way that the natural sciences were studied.

In his approach to the scientific study of man, he divided social physics into two parts — social statics and social dynamics. Social statics he defined as the givens in reality: human physiology, for example, dictates among other things that men live in societies, form families, establish divisions of labor, and establish supra- and subordinate roles. Comte was not interested in social statics as much as he was interested in social dynamics. In social dynamics he sought to identify the basic laws which influenced the progression of one stage of development to the next.

Social dynamics, for Comte, was the heart of the science of history. It was his opinion that there were many historical facts but they were of little significance because they were unorganized, unstructured, and viewed as unrelated phenomena. What was needed was a system of unification. Comte believed that he had identified that unity in his three stages of development. All that we can know of reality, he wrote, is what we can observe or deduce from what we observe, and it is science that provides us with a model and a method to obtain the only kind of meaningful knowledge that we can acquire.

John Stuart Mill, in pointing out the similarities in the system of Comte, John Mill, and Bentham, enlarges upon the Comtean view as follows:

We have no knowledge of anything but *Phaenomena*; and our knowledge of *phaenomena* is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relation to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link *phaenomena* together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent or consequent are termed their laws. The laws of *phaenomena* are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.¹⁰

It is the certain and the *précis* of the empirical method of science that allows one to identify the *organique* as a structural system and permits the *réel* to be known and used in the service of man. Comte, going beyond Bacon, held that mere facts are not sufficient to arrive at truth — the mind must form theories; but because intelligent theories cannot be formed without facts one seems to be confronted with a vicious circle. This, argued Comte, is the reason primitive man did not arrive at scientific truth:

*Trapped between the necessity of observing facts in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle but for the natural opening afforded by theological conceptions.*¹¹

Primitive man initially hypothesized about the gods and later modified his hypotheses as reason was brought to bear upon his observations. Similarly, the second stage, metaphysics, which emphasized abstract and impersonal conceptions based upon reason and logical relationships, served as a prerequisite to the emergence of the final stage, scientific-empirical verification. The movement in the Comtean system, then, can be characterized as a progression from *speculation* to *abstraction* to *demonstration*.

It is important to bear in mind that Comte, in developing a science of history to verify historical fact empirically, did so within the context of a philosophic orientation. It is not so much the methodology that Comte recommended that is currently rejected as it is his philosophical orientation. His view is accepted that phenomena or facts are relative, connected by way of succession of similitude, and related by antecedent — consequent sequences; his notion is accepted that with-

out some insights into the ways the facts are to be structured, they will remain unstructured and meaningless; his view is accepted that if facts do not support the hypothesis cast, it must be recast until it can account for all the phenomena being studied; his view is accepted that the various disciplines are inter-related in some hierarchical fashion; his notion is accepted that it is not possible to formulate a single master science that would explain all phenomena in a unitary law; his notion is accepted that the real unity within the sciences is their willingness to avoid questions about origins and ends (theological) and questions about essences and causes (metaphysical) as not being subject to empirical verification: and his view is accepted that laws, concepts, and generalizations are but abstract expressions of the general phenomenal (but not the Kantian noumenal) reality. But what is rejected is the philosophical, religiometaphysical doctrines used as the organizational themes of positivism. His organizational themes eventually developed into a Religion of Humanity ruled over by a *Grand Etre*, a mystical divinity of learned consensus.

HUMANISM, SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICISM, AND RATIONALISM

The convergence of the first two elements, humanism and scientific empiricism, was clear in the 1840's, but the unacceptability of Comte's organizational themes prevented a widespread adoption of his thinking. As a result of successive purgings and modifications of his system, positivism is currently limited to the positions of logical positivism and scientific empiricism.¹² We have at this point specifically indicated the sources of two basic elements in the definition of the behavioral sciences — the scientific study of man. The third element of the convergence, rationalism, plays an important role in the methodology of the behavioral sciences in two important ways: as a guide in hypothesis formulation, and as a guide in abstracting concepts and analyzing their propositional relationships. The verification of propositions is not scientific in the manner of sense verification, but is scientific in the sense of being analytically verifiable. The central idea in such an approach is the position that propositions have

form and structural relatedness that can be systematically constructed and analyzed.

Both hypothesis formulation and theory construction are attempts to identify relationships among variables and propositions that can be empirically verified. Elizabeth Maccia in *The Model in Theorizing and Research*¹³ asserts that scientific investigation involves two dimensions: (1) the task of developing cognitive claims and (2) the task of justifying cognitive claims. Both of these dimensions must involve task specifications for constructing and verifying empirical claims. In this context a hypothesis may be seen as a generalized proposition that makes an assertion about a relationship between variables. It is Maccia's contention that one cannot approach theory in an inductive way. She argues, *One does not begin with observable data and work toward a group of precise and systematic characterizations, a theory. It is not possible to develop theory inductively. In a scientific inquiry, theorizing must precede researching. Nature cannot be approached in an empty-headed fashion. Data must be collected and one must know which data are relevant.*¹⁴

In terms of the task of constructing cognitive claims, Bacon's position is not clear. Despite his assertions of the importance of "putting to nature the question" and "the need for a consistent principle," the general interpretation is that his induction is "simple-minded." It is simple-minded in that there is no structuring hypothesis.

In the Baconian view, the investigator "starting with a blank mind gathers simple sensuous perceptions and then by ascending continually and gradually, finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true."¹⁵ Comte is somewhat more sophisticated in his approach and puts the question of the "Three Stages" to the historical test. His findings, he says, affirm the hypotheses and clearly establish a law covering both physical and social phenomenon. Maccia's retroductive approach¹⁶ is closer to Comte than Bacon, and in fact, is more rigorous than the Comtean system in that the task of developing cognitive claims, hypothecating, must be as systematic and as controlled as the task of verification.

Maccia's position, in essence, combines the rational and empirical elements in such a way that a hypothesis may be seen as a generalized

proposition that makes an assertion about a relationship between classes and variables:

*The tasks of verification (researching) are separate from the tasks of theory construction (theorizing). In doing so, however, the other must be taken into account. Theorizing must be adjusted to verification principles. Conceptional schemes which cannot be brought into correspondence with indicators and designs are useless. Concepts without percepts are empty. Also, on the other hand, verification procedures which cannot be brought into correspondence with variables and their relations are useless. Percepts without concepts are blind.*¹⁷ Maccia's steps in the act of scientific inquiry clearly indicate the relationship of reason and empiricism.

1. Development of Cognitive Claims: Theory Construction Tasks
 - 1.1 Setting for the terms (variables)
 - 1.2 Relating terms (variables) to Form Propositions (Hypothesis)
 - 1.3 Relating Propositions (Hypothesis) to Form Theory
2. Justification of Cognitive Claims: Theory Verification Tasks
 - 2.1 Collection of Data
 - 2.1.1 Specification of indicators
 - 2.1.2 Specification of design
 - 2.2 Interpretation of Data¹⁸

Clearly, then, modern rationalism and empiricism are inseparable elements in the scientific method and perforce are necessary elements in the methodology of the behavioral scientist as he attempts to study men in a scientific way.

The second way that rationalism plays an important role in the methodology of the behavioral sciences is in its position as a guide in abstracting concepts and analyzing their propositional relationships. Comte argued that man, having moved through the theological stage and the metaphysical stage, now stands, with the advent of scientific methodology, on the verge of understanding both physical and human reality. What is required at this point of development is the conversion of the multiplicity of perceptible, experimental, and historical data into concepts, hypothesis, and laws that make such data manageable. Guido De Ruggiero in discussing the writing of Mach makes the following comment, *From the point of view of criti-*

cal reflection and analysis Mach's empirico-critical conception is particularly important. He reviews the work of science under the category of economy, seeing concepts, hypothesis and laws as so many means of abbreviation and simplification enabling the thinker to grasp with a minimum of effort, and hence a maximum of economy, the infinite multiplicity of perceptible and experimental data.¹⁹

The process and significance of the abbreviation and simplification of data is important in the behavioral sciences for several reasons. It facilitates manageability of data, manageability of research design, and manageability of the learning process. In research design applicable to the physical or natural world, abbreviated and simplified theoretical constructs, in many instances, may be more readily derived in a direct empirical way, whereas in the behavioral sciences direct empirical verification may be more difficult to obtain and indirect empirical verification may be required. Richard Mosier in an article discussing the philosophy of the behavioral sciences describes the rationale as follows:

1. *Scientific theory construction generally involves the notions of construct, operant, or variable, hypothetical construct and intervening variable.*²⁰

In the physical sciences, in many instances, the first three may be derived in direct empirical fashion; however, in cases where direct derivation is more difficult, as one might find in many behavioral science investigations, the hypothetical construct and the intervening variable must be employed.

2. *The classical experimental set of variables between which the behavioral scientist wishes to establish functional relationships and derive empirical laws are:*
 - a. *R-variables, measurements of the behavior or response of organisms, sometimes called dependent variables.*
 - b. *S-variables, measurements of physical and social factors and conditions presumed to influence or determine behavior, sometimes called independent variables.*²¹

The problem is that the number of possible variables that are present in a behavior situation is so great and their respective structures so complex that it is very difficult to devise abstractions and inter-

pretations directly from the empirical data. What is required is to isolate those variables to be viewed under deliberate experimental control and then to develop hypothetical constructs involving intervening variables, which would facilitate the empirical verification of their dependent relationships. Since the behavioral sciences must rely more and more upon symbolic constructs as the investigation moves away from direct observation and verification, it becomes increasingly necessary to rely more and more upon theoretical and hypothetical constructs. Mosier, in fact, sees the trend in the philosophy of the behavioral sciences as *"the fusion of the empiricist's conception of modern science with the rationalistic or formalistic conceptions of modern logic. . . . The formal propositions, that are rationalistically and logically established, gain empirical significance when their truth can be demonstrated by a set of concrete operations."*²²

The convergence, then, of all three basic elements is essential to the basic methodology of the behavioral sciences. Man is to be studied in a scientific way, but because of the degree of remoteness and necessary abstraction involved in the behavioral study of man it is necessary to (1) develop hypothetical constructs involving logical relationships, (2) establish indications and operations that will facilitate empirical verification, and (3) test the hypotheses and objectively interpret the findings.

THEORY, CONCEPT, AND STRUCTURE

In reference to theory, the contribution of modern rationalism and scientific empiricism to the behavioral sciences is clearly revealed in the work of Parsons and Shils: in particular, the necessity (1) to develop hypothetical constructs, involving logical relationships, (2) to establish indications and operations that will facilitate empirical verification, and (3) to test the hypotheses and objectively interpret the findings. They state that in establishing a general theory in the social sciences three conditions must be met: (1) a general theory should provide generalized hypotheses for organizing individual events and objects under general concepts, (2) *"a general theory should provide the hypotheses to be applied and tested,"* and (3) a general theory should help to control the biases of observation and interpretation.²³

In reference to concepts and structure, the process and significance of the abbreviation and simplification of data is important in terms of the manageability of data, research design, and learning.

The position of Comte that knowledge is phenomena that we know in terms of their relations to other phenomena by way of succession and similitude, and also the position of Mach that concepts, hypotheses, and laws are so many means of abbreviation and simplification enabling the thinker to grasp a multiplicity of perceptible data, are clearly evident in notions of concept formation, the structure of knowledge and the learning processes in much current educational literature. But what is missing in much current educational research is the formulation of theoretical constructs, and more basically, rationalistically controlled retroductive hypotheses which are essential to the development of education as a discipline of study in its own right. In the debate as to whether education is an art or a science, it has remained up to this point an art. However, if one follows the Comtean argument, now, with the advent of scientific methodology, it is possible for education to guide and control the behavioral development of man.²⁴

What is needed, if indeed education is to be a discipline of study, is a scientific point of view, a theoretical rationale. "A scientific theory," says Maccia, "to be adequate must exhibit formal coherence, observational verification, and observational predictiveness." Stated in terms of this chapter, formal coherence is modern rationalism, observational verification is empiricism, and observational predictiveness, in terms of the behavioral sciences, is what Maccia calls "homological" control. It is precisely at this point, the convergence of the three elements, that education now stands. There is a concerted effort to structure and discipline the field of education by identifying the concepts, generalizations, principles and laws that will constitute the structure of the discipline.

ELEMENTS OF A THEORY BASED ON CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE

Woodruff indicates that "there has been a constant inference that concepts have a significant place in man's thinking processes, but not

until recently has anyone drawn a clear picture of the nature of a concept or its actual relationship to behavior."²⁵

Bruner, in discussing the need for a theory of instruction, identifies several elements in the structuring of knowledge and the development of concepts. He asserts that such a theory should be developed around four problems: (1) predisposition, (2) structures, (3) sequences, and (4) consequences. Addressing himself to the second problem, he says a theory "should concern itself with the optimal structuring of knowledge . . . for any body of knowledge there is a minimal set of propositions or statements, or images from which we can best generate the rest of what exists within the field."²⁶ As a part of the task of structuring the knowledge of a field, he identifies three basic criteria that must be met: (1) economy: the structure must be useful in simplifying the diversity of information within the field; (2) productiveness: the structure must be capable of generating new propositions which go beyond the investigation given; (3) power: the structure must facilitate the manipulation of knowledge in various forms of combinings and recombings.²⁷

Another view of structure, in this sense the structure of the learning process, is treated in the work of Gagné. Gagné in *Conditions of Learning* has systematically treated concept formation and the necessary conditions for learning concepts. He sees concept formation as central to learning and asserts that problem-solving, the highest form of learning, is hierarchically based upon one's ability — to learn and to apply — principles and concepts which in turn are based upon the learner's ability to discriminate, associate, and connect concrete objects and events initially derived from immediate sense experience.²⁸

With respect to Bruner's third point, sequencing, Taba reports that children inevitably build mental constructs with which to organize the specific bits of information they encounter. An immediate problem, says Taba, is that if teachers pay little attention to creating models for thinking, children will create for themselves faulty or unproductive conceptual schemes with which to organize information. Appropriate learning is building constructs which have a high degree of productivity. In analyzing the problems of developing conceptual schemes in children, Taba identifies three specific cognitive tasks that are essen-

tial in the process of thinking and learning: (1) concept formation, (2) inferring generalizations or interpreting specific data, and (3) applying generalizations to new phenomena and predicting consequences of certain events and conditions. In explaining the logical structures of the three cognitive tasks, Taba identifies specific hierarchical sequences of thought processes: (1) enumeration of concrete items, (2) grouping these items on some conscious basis, (3) labeling and classifying items according to a membership set. Underlying these basic steps are still other cognitive processes such as differentiation of certain properties of phenomena or events with some degree of precision and an ability to abstract common elements and to determine the basis on which to group and label them.²⁹

With respect to Bruner's fourth point, consequences, Elizabeth Maccia believes that learning is building knowledge structures within the individual in such a way that rule-governed behavior directs and controls the individual and allows him to become an effective problem solver.³⁰ In analyzing structure it is obvious, writes Maccia, that *"there can be no structure unless there are rules for putting elements together. The following of rules is the heart of organization."*³¹ The rules are inherent in the structure, and teaching becomes the process of helping the learner to internalize such rules and to build the cognitive structures that simplify, abbreviate, and make manageable the perceptible, experiential, and experimental data that the learner will encounter. The consequence of such learning, then, is rule-governed behavior that directs and controls the learner and allows him to become an effective problem solver.

THE ELEMENTS OF A THEORY AND THE EMERGING SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM

Recent research developments in the social studies reflect a trend in the direction of utilizing logical analysis, empirical verification, and the cognitive structuring of knowledge as fundamental methodological approaches in the teaching of the social studies. During the past five years there have been over 40 major projects and studies devoted to investigating various aspects of this approach to the teaching of the

social studies.³² Edwin Fenton in his book *Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach* writes that there are no new elements in the recent trends in the social studies. They are old elements that are being restated in unique ways. Fenton's recommendations are cogently stated and, in fact, serve as a summary of much current thinking about needed changes in the social studies curriculum. He argues that:

*Identifying structure with analytic questions makes the structure of the disciplines the major key to hypothesis formation. Facts do not speak for themselves. They have meaning only when the minds of men order them into patterns. Social Scientists have developed a large number of fruitful ways to order data, stemming from their knowledge of man and society. As historians engage in research, they often put the implications of a social science model, a generalization developed from previous research or an earlier instance in a similar pattern of development, in the form of an analytic question which guides their search for data. These questions lead to hypotheses. They can be validated, revised or rejected by using historical data in accordance with the rules for critical thinking. The development and validation of hypotheses are the heart of the mode of inquiry in the social studies.*³³

The social studies program is clearly the study of man and its historical relationship to the humanities has always been heavily emphasized. In fact, the social studies curriculum has rather consistently used history as its central theme. However, it has not been the scientific, propositional, empirical analysis of history as recommended by Comte. It has been treated more as an art form than as a science. This strong identification with the humanities in terms of methodology and purpose, together with the requirements of scientific objectivity, may account for the lack of clarity and direction in social studies instruction. However, if the work of the 40 major projects and studies devoted to various aspects of the logical analysis of teaching, the empirical verification of hypotheses, the structuring of knowledge in the social sciences, and the teaching of concepts, is successful, then rather fundamental changes in the social studies will occur. In short, if the trends continue and the work is successful, one may expect to find

the social studies moving away from the humanities and the social sciences into the camp of the behavioral scientist.

THE ROLE OF THE HUMANITIES IN THE EMERGENT SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM

If the attempts to establish education as a discipline of study in its own right continue and the social studies continue to follow that trend, two immediate developments are clearly possible.


One, methodological demands in the social studies may move them away from the humanities toward the behavioral sciences. The rigorous insistence by the behavioral scientist on empirically verified and publicly shared knowledge, and the apparent growing recognition of the need for the *certain*, the *précis*, the *organique*, and the *utile* in education make this a distinct possibility. In this event, the humanities and the social sciences would contribute to social studies instruction as basic data sources and would provide information, at Peirce's point of retroductive pondering, about objects, events, persons, and places that would contribute the basic data utilized in the hypothecating task. As the task of hypothecating is a fundamental step in the methodology of the behavioral sciences, the emergent social studies program of instruction would be inoperative without it. Hence, a close working relationship between the social studies and the humanities would have to be established and maintained.

Two, the social studies may elect to include the methodology of the behavioral sciences as *one of several methodologies* to be employed in the study of man. In this instance, the behavioral sciences, the humanities, and the various social sciences³⁴ would all contribute to the task of strengthening social studies instruction in their respective capacities.

In respect to the first alternative, the behavioral scientist would argue that the task of verification is empirical and that empirical testing is the most reliable method of warranting conclusions. He would argue, within the context of alternative one, that it would not be necessary to move away from the *humanities* if, indeed, the human aspect is stressed, nor would it be necessary for the social studies to

move away from the social sciences if, indeed, the science aspect is stressed. He would argue for a higher level of confidence and success in the teaching of the social studies through strengthened relationships with the humanities and the social sciences in the sense of developing a *human science*, i.e., the behavioral sciences. He would not, in this sense, recognize a conflict between science and the humanities.

Indeed, in this context, it may be argued that the behavioral sciences are properly the humanities which have accepted science and empirical evidence as their methodological frame of reference. A simplified logic tree can demonstrate this relationship and summarize the convergence of the three elements developed in this discussion.³⁵



The diagram helps to identify what J. Bronowski, C. P. Snow, and others³⁶ decry as the artificial separation of science and the humanities into two separate camps. If rapprochement between science and the humanities is possible, the social studies may well provide the natural opening for such a development. The gap between the humanities and science may well be bridged by what Fenton calls the analytic question, the key to hypothesis formulation. Equally important, says Fenton, "*the questions lead to hypotheses that can be validated in accordance with various rules.*"³⁷

Certainly, Bacon, Comte, Peirce, Mosier, and Maccia directly contribute to a position that would support rapprochement between science and the humanities at this level.³⁸

In respect to the second alternative, the single method of the empirical verification of hypotheses is rejected in favor of various rules and methodologies for verification. The basic rejection of the first alternative would be on the grounds that although the empirical method is *one* important test of verification, it is not the only method appropriate to social studies instruction. As Israel Scheffler writes in *Conditions of Knowledge*, the difference between belief and knowledge is . . . *the knower having adequate evidence for the beliefs in question. The adequacy of the support of a belief needs to be judged*

by reference to the relevance and adequacy of the evidence supporting the belief before it can be identified as knowledge.³⁹

The behavioral scientist contends that empirical testing can be used to establish adequate, appropriate, and relevant evidence to support his hypothesis. But, as Scheffler points out, . . . in empirical matters, empirical evidence is appropriate; in mathematics, it is proof that counts; in moral deliberation, moral reasons have a distinctive role to play.⁴⁰ Hence, Fenton's view that "hypotheses can be validated in accordance with various rules" would suggest that the social studies teacher must again draw on the humanities. He must know the rationale, the methodology, and the frame of reference of the humanities, and he must know the appropriateness, the adequacy, and the relevance of the evidence used to support or reject hypotheses cast within the sphere of the humanities. In short, in treating the cultural, attitudinal, and critical values of man, the social studies teacher must be competent to conduct a rational investigation and a rational analysis of the various elements of man's cultural heritage. To be effective in this task, he must draw upon and incorporate into his teaching the rules of evidence appropriate to the methodology of the humanities.

Further, Scheffler casts teaching in the mold of the humanities when he characterizes teaching as the engagement in critical dialogue based upon rational explanation. Teaching, he says, is the . . . giving of honest reasons and the welcoming of radical questions . . . an interaction which exposes the teacher's judgments to the critical evaluation of the student . . . and invites the student to form and submit his own judgments likewise to critical appraisal.⁴¹

Whether the first or second alternative emerges as the dominant pattern in the social studies, the social studies teacher and student will, of necessity, draw heavily upon the humanities. In the first alternative, rapprochement is possible through the requirements of the task of hypothesizing. In the second alternative, rapprochement is possible through both the task of hypothesis construction and the task of hypothesis verification.

In light of the contributions that the humanities and science can make to the social studies program, and in light of the objectives and responsibilities of social studies instruction, rapprochement, at this

time, could well lead to the realization of Bacon's dream of a bright future for humanity.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The humanities, as the direct development of humanism, currently stress the importance of man through the rational study of the various branches of knowledge concerned with human thought and action as evidenced in languages, literature, philosophy, history, and the fine arts. The current methodological emphasis in the humanities, then, is a stressing of the cultural, attitudinal, and critical values of man through a rational analysis of his recorded cultural heritage. See: Noll, James William. "Humanism as a Method." *The Educational Forum* 28: 489-95; No. 4, May 1964.

² In this chapter, empirical refers to knowledge that is based on experiment and careful observation; systematic refers to the ordering and structuring of facts and principles so that the parts explain the whole and the whole explains the separate parts. See Eson, Morris. *Psychological Foundations of Education*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. Chapter 4.

³ Bacon, Francis. *Works*. (Edited by James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath.) London: 1857-75 (24 vols.). Cited by Hampshire, Stuart. *The Age of Reason*. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1956. p. 23.

⁴ See Hampshire, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22. See also pp. 23-29, citing Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphorism XXXVI. . . . We must lead men to the particular themselves, and their series and order. . . . Book I, Aphorism CIV. . . . We rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general. For the lowest axioms differ but slightly from bare experience, while the highest and most general . . . are rational and abstract and without solidity. . . . Book I, Aphorism CV. . . . Induction which proceeds from simple enumeration is childish; its conclusions are precarious, and exposed to peril from a contradictory instance; and it generally decides on too small a number of facts, and only those which are at hand. Book I, Aphorism III. . . . Where the cause is not known the affect cannot be produced . . . and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. . . .

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸ Comte, Auguste. *Discourse de L'ensemble du Positivism*. Cited by Gouhier, H. *Jeunesse D'Auguste Comte*. Volume 2. Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1941. p. 22.

⁹ Comte, Auguste. *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. 2nd edition, Volume I. Bailiere, 1864. See: Manuel, Frank E. *The Prophets of Paris*. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Chapter VI.

¹⁰ Mill, John Stuart. *Auguste Comte and Positivism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961. pp. 6-8.

¹¹ Comte, Auguste. *Cours de Philosophie Positive*.

¹² Rationalism, of course, plays a fundamental role in the Comtean system, but it is not the modern rationalism that is fundamental to the work of the behavioral scientist. The schools of logical positivism and scientific empiricism trace back to Comte; hence, the use of the term positivism. Logical positivism and scientific empiricism are both subsumed under logical empiricism which is a division of analytic philosophy. "*Analytic philosophy is concerned with the development and use of methods for classifying the language and the logical verification of discourse. . . .*" Logical empiricism as one school of analytic philosophy aims to develop logical, symbolic language which is more precise than ordinary languages. The logical, symbolic language of the logical empiricists is used to evaluate arguments and propositions found in the empirical sciences and, of course, in the behavioral sciences. The assumption is that statements or propositions used by the behavioral scientist must be empirically verifiable to be meaningful. "*The second school in analytic philosophy linguistic analysis purports to develop methods for handling the terms of ordinary discourse. Not only are empirical statements subjected to scrutiny, but so are definitions, statements, and value judgments.*" See: Kneller, George. *Foundations of Education*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963. pp. 123-31, 357.

¹³ Maccia, Elizabeth Steiner. *The Model in Theorizing and Research*. Educational Theory Center, Occasional Paper 65-180. Columbus: Bureau of Education Research and Service, The Ohio State University, May 1965.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4. Note: Comte's position as we have seen was to recognize that theology made the original breakthrough by creating myths at the initial level of theorizing. The myths were then subsequently subjected to rational and empirical tests of verification.

¹⁵ Bacon, *Novum Organum*, *op. cit.*, Aphorism XIX.

¹⁶ Peirce recognized three kinds of reasoning: induction, deduction, and retroduction. It was Peirce's argument that theory or initial hypothesizing arose through the process of retroduction. He wrote,

The inquiry begins with pondering . . . phenomena in all these aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture as premises. . . . The whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis. . . . I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its characteristic formula reasoning I term retroduction. . . .

Retroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must be tested.

This testing to be logically valid, must honestly start . . . with examination of the hypothesis, and a muster of all sorts of conditioned experiential consequences which would follow from its truth. This constitutes the Second Stage of Inquiry. For its characteristic form of reasoning our language has, for two centuries, been happily provided with the name of Deduction. . . .

The purpose of Deduction, that of collecting consequents of the hypothesis, having been sufficiently carried out, the inquiry enters upon its Third Stage, that of ascertaining how far those consequents accord with Experience; and of judg-

ing accordingly whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, or requires some essential modification, or must be entirely rejected. Its characteristic way of reasoning is Induction." (Cited by Maccia, Occasional Paper 62-107, *op. cit.*, p. 11.)

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ De Ruggiero, Guido. "Positivism." *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. (Edited by Edwin R. A. Seligman.) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934. pp. 260-65.

²⁰ Mosier, Richard D. "Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences." *Review of Educational Research* 25: 13-24; No. 1, February 1955.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Comte believed that he had discovered in the *physique sociale* the structure, the processes, the methodology of the social sciences. However, his interpretation and the desired explication of his findings have by and large been rejected. The currency of his rationale and his methodological approach, however, are clearly seen in the work of Parson and Shils who write in the introduction of *Toward a General Theory of Action — Theoretical Foundations of the Social Sciences*:

The present statement and the volumes which it introduces are intended to contribute to the establishment of a general theory in the social sciences. Theory in the social sciences should have three major functions: First, it should aid in the codification of our existing concrete knowledge. It can do so by providing generalized hypotheses for the systematic re-formulation of existing facts and insights, by extending the range of implication of particular hypotheses, and by unifying discrete observations under general concepts. Through codification, general theory in the social sciences will help to promote the process of cumulative growth of our knowledge. In making us more aware of the interconnections among items of existing knowledge which are now available in a scattered, fragmentary form, it will help us fix our attention on the points where further work must be done.

Second, general theory in the social sciences should be a guide to research. By codification, it enables us to locate and define more precisely the boundaries of our knowledge and of our ignorance. Codification facilitates the selection of problems, although it is not, of course, the only useful technique for the selection of problems for fruitful research. Further than this, general theory should provide hypotheses to be applied and tested by the investigation of these problems. If research problems are formulated in terms of systematically derived theoretical hypotheses, the resulting propositions will in turn contribute toward both the validation and revision of the theory.

Third, general theory as a point of departure for specialized work in the social sciences will facilitate the control of the biases of observation and interpretation which are at present fostered by the departmentalization of education and research in the social sciences. Parsons, Talcott, and Shils, Edward A., editors. *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. p. 3.

²⁵ Woodruff, Asahel. "The Use of Concepts in Teaching and Learning." *Journal of Teacher Education* 15: 81; March 1964.

²⁶ Bruner, Jerome. "Needed: A Theory of Instruction." *Educational Leadership* 20: 525; May 1963.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 523-32.

²⁸ Gagné, Robert. *Conditions of Learning*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. Chapter 2.

²⁹ Taba, Hilda, and Elzey, Freeman. "Teaching Strategies and Thought Processes." *Teachers College Record* (Columbia University) 65: 524-34; March 1964.

³⁰ Maccia, Occasional Paper 62-155, *op. cit.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Michaelis, John, and Johnson, A. Montgomery. *The Social Sciences — Foundations of the Social Studies*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965. pp. 302-05. Michaelis and Johnson cite 33 social studies projects studying various aspects of the structuring of social sciences knowledge, the identification of major concepts and concept formation, and K-12 and K-14 curriculum designs for sequencing and spiraling concepts throughout the social studies curriculum.

³³ Fenton, Edwin. *Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. pp. vi-vii; similarly, Massialas and Cox propose an inquiry approach to the teaching of the social studies. They base their model on sequential phases of thinking which include steps for hypothesizing, generalizing, and evidencing. Massialas, Byron C., and Cox, C. Benjamin. *Inquiry in the Social Studies*. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1966.

³⁴ Bellock, Arno. "The Structure of Knowledge and the Structure of the Curriculum." *A Reassessment of the Curriculum*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964. pp. 25-40. Bellock discussed the multiple methodologies in the social sciences.

³⁵ Brameld, Theodore. *Education as Power*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. pp. 66-68. Brameld sees the relationship in the following terms:

The . . . teacher is concerned centrally and properly with one phenomenon of nature, . . . the phenomena of the behavior of the human being, both in itself and its relations to other human beings. This is the universal subject matter of the average teacher, to which all other subject matters are secondary. His primary task is not to teach mathematics or science or history. It is rather to teach human beings how to be human, how to grow into full, rich personalities living in concert with other personalities.

. . . The subject matter necessary for all teachers is best encompassed in the term behavioral science. The behavioral sciences sometimes called the human sciences, are those that have to do with the way man, individually and socially, behaves.

Let me add a little more about the nature of the behavioral sciences. Many people do not yet seem to realize that four great classes of revolution have occurred in the twentieth century. First are the political revolutions of which so many millions are aware from direct and bloody experience. Second are the revolutions in technology which in turn have produced the revolution in, for example, communication and transportation. Third are the revolutions in the

physical sciences which are closely related to those in technology and communications. The fourth class, of which many of us are still only vaguely aware, is the revolution in the behavioral sciences. Within less than a century, and for the first time in history, we have come to the full realization that man can be studied scientifically and controlled scientifically in the same way as any other object of nature. . . .

Along with the maturation of the sciences of man is an even more recent and still only partially recognized event of revolutionary importance. This is the discovery that man is a whole being, and that we must study him as a whole.

³⁶ Bronowski, J. *Science and Human Values*. New York: Harper and Row, revised edition, 1965; Snow, C. P. *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. Rede Lectures, Cambridge University Press, 1959. Bronowski writes,

. . . it is logical to ask what is the nature of truth, as we seek it in science and social life; and to trace the influence which this search for empirical truth has had on conduct. . . . The discoveries of science, the works of art are explorations — more, are explosions, of a hidden likeness. The discoverer or the artist presents in them two aspects of nature and fuses them into one. This is the act of creation, in which an original thought is born, and it is the same act in original science and original art. . . .

It is wrong to think of science as a mechanical record of facts, and it is wrong to think of the arts as remote and private fancies. What makes each human, what makes them universal, is the stamp of the creative mind.

The act of creation (lies) in the discovery of a hidden likeness. The scientist or the artist takes two facts of experiences which are separate; he finds in them a likeness which had not been seen before; and he creates a unity by showing the likeness. (p. 27).

³⁷ Fenton, *op. cit.*, pp. vi-vii.

³⁸ Bacon, Comte, Peirce, Maccia, Mosier, and Bronowski all contribute to the position that would support the necessity of rapprochement between science and the humanities. To briefly recapitulate, Bacon recognized "the importance of 'putting to nature the question' systematically and in pursuit of general hypotheses, rather than merely recording observed facts on no consistent principle." Comte argued that there were many historical facts but they were of little significance because they were unorganized, unstructured, and viewed as unrelated phenomena. What was needed was a system of unification. Rationalism, the third element of the convergence and which is fundamental to the humanities, as we have seen, plays an important role as a guide in hypothesis formulation. Peirce argues that retrodution — a pondering in the midst of facts — leads to the casting of a hypothesis that is first deductively, rationalistically and syllogistically tested. Finally, to test how far the consequences accord with experience, and to sensibly judge it, the third stage, induction is conducted.

Maccia and Mosier similarly point out that scientific investigation involves two dimensions: (1) the task of developing cognitive claims and (2) the task of justifying cognitive claims.

³⁹ Scheffler, Israel. *Conditions of Knowledge*. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965. Chapter 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Part Three

The Human Studies...

ROBERT L. ARNOLD

The Goal:

Education for Human Becoming

THERE IS INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT THE ALIENATION OF man: his loss of individual identity, his sense of emptiness, his blasé attitude toward the world, his irresponsible behavior, his perceptual limitations, and his inability to identify his real feelings, let alone communicate them effectively. There is a growing sensitivity to the rootlessness of modern technological society, in which jobs and people are interchangeable, organized activity is increasing at the expense of private autonomy, and mass minds in a mass society are replacing the individual commitment of the past. But can heightened awareness of these problems lead to a more appropriate plan for action in education?

The schools are institutions capable of greatly reducing alienation. Instead, they have become factories whose separate conveyor belts ignore individual differences. The schools are increasing, not decreasing, the possibilities for alienation.

THE INAPPROPRIATE CONTEXT

A business point of view based on efficiency, expediency, and external reward has molded education in the image of an industrial enterprise where people are like Fords on an assembly line. Unlike assembled Fords at the terminus, however, we find increasing numbers of disassembled, anti-social human beings. One need only observe the state of mental health and the lack of concern for fellow man to verify these statements. It is no secret that people use automobiles to vent their hostilities, that they escape into fantasy via television, bar rooms, and "mass culture." Ironically, an emerging value system in modern America is based on the exploitation of fellow human beings whose very support and understanding is essential to the individual's well-being.¹ This conflict is one which psychologists find at the heart of many mental and physical disorders; it manifests our highly competitive, mobile society.

Education is contributing in many ways to the disintegration of human values. We insist on knowledge dutifully recorded in separate and often unrelated compartments. Such segregation of knowing fractures one's sense of unity, his world view, and, therefore, the meaning in his life. We pit student against student in a battle for grades, promotions, and scholarships. We employ punitive measures to discourage unorthodox behavior, and we prevent many from functioning effectively. We introduce people to second-hand verbal experiences in the name of instruction, resulting in the development of "non-functional literates," a far more serious problem than functional illiterates. Many practices in today's schools lead to disintegration of personality structures.

Such practices are efficiency-oriented, not human-oriented. How else can we justify mass instruction via television, programmed learning, or team teaching — nearly always predicated on the necessity for acquiring pre-determined facts and generalizations rapidly? Textbooks and workbooks (embalmed teachers) are seldom more than verbalized knowledge, generalized into a meaningless form, organized for efficient consumption and periodic regurgitation. It is no wonder teachers have voiced concern about machines taking over

their responsibilities. If all teaching is passing out information and interpretations to the student, to be returned in their original forms, a machine is probably more efficient. But if teaching is guiding the learning of students, then a machine or a machine-like teacher is woefully deficient. It is not enough to say to the teacher, "Stop telling the students and let them discover." There must be a guiding framework which can reasonably assure a productive experience. This framework is not available today, except in scattered sources.

In order to find a more appropriate avenue for action, we need to develop what Whitehead has called "an eye for the whole chess-board, for the bearing of one set of ideas on another." We must pull together those conceptions of man and his evolution which are supported by research findings and can be verified by observation. These conceptions, hopefully, can reveal a consistent framework for guiding both teaching and learning to a more fruitful outcome.

A Scottish correspondent to *The Times Educational Supplement*, writing in 1964 of educational change in the United States, expressed what has belatedly become a concern of a few professional educators and laymen. *The new reforms in curriculum, he said, were not inspired by any articulate theory of education. They operated within chosen subject fields and no attempt was made to have a larger educational design or even for one group of specialists to share their thoughts with their neighbors across the fence.*²

In spite of this observation that no unifying curricular theory has guided change it would be a mistake to assume that the majority of these reforms do not operate from a fairly unified set of assumptions. The problem is that these assumptions are more suitable to the successful development of a business than of human beings.

Consideration needs to be given to basic concepts that can undergird a curricular design which can support the full development of human potentialities. If a general statement of these concepts exposes the skeleton of a unifying theory, fine. The least it can do is offer some criteria (and hopefully more adequate ones) for judging the value of new proposals. It should reveal a means of closing the gap between science and the humanities and ultimately giving direc-

tion to curricular proposals that can eradicate man's cancerous alienation.

THE STRUCTURE FOR MEANING

The fundamental questions to which we should initially address ourselves are:

1. To what extent is man capable of creating his world?
2. What ultimate value does this creative action have in the fulfillment of the human organism?

Answers to these questions may receive more support if, to begin with, they come from biology rather than psychology. That is not to say that psychologists have not reached these same conclusions (many have), but that our esteem for the so-called "scientific fact" has made many suspect the subjective evidence often relied upon in psychology.

The biologists are not content to talk only of the potentialities of man but speak of the potentialities of the total cosmos. Herrick, in his masterful book, *The Evolution of Human Nature*, took the position that *the urge to live and to live as abundantly as possible is a high-level exhibition of a property that seems to be characteristic of our cosmos as a whole.*⁴ And this creative process, evident throughout nature, reaches its highest level of creative or inventive capacity in the human mind.

The human organism is one of many life forms evolving to higher levels of integration. Integration in man is believed to proceed toward efficient action and self-sufficiency in adults. The organism is thought to achieve satisfaction at each level of self-control, self-unity, and self-development it attains.

Through gene exchange at conception, mutations, and natural selection, evolutionary changes occur. Though evolution has its roots in a past, and therefore is fixed to some degree, it is also inventive. The messages which the genes transmit prescribe, for the moment, the outer limits of one's being: but the bounds of creativeness are elastic. For instance, biologists tell us that even our physical structures, which we often view as well-defined and rigid, have inherent

creative potentialities. This can be seen in the resorption of bone tissue that is given to stress. Potentiality for muscle development is, of course, a well-established fact. Surely the potentiality for one's total personality development is equally great.

This evolutionary process, as Herrick states, appears to result in three general states not limited to the welfare of man. First is the state of de-differentiation of structure, leading ultimately to a loss of individual identity. At the other extreme is the state of over-specialization. In either extreme state the final result is elimination of the specie through evolutionary mal-adaptation. Thus, both over-specialization and loss of identity are thought to lead to unfulfillment in the biological organism. The state of *individual adaptation*, then, is obviously the one which man must strive to maintain.

Man's adaptation, to the biologist, is a continuous reorganization at higher and higher levels of integration. True or perfect adaptation is never achieved. The organism is continuously striving, powered by the urge to achieve an abundant life. To rob one of this opportunity to adapt through full employment of his potentialities is to rob him of his life. It is an organism's given right to seek its own fulfillment and to find it.

When the biologist speaks of the creative movement of the total cosmos he is asserting his belief in its basic unity. This is as comforting as it is valuable in orienting his point of view. But an assumption of unity has disadvantages as well as advantages. On the positive side, it directs inquiry toward the assessment of patterns of relationships with limitations as broad as or broader than the universe itself. On the negative side, one is apt to believe that a finite unity exists to be discovered. This basic realism has led many to deny the creative role of man's intellect which, the biologists and anthropologists remind us, operates under general rules for the entire biological organism in union with a creative nature.⁵

THE MEANING FOR STRUCTURE

Man has a basic integrity, biologically speaking, which sets him apart from the surroundings of which he is an integral part. He

comes to know reality through his senses. These organs introduce data from which one's knowing is created. Perceptual data are not copies of the world but transformations. That is, what we perceive of our world is of our own making, limited by the particular biological "givens" and the experiences of the organism. Whether or not the cosmos is indeed unified is not at issue since the unity we perceive is ours.⁶

Accepting these biological and perceptual points of view, Piaget has postulated the existence of self-developed cognitive structures which intercede between the object and a person's knowing. Piaget describes these structures as operating according to the biologist's concept of adaptation.⁷

If, therefore, a structure impedes a message it must accommodate itself to allow assimilation. Accommodation is accomplished through individual action or experience. What one knows, one creates, and what one creates are symbolic transformations of the total cosmos, whatever in fact it may be, resulting in meaningful patterns.⁸ These transformations are given form in the self-developed structures of the mind.

It is important to emphasize the point that these intellectual structures are self-developed through experience. If one lacks experience and has not constructed unified patterns or structure, he is incapable of communicating effectively, cognitively speaking. But, since mind structures are unique to each individual, one wonders how communication can occur. The answer lies in the nature of experience. The experiencing individual has the potentiality for generating higher level generalizations which are manifested in his mind structures. These higher-order organizations have commonalities regardless of their antecedents. That is, differing experiences can produce similar generalizations. Therefore, communication can occur when both the sender and the receiver have similar cognitive structures, produced through unique perceptions and conceptualizations.

Though Piaget has been primarily concerned with the conscious mind, he does not discount the role of the unconscious. It would seem reasonable to assume that similar states of readiness for communication may exist at the unconscious level. These states of self-

constructed and biological organizations of mind and body which produce this readiness are based in the experiences of the organism.

The organism is subject to both mind-releasing and mind-restricting experiences at both the conscious and unconscious levels. Traumatic experiences of childhood, blind memorization of pre-determined facts, generalizations, and structures are examples of restricting phenomena. Conceptualization of restricting forces has been aided significantly by Freud's model of it, ego, and super ego. But, however valuable this construct may be for clinical purposes, it has its limitations in accounting for the creative mind-releasing experiences and processes of man. In this respect, the constructs of Jung, which place the unconscious in a complementary role with the conscious, seem more appropriate to the position here taken. His positive orientation seems more in line with the creative nature of the healthy human organism.

Effective education would enable the individual to perceive and restructure those experiences that have yielded mind restrictions. In short, an effective education is one which frees the mind to function. This freeing of the mind requires positive action on the part of the individual, utilizing all his powers in unity, directed toward awareness and understanding of the relationships of the total cosmos, the psychological concept of "self."

All experiences are potential transformations resulting in meaning patterns.⁹ These patterns are fundamental to communication but, as pointed out above, are not necessarily dependent on the specific common experiences of people, so much as on the "significant form" they have perceived and generalized.¹⁰ An example of this can be seen in a conversation between a scientist and a layman. The meaning of scientific knowledge to the scientist comes from his sense of "significant form." The layman who has not experienced the same phenomena sees this knowledge as individual facts to be evaluated on their own merits. Two scientists, on the other hand, communicate through mind structures which represent a science point of view.¹¹ This communication is a reciprocal relationship; creative and meaningful, inasmuch as what is said by one is meaningfully transformed by the other. In the case of the scientist and the layman, communi-

cation bogs down when the scientist talks of projected inquiry because the layman has not developed a science point of view. The result is, he "fields" each word as an individual entity and therefore the unified conceptualizations of the scientist are lost in the translation.

But let us not fall into that trap in which so many of our predecessors have found themselves — namely that ultimate meaning and communication to the individual are limited to what is catalogued as reason. As important as reason itself is the fact that it is not the only source of meaning, nor the ultimate. Meaning is also derived from intuition and faith. The human organism has the power symbolically to transform his world into meaningful patterns in at least these three ways. All three are actually manifestations of the same world apprehended in different ways. And since man is a symbol-creating and symbol-using being, he continuously builds and refines his symbol-systems, seeking to recognize and create order in terms of his life and world. This power to symbolize has led to the development of refined sources of meaning or symbol-organizations through which truth is sought and reality is perceived. These organizations result from a continuous striving to lend greater form and substance to life and will be continually refined as time goes on, both in form and function. Today these organizations are the most sharable and efficient means existent for grasping the world of the past and present and providing a foundation for future inquiry. They represent "process," which is man's fulfillment. As man-made structures, they too, become part of the reality to be perceived. They constitute a system of interrelated ways of knowing or disciplines of varying dimensions.

The form and function of these ways of knowing, ways of becoming, or models of perception is known by and through individually developed structures, by and through their methods of inquiry, key ideas, domains of reality, and products of inquiry. Essence or structure in these ways of knowing, perceived by each person, is a source of meaning for one's discursive language and is at the same time a non-discursive language necessary for acquiring meanings. For example, structure in geography acts as a perceptual model through

which geographic knowledge comes into being.¹² Critical evaluation of this knowledge by a non-geographer requires the previous formulation of a geographic model. Structure in this sense is *a changing significant form carved from experience, not simply the unique relationships within any system of knowing, not just organizing principles*. Therefore, viewing structure as a finite set of relationships is contrary to findings in perception and cognition. One might do better to refer to structuring rather than to structure. Structuring has a symbolic mission in that it provides changing perceptual models which generate meanings, free one from any one structure, and provide form for effective communication.

EDUCATION AND THE DISCIPLINES

Man's symbolic transformations are means to high level integrations both biologically and psychologically. This symbolizing capacity seems to be unique to human becoming. And the capacity increases in importance throughout the adaptive life of the individual. Since it is a basic means to self-fulfillment, it is therefore significant to the educative process.

Education can best be defined in terms of these symbolizing capacities. It can be considered a continuous process of refinement wherein one strives to relate intimately with his world, implying refinement of the processes of symbolic transformation as well as insight into previously created products, and refinement of self-understanding. The curriculum is therefore representative of that human activity directed toward quickening these refinement processes.

The basically human capacity for symbolic transformation is well supported in today's literature in psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and biology, to mention a few, and is recognized by many good teachers. But simply acknowledging the creative potentialities of man is not sufficient. We must devise ways and means to free these potentialities. A key to these ways and means exists in "academic disciplines." They traditionally have been viewed as important essentially for the purpose of transmitting the cultural

heritage and have therefore been "offered-up" as the principal means to an education with little regard for the student. As a result, we have become enamored of either the form or content of these disciplines at the expense of their function or process, or at the other extreme, we have been bent on function at the expense of form. Seldom has there been an adequate marriage of these two positions. We now have in the concept of symbolic transformation coupled with knowledge in biology, psychology, etc., a new insight into the solution to this problem. So for the purpose of determining what the substance of a curriculum designed for humans is to be, we need to consider first what man's sources of meaning are and how they function.

Man's symbol systems can be categorized by sources of meaning — meaning based in reason both postulative and inductive, meaning based on intuition and meaning based on faith. Concepts are defined in terms of wholeness, abstracted from one's world through these three ways of knowing. (The emphasis on wholeness refers to the essence of knowing, which cannot occur disconnected if it is meaningful, regardless of its stage of development.) Through intuition, concepts are derived directly from experience as immediately apprehended fact.¹³ Concepts by faith are based in reason or intuition or subjective experiences of revelation. Concepts by reason result from postulation and induction, the former being a deductive process and the latter an active search process.

These conceptual modalities are subject to development, and exist at various levels of refinement. From their most basic form to their fullest development, they play a part in the continuous integrations of the human organism and lead to the enhancement of self-awareness. Research in language development supports this thesis as language has been found to develop from an enactive stage, to iconic, to symbolic.¹⁴ This appears to hold true to some extent at any age level when one approaches a new experience. Therefore, whether meaning comes from intuition, reason, or faith, it is developmental and, most importantly, is by definition unified at all levels.

These meaning components are viewed as interdependent because meaning in one realm is defined in terms of meaning in another.

For example, the concept of granite in geology is realized through differentiating characteristics of this rock from all other rocks and synthesizing these characteristics with all the other factors within the setting. Concepts by reason are thus derived not only from properties of things or ideas but from their functional relationships as well. But this is not all. These concepts have aesthetic components as well as reasoned ones. They are also based on faith, implied or otherwise. In other words, concepts by reason are derived from properties of things or ideas and their functional relationships, coupled with feelings toward or about the objects, and faith in their existence and comprehensibility. Of course the degree of abstraction varies with the amount and stage of the individual's experiences. The initial stages of development might best be termed the stage of common intuition, common faith, and common sense.

It would be difficult to determine which of these three types actually initiates one's knowing and probably the question is irrelevant anyway. Each type can initiate knowing and the results will likely be similar. All have this potentiality. Their higher refinements can lead to greater flexibility, greater range, and greater self-insight. Such ideas as "intuitive leaps" noted by scientists, and "the art of inquiry" substantiate this claim. This illustrates a symbiotic relationship between modes of knowing which are continuously evolving new adaptations. Knowledge of the reciprocal relationships between ways of knowing breaks down the schism between the sciences and the humanities, not simply on an emotional basis but in terms of the integration of a biological organism. Note, however, that integration is an internally generated adaptation which has nothing to do with the externally perceived relatedness of one subject area to another.

In the author's view, samples of man's developing symbol organizations reveal the following categories based on the single criterion — sources of meaning, as shown in Chart I.

Each way of knowing focuses upon aspects of the same assumed cosmos and must therefore be thought of as being somehow interconnected. The same holds for the products of these creative modes. This does not imply a static nature but rather a suspended unity always in flux, depending wholly upon the individual's perceptions.

CHART I: Sources of Meaning

REASON

POSTULATION (Deductive)

Formal logic,
mathematics

INDUCTION (Empirical)

Differentiative

Geology
Minerology
Pedology
Topography
Hydrology
Oceanography
Botany
Zoology
Biology
Meteorology
Climatology
Astronomy
Chemistry
Physics
Psychology
Physiology
Economics
Political Science
Sociology
Linguistics
Anthropology
Various Combinations

Synthesizing

Ecology
Geography
History
Archeology
Philosophy
Theology

INTUITION

Ritual
Myth
Drama
Painting
Music
Sculpture
Poetry
Literature
Dance
Architecture
Photography

FAITH

Agnosticism
Shintoism
Moslem
Judaism
Protestantism
Catholicism
Hinduism
Confucianism
Buddhism
Atheism

These assumed interrelationships make critical evaluation possible. In the areas of reason, the evaluative criteria are basically those of logic and empirical evidence coupled with intuition and faith. In the intuitive form, appropriateness is judged against the background of free response to the real world since perceptual closeness or similarity to the real world is its trademark. But it too can be judged by reason and faith. Faith, being the indirect result of reason and/or intuition, and the direct result of revelation, can be evaluated in terms of reason and intuition but not in terms of revelation, at least as yet determined. Perhaps research in extra-sensory perception will yield some light here eventually.

Contradictions between fields lead to questions of validity within fields. The assumption of unity makes this evaluation possible. Thus, when one's beliefs are in conflict (and they always are to some degree), for the sake of psychological and physiological well-being one must strive to resolve this conflict. In other words, a state of perfect homeostasis is continuously sought but never fully achieved. There seem to be plateaus, however, and, of course, regressions which in actuality exist but are not accounted for in this theory.

What can this be boiled down to? Simply this. Man is born with the potentiality for human-ness, for becoming a unique yet culturally compatible person. Fulfillment of this potential for the human being requires ever-increasing degrees of self-insight and self-discovery in addition to the basic requirements for physical well-being. Self-discovery results in what Erickson has termed an omnicentric individual as contrasted with an egocentric.¹⁵ To achieve omni-centric development is to generate a deep perceptiveness of reality, a feeling for life in all its manifestations but above all a value system based on humanistic criteria.

How does one discover himself? To discover "self" is to become aware of the adaptiveness of the human organism—to sense the flux and flow of the total cosmos of which a human being is an integral part. This requires action on the part of the individual directed toward the differentiation of all aspects of the universe and their integration into one's total becoming. The various modes of knowing offer keys to the development of such a concept of "self." They

are predicated on an openness to the world and especially to one's fellow man even though they result in greater control, unity, and meaning.

The reciprocal relationships true communication implies, which psychotherapists see as fundamental to the therapy situation, are prerequisites to the discovery of "self."¹⁶ For it is in a social situation where there is face to face exchange of ideas and feelings that one truly sees himself. And that which he believes about himself is mirrored in the perceptions of the world he alone perceives.

A healthy "self concept" can only be hoped for when individuals have adequately developed their varied potentialities.¹⁷ These potentialities remain untapped as long as environmental conditions are considered to dominate the individual; in fact as long as any simple cause and effect relationship is the main conceptualization accounting for the affairs of human beings;* as long as literature becomes a technique before it is an experience; as long as method becomes predominant over the wondrous world toward which our inquiry is directed.¹⁸

The significance of the concepts briefly summarized in this chapter is readily apparent. The human organism has many creative potentialities which must be reckoned with if it is to gain significant degrees of self-fulfillment. The basic contentions upon which a sound curricular policy should be building grow naturally out of consideration of these creative potentialities.

What new assumptions, then, do we have for real curricular innovation?

1. Each human being is engaged in a continuous search for meaning, order, and unity in his world.
2. Man and his environment are dynamically interacting systems.
3. The problem of knowing and becoming is not one of developing constructs of the mind to match those assumed to exist in the external world.
4. Each human being has the power to transform symbolically his world into meaningful patterns.

*See the intellectual revolution in Physics as described by Bridgman in *Limits of Language*. (Edited by Walker Gibson.) New York: Hill and Wang, 1962.

5. Man's search for meaning has yielded symbol systems or ways of knowing which are sharable, efficient, and potentially fruitful means for seeking and knowing reality.
6. Utilization of the processes of symbol systems develops one's own sense of meaning; they are effective means of self-insight.
7. Man's becoming is a continuous integration of the total cosmos of which he is a part, each meaningful experience being transformed in wholeness by intuition, reason, and faith.
8. Continuous integration of one's knowing and being leads to higher and higher levels of self-fulfillment and humanly oriented values.
9. Designing curricular materials and experiences for maximum human development is essential to the well-being of a democratic society and its individual members.

What specific suggestions do these assumptions reveal for curricular development?

1. Students must be involved in "active search" for order and meaning in their worlds rather than passively consuming pre-digested facts.
2. Active search guided by the methods of symbol systems leads to structure which permits communication, making it imperative that each student acquire the necessary depth of experience to produce this state.
3. The methods whereby scientists, writers, artists, mathematicians, and other specialists actively transform their worlds provide effective clues to the process experience required by students. As with these specialists, transforming experiences for students must not reflect imposed intellectual segregations but must evolve naturally from feelings and thoughts identified by the individual making the inquiry.
4. All experiences must be considered as having the potentiality for language development in its broadest sense; some are more readily obtainable than others depending upon the individual's age.*

*See Piaget's developmental stages.

5. Integration of one's knowing can readily occur when the individual is open to experiences and equipped with refined sources of meaning — reason, intuition, and faith.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Powell, Thomas F. "American Values—What Are They?" *Social Education* 30; No. 2, February 1966.

² See *The Times Educational Supplement*, No. 2582. London: November 13, 1964.

³ Murphy, Gardner. *Human Potentialities*. New York: Basic Books, 1958.

⁴ Herrick, Judson. *The Evolution of Human Nature*. Austin: Texas University Press, 1956. p. 121.

⁵ Eiseley, Loren C. *The Mind As Nature*. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

⁶ Kelley, Earl C. *Education For What Is Real*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

⁷ Flavell, John H. *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963.

⁸ Langer, Susanne. *Philosophy in a New Key*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Bell, Clive. *Art*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958.

¹¹ Conant, James. *On Understanding Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.

¹² Arnold, Robert L., and Lahey, Charles. *Inquiry—A Sourcebook for the Discovery Approach to Social Studies*. New York: Selected Academic Readings, 1965.

¹³ Northrup, F. S. C. *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947.

¹⁴ Bruner, Jerome S. "The Course of Cognitive Growth." *American Psychologist* 19; 1964.

¹⁵ Erickson, Erick. *Childhood and Society*. New York: Norton Press, 1963.

¹⁶ Jourard, Sidney. *The Transparent Self*. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Press, 1964.

¹⁷ Jersild, Arthur. *In Search of Self; An Exploration of the Role of the School in Promoting Self-Understanding*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1952.

¹⁸ Koch, Sigmund. *The Allures of a Meaning in Modern Psychology: An Inquiry into the Rift Between Psychology and the Humanities*. La Jolla, Calif.: Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1961.

WARREN HICKMAN

Bridging the Gap

The Humanities — The branches of learning concerned with human thought and relations, as distinguished from the sciences, especially literature and philosophy, and, often, the fine arts, history, etc.¹

EDUCATION HAS BEEN STEADILY SHIFTING FROM THE CLASSICAL — humanity oriented — to the technical. We have departed from philosophy and art, from what man thinks and from the relations of men with one another, to concentrate on the techniques of organizing society and utilizing its technologies.

Our trend may be good, it may even be the only direction in which society will permit us to develop. Certainly it is a most obvious accompaniment of the secularization-urbanization-industrialization syndrome which has made possible our system of public education. But, good or bad, we should recognize our rapid approach

toward that point where humanities are threatened with extinction at the secondary school level.

Already there are far too few opportunities for exposure to the humanities from K through 12. The pressures of our universities are not the least of factors molding our elementary and secondary curricula. The emphasis on oral skills and proficiency tests in foreign languages is understandable, but something has had to give. Personally, I wish I had learned to speak my "foreign languages" as a beginning student, and could now be less embarrassed when attempting even a most modest conversation. On the other hand, language laboratories have usurped time which was in part devoted to studying literature and art of the respective foreign culture.

A natural emphasis on mathematics and the sciences has been urged both by parents and universities of our post-World War II technologically oriented society. Even the cry "Johnny can't read or write," has drawn tax-payer support for cutting out such "useless frills" as Shakespeare and Emerson in favor of more business letter writing. Elective offerings in speech, drama, and journalism further draw the "English" requirement into the area of techniques formerly reserved for the sciences, languages, and vocational programs.

The social studies have come under similar attacks from a curious assortment of allies. Interested citizens and occasional legislators decry the impracticality of "dates and names" and demand, instead, electives in economics which will guard our youth against the enticements of socialism. Spokesmen for other social science disciplines are quick to slip into this opening with pleas for their specialties. "Cut back on the old social studies," we are told, "and add courses in sociology, anthropology, political science, law, psychology, and regional history."

Advisors from the social science disciplines have called for students to become more socially oriented. Their call to arms should, however, be weighed against the possibility that their specialties actually threaten to do the very opposite of making students more "socially" conscious, more aware of man's thinking and of his relations to other humans. Can we skip a general education type of social studies and directly substitute social science courses from the

various disciplines without turning our students into behavioral statisticians (or at least technicians) instead of citizens with an understanding of man's thinking?

It would be naive to assume most students are today understanding human thought and relations, but is the direction of increased specialization the only one in which a solution can be sought? Any curriculum which concentrates on analyzing man as it would a machine, which concentrates on statistical predictors of action instead of human thought and relations, can make students less creative and more mechanical. Certainly, "history" courses which have been made mere chronicles of wars, assassinations, births, deaths, and coronations, have well earned the abuse of students as well as of the teachers of other disciplines. A good historian shudders at such a description of "history," for he knows history is not only the record of man's life through the ages, but is also *the attempt to interpret the significance to man of the events recorded.*

PHILOSOPHY VS. EXPERTISE

History taught as a calendar of events, or history as taught to a college sophomore should have no more place in a K-12 curriculum than the specialized study of behavioral statistics. On the other hand, we may talk all we will about a new direction for the social studies, but if the change is all in the direction of "science," we are well on our way toward wiping out humanistic thought.

Compressing the present curriculum in order to add new specialties does not "preserve a little of both approaches." For example, a curriculum plan which might call for completing United States history in the eighth grade and cutting out all western history prior to the middle ages in order to make room for economics, American studies, sociology, and similar courses, will only reduce whatever little *real* history now remains to a meaningless journal or calendar of events. If this change is undertaken because current social studies in some schools already places too much emphasis on dates and names and too little on interpretation, the above change will only drive the "history" portion of social studies farther into pure chronicling.

How, in such a case, can we expect the citizen who is a graduate engineer, doctor, accountant, chemist, or farm agent, or who is a terminal high school graduate in a non-professional field to see any relationship between what man has done and the problems of labor, management, government, religion, megalopolis, automation, civil rights, and social change?

Students should still learn *what man did and why*. Why was there an American Revolution, a War of 1812, a Civil War, or a Korean War? Are problems leading to those events now resolved? If so, how and when? If not, are they a continuing source of trouble today? When and why did labor problems arise? How have attempts at their resolution influenced our present society? Why are current economic crises inseparable from international affairs? Why and how has our population shifted westward? What are the roots of our contemporary social problems? Why are they still with us? — Why? How? Why?

It is not likely that the compression and termination of United States history at the eighth grade, and a terminal eight months on the western world since 1400 at grade 9 or 10 is even going to make students aware that there is a question of *Why* or *How*.

All this has the earmarks of a special plea for history as the sole content and purpose of social studies. On the contrary, the chronological, cause and effect, interpretive approach of history is only one aspect of a successful bridge between the sciences and the humanities. We do need to preserve history, but only as an integral part of a total social studies program.

We need geography and history as spatial and chronological tools for inquiry and for proper perspective. A sociologist or economist who might be inclined to dismiss background in geography and history as irrelevant to his future disciplines ignores his own background. Competent anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists see their findings in a historical perspective. The Jacobins, August Comte, experiences with mercantilism, democratic and industrial revolutions, and the growth of the nation-state are a part of the understanding of the sociologist, the economist, and the political scientist. To teach an entire new generation only the find-

ings of a social science discipline without the perspective of the teacher can leave us with a generation of parrots unable to create or criticize within their own discipline.

At a reception in the home of a graduate professor of philosophy in the immediate post-World War II period, a graduate student, with the pomposity of youth, informed his host that he was going to be "a philosopher."

"What," his professor host inquired, "have you studied?"

"I took every undergraduate course in philosophy offered by my department, and I'm taking every graduate course available here."

"Have you had any physics?"

"No."

"Any biology?"

"No."

"Any economics, sociology, political science, or mathematics?"

"No."

"Then you can never be a philosopher," the hosting professor remarked over his tea. "You can only be an expert on what philosophers have said."

Perspective and tools — Social studies must provide them as a part of general education. History, metaphysics, religion, political science, and even mathematics were once taught as a part of philosophy. The growth of knowledge has been something akin to a bursting seed pod. From philosophy's stem drifted the sciences and history. And from science spread the specific disciplines of chemistry, physics, and biology, from which sub-disciplines are pressing now to emerge. Hybrid psychology was shunted from departments of philosophy to departments of biology, and finally built a department of its own. History proliferated political science, sociology, anthropology, and economics. Each new generation of seedlings was further removed from its source discipline, philosophy. And each was more a science and less a humanity.

On university campuses arguments rage within disciplines as to the direction they should take. Sociologists, for example, may agree that sociology is a "scientific study of social behavior or social action of human beings,"² but from that point on may disagree as to

whether to follow rigorous experimentation, statistical sampling, and data analysis, or to use an historical or generalizing approach.

At the 1966 annual meeting of the New York State Council on Social Studies, Professor Andrew Hacker, Department of Political Science, Cornell University, warned his audience to "look before you leap." If there is still uncertainty as to what is the correct approach within disciplines on university campuses, Dr. Hacker continued, teachers should think carefully before throwing out all they now have in social studies for a disciplinary specialty which may soon be disowned by the disciplinary scholars themselves.

ON BRIDGES AND BUILDING

If pure history is not the answer to our search for a better social studies program, and if too great a scientific emphasis dehumanizes the field still further, in what direction lies the solution?

The purpose of social studies appears to be best met by developing a bridge between the sciences and the humanities. At one extreme lie the "pure" humanities, at the other the physical and natural sciences. The bridge itself should be a transitional program structured from all social science disciplines and approaches, from the blend of history with the other humanities at one end to the opposite point where social science merges with the other sciences. In this manner, the social studies can bring humanities into the lives and thinking of our technologically oriented students, and can keep the humanities in contact with the rapidly changing physical world of our citizens.

Our real struggle now is not to convince social studies departments to change, but rather to direct changes toward building a bridge when so many wish merely to leap the chasm by complete conversion to behavioral sciences.

Not all discussion of method need be confined to classroom techniques. An important phase of method is that by which new curriculum can be constructed and offered to students to accomplish the above stated purpose.

A social studies program for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can no more ignore the latest developments in the most scien-

tific of the social sciences than can science courses ignore the solid state physics or molecular biology of the space age. Our first task is a proper integration of the major concepts and their supporting evidence from each social science discipline. We can learn from the experience of our colleagues in the physical sciences who have already undertaken extensive revision of their program. The physical scientists did not turn their courses into highly specialized offerings such as optics or organic chemistry. First of all, they could not. Unless a student has a knowledge of mathematics and more basic physics, he cannot complete a full course in optics. Without qualitative and quantitative chemistry, a student would be lost in a course devoted entirely to organic chemistry. The content of the basic physical science courses has changed, because the knowledge explosion in the sciences since 1940 has added more to be learned than did the preceding two centuries.

The knowledge explosion has not been limited to the physical sciences, and it is natural that social science specialists on university graduate faculties should urge an earlier beginning in their special field. But the knowledge explosion has resulted not only in more knowledge at the highest level of a discipline, but also in general basic information common to and required by all disciplines. In short, the body of material considered as general education has grown in proportion to the growth in advanced specialties. Study of comparative government without a knowledge of American government provides no ground for comparison, and American government without a knowledge of American history is an insurmountable assignment.

In designing a social studies program, we must appreciate the need for a base for all individual social sciences and for all citizens who will terminate their social studies upon receipt of a high school diploma. Now, in K-12, not in engineering school, or law college, or even in a liberal arts history department, or on the assembly line, the student has his *only* opportunity to receive a thorough general education in social studies.

If this means adding another year to the A.B. or the Ph.D., or revising major requirements in colleges or on jobs, then that is what should be done. We have seen the old textbooks which have been

"updated" by cutting an opening chapter and adding a new "current" final chapter. We *lost* the material of the first chapter. Cutting the general education base of the student by eliminating basic concepts and the evidence upon which they are based, in order to offer more advanced prerequisites to a specific discipline, may deny the student future access to the offerings of other specific disciplines. Don't cut the size of the foundations of an already unsatisfactory structure in order to use the time saved to add one more floor to it!

If social studies are to be general education oriented, they should integrate the major ideas of each of the social science disciplines. There are important facets of each social science which can fit the bridge to the humanities. Basic economics can be taught with emphasis only upon economic activity or as a foundation for economic theory. Political science can concentrate on administrative techniques and processes or upon political theory. We can offer basic education, from each of the social sciences, which centers upon man, his thought, and his relations with fellow men. From K-12 it is more important for students to study man's reaction to political ideas upon which governments are based than to know the marriage patterns of a Kansas City suburb.

Caution is necessary whenever speaking of integration. The integrated freshman social science course in some colleges, for example, has been little more than a collection of short surveys of sociology, psychology, economics, anthropology, and government. Who teaches such "integrated" courses? Usually it is a professor of one discipline, who has not had even an introductory course in some of the disciplines being surveyed. A good integration of social sciences in a K-12 social studies program should weave the key facts, concepts, and generalizations of individual disciplines into a perspective centered on man. It should not be a miscellaneous collection of edited or "watered-down" selections from six or eight "introductory" courses.

ON USING THE DISCIPLINES

How do we do it? What do we use for a skeleton?

To determine the skeleton, we must first decide upon a starting point and a goal. The goal has more or less been stated above. The

starting point can be determined by first weighing the role of facts, concepts, and generalizations.

We have been pressed by the various disciplines to learn and teach their generalizations. The laws of physical science, and more recently, "laws" of social science can be included among these generalizations. Actually a law, in the sense of legislation by governments, is a generalization based upon concepts held by a society. In turn, the concepts are structures composed of ideas. We usually claim our ideas to be based in turn upon facts.

Our problem is to decide whether to concentrate on generalizations, concepts, or facts, or upon all or any combination thereof. If we concentrate on generalizations we are in danger of turning out a generation in which the "law" is always right (scientific or social). The new generation, lacking an understanding of basic concepts of contributing disciplines, could not effectively challenge or evaluate generalizations. Likewise, concentration on concepts to the exclusion of "facts," poses a similar danger of producing citizens unable to create new or criticize old concepts. But of what use are facts if students have not learned to develop concepts from them, and are concepts alone practical unless they can be applied to generalizations? Like the chicken and the egg, we have created a continuous cycle.

We need, therefore, facts from which to create both disciplinary and interdisciplinary concepts and, of course, to create further the basic generalizations of the social sciences. If we had only learned the laws of science and never passed on or searched for facts our "laws" would still uphold pre-Galileo explanations of an earth centered universe.

A chronological and chorological approach to facts need not be a sop thrown to historians. Cause and effect relationships of facts, necessary for conceptual development, can only be offered in chronological and chorological contexts. We need look no further for the skeleton upon which to build our offerings. Let the chronological approach be the skeleton for facts. From facts, whenever sufficient are available, draw concepts. From concepts, build generalizations. Generalizations in turn may reinforce, alter, or wipe out what we have accepted as facts.

The importance of this cycle, rather than complete emphasis on one phase, is the development of perspective for comparative purposes. Just as we compare the size of George Washington's army with the seats in Yankee Stadium to illustrate the small number of committed Americans in 1779, so we can compare the thinking of men. Seeing Plato's theories in their own political, religious, and social environment, and comparing and contrasting the ideas and eras of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Spinoza, Rousseau, Locke, Dewey, and others, develops perspective for creative thinking in our own era.

Drama, poetry, philosophy, religion, music, painting, and other expressions of creative thought are the important elements of an age. The kings and wars of a century mean little if we do not understand why man's relations with other men bred these monarchs and conflicts. Nor is that the end. From these ages what new was formed upon which the next era was built? From what thinking around and before him did August Comte draw in outlining his "queen of the sciences," sociology? What influences formed Locke's political philosophy? How have social and philosophical forces driven reformers from the Reformation to the God Is Dead movement?

Surely the symphonies of Tchaikowsky and operas of Wagner, the plays of Shakespeare, the essays of Emerson, and the works of Michaelangelo and Titian have influenced as well as reflected an era. How then can they be ignored? We claim it impossible to create in modern science without a knowledge of the findings of Newton, Boyle, Pasteur, Curie, and Einstein. But there are some who believe we can begin structuring political, social, and economic thought with no reference to or knowledge of the thinking of the past or of our fellow man today. Chronological ordering of social, political, economic, and religious action can structure a causal perspective in which action and reaction make sense. In other words, social studies are perspective for our political and scientific world.

In the social studies classroom, the student should learn to bring human thought and relations into contact with his own material problems. If this bridge is built, a thinking citizenry may be able to catch up socially with its technological accomplishments.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The above has been selected from *Webster's New World Dictionary*, College Edition, as a more general definition of humanities than those sometimes offered within the restrictions of a single discipline.

² Gould, Julius, and Kolb, W. J. *UNESCO Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. p. 676.

ROBERT F. CARTER
KATHERINE K. CARTER

Some Practical Difficulties

FOR AN INDIVIDUAL TO BE A COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE BEING, HE must have an understanding of himself as a person relative to other persons in the whole sphere of experience. The social sciences embrace the large framework in which he may place himself — both abstractly and factually. The humanities embody the experiences and perceptions of *individuals*, and the study of these can help one to gain insights into his situation and role in society. It would seem only reasonable, then, that an integrated study of the social sciences and the humanities is the approach by which people would most benefit.

This is a complex, interdependent, swiftly changing world in which the social sciences and the humanities are often eclipsed by natural science and technology: a world of continuing wars and revolutions in which political and social problems mount at a frightening pace. The physical and material control of nature by man far outreaches his abilities to understand and cope with the unforesee-

able consequences of that control. Man seems to have become the slave rather than the master of science and technology and of his own archaic institutions. The very future of humanity and civilization is in doubt.

As knowledge of science and technology continues to accelerate, the individual more and more lives in a world in which quantification, depersonalization, commercialization, and propaganda reduce him to a sense of futility and alienation from himself and his fellow man. In a world of mass society, mass culture, and automation, the person feels more and more reduced to impotency and unimportance. He is a consumer: entertained, advised, titillated by the mass media even as he becomes a cog, inwardly lonely, frustrated, and ineffectual. Immersed in a driven, exploitative, materialistic culture, his life goals become wealth, power, and status. Though more luxurious, man's life has become increasingly overorganized, bureaucraticized, and standardized. He is paying a price for his "progress" — in alienation, anxiety, and conformity.

But what has all this to do with the social studies and the humanities? The humanities can contribute important understandings to man's social knowledge. Many intangible values, such as sensitiveness, compassion, and imagination are indispensable to man's understanding of himself and the problems of the contemporary world. Because the humanities have to do with the development of the ineffable qualities in the *total man*, they can aid man to become less the servant, more the master of his own institutions. Natural science and technology are simply not enough for man's happiness and survival. The humanities offer a marvelous mirror of the human condition, and if skillfully incorporated into the social studies, can enable students to see the unique, human side of man within the social context. Students can better understand the American experience in all its variety and color through literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, drama, and poetry which are, after all, views of life as experienced by particular individuals; views that can beautifully recapture the mood and perceptions of a precise time, and thus, enhance historical study. Discernment and insight are individual; they can emerge more vividly from novel and exciting materials which

social science generalizations and abstractions rarely supply. The humanities express and assess man's plight in the world and so have much to offer by providing the individual who is endeavoring to know himself an additional means of developing insights into himself and the time. That is why the humanities should be drawn upon by the social studies.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

Contemporary social studies education, despite some reforms and modifications, still largely consists of the traditional narrow courses. The typical school course in American History, for example, still is dominated by political history to the exclusion of social, cultural, and intellectual developments. There are hopeful signs and changes in the so-called "new" social studies which stress a more inductive approach — "discovery learning" by students reading documents, essays, doing library research projects under teacher guidance — and the use of documentary films, tapes, records, all of which assuredly make the courses more meaningful. Still, social studies education tends too often to be one-dimensional in approach. Little attempt is made, except in rare cases, to integrate the humanities with the secondary social studies courses. In too many schools courses are still largely textbook-centered and, too often, a dull, dry recitation of names, dates, battles, and the like. An integrated approach to the social studies will give variety and breadth to the conventional courses. It will give much-needed depth and individual meaning to what otherwise is often a collation of meaningless abstractions and lifeless data. But integration of the humanities with the social studies will require recognizing and dealing with many obstacles and problems not least of which is convincing teachers, administrators, and parents of the *value* of the humanities in the social studies. Some problems are inherent in the high school itself; some devolve upon the high school from the college where the administrators and teachers prepared.

We cannot assume blithely that it will be a fairly simple matter to integrate the humanities and the social studies. The instigation of a new course or a new program affects and is affected by the inter-

ests of all participants — community, administration, faculty, students. Lack of understanding, lack of support from any one group can immobilize the secondary school. Of all the groups culpable here, students are the least so, though they are most often charged with impeding change in the school. They are blamed for lack of interest, lack of understanding, lack of willingness to change, but they are seldom guilty. Young people dote on change. They like things that are different; they want to get out of the old routine; they want new ways, new programs, new courses. No, students are not the resisting forces, but some members of the other groups are — for what they, rightly or wrongly, deem to be good and sufficient reasons. And the group best able to work for change and then to make change work is the faculty.

The practical difficulties of integrating the humanities in the teaching of the social studies and *vice versa* are enormous. The brunt of the work must be handled by the social studies and English departments. They must consult with music, art, languages, but the bulk of the planning and execution of the program must be done by social studies and English personnel. Can they do it? Of course they can if they will surmount some presently inhibiting factors. And the first step in overcoming obstacles is the recognition of the nature of the hindrances to such a program.

The usual teacher of high school social studies is a person who thinks himself reasonably well grounded in his own area. He has read history, some sociology, political science, and economics. Philosophy, literature? Probably not, or if he has, it has been in an extremely limited fashion. After all, he isn't teaching those — or art or music either — nor did he plan to. The usual teacher of high school English is also a person who thinks himself quite conversant with his own field. He has pursued the study of grammar to a greater or lesser degree either in the traditional way, or more lately, through the linguistic approach. He has had a course or two in public speaking and composition. He has read something of all kinds of materials usually termed "literature" — poetry, drama, novels, essays, biography. History, political works, philosophy? Rarely. He doesn't expect to teach them and anyway, they aren't literature, are they?

Neither of these persons is fully aware of the wide range of materials available to better his understanding of what he is purporting to teach. The first step toward an integrated program for humanities-social studies is for teachers to recognize their own needs for broader backgrounds in related areas of learning. They must *read* — broadly, deeply, and well — from all of the best sources. Formal courses are important, but much of the necessary reading can be done independently. Only then will these teachers be able and willing to talk with each other for the purpose of planning and implementing a program of interest and value to their students and themselves. Why, then, do we not immediately prepare ourselves for progress? This question brings us to our second arena, the college.

TEACHER PREPARATION

An increasing number of teachers are Liberal Arts graduates with the B.A. or M.A. in an academic area. These people usually have a depth of background in their major fields. Others, however, are those who have fulfilled the minimum requirements for the B.S. in Education and provisional certification. The B.S. or M.S. in Social Studies Education may have a few hours each of American History, European History, sociology, economics, political science, and geography. There is typically no focus in his training. The B.S. in English Education may have only minimum hours in literature, which is the core of the secondary English program. The balance of the required hours are scattered over various phases of the English offerings from the college catalog, but with no real concentration or depth in any area. In both of these cases many of the courses, in all probability, were of the survey type such as those taught to freshmen or sophomores, so that the graduate teacher-to-be has had little or no exposure to advanced courses or seminars or readings and has acquired no knowledge about his field in terms of its philosophy or of its investigation and writing.¹ Therefore, it seems that the secondary teacher's preparation in his own area is limited and his acquaintance with contributing fields is even more so. This is a major obstacle to the integra-

tion of the social studies and the humanities. This is why we say that teachers must broaden and deepen their own learning in order to deal effectively with the social studies and the humanities — through formal courses and through independent reading.

It is true that some colleges and universities are attempting to upgrade the preparation of secondary teachers in academic areas through M.A. programs and Master of Arts in Teaching programs. These programs may also be the means to permanent certification to teach a specific subject area since the additional study will — theoretically, at least — give the recipients of these degrees some further content courses in their chosen fields. But the B.S. or M.S. in Education continues to dominate. For one thing, it has been institutionalized more effectively in terms of teacher certification requirements.

For secondary school teachers one of the courses required for certification is designated as methods of teaching. Such a course is required of candidates for degrees in Education and of those who hold the B.A. in an academic area who wish to become certified to teach. This kind of requirement is, on the face of it, not a bad thing. Courses in education or teaching methods and technique can have great value to the prospective teacher if they are taught by wise and experienced teachers, veterans of the secondary areas, who also have excellent broad academic backgrounds. They can be of inestimable practical value to the teacher-to-be. Properly taught, such a course introduces the neophyte to some of the realities of organizing his own course, of classroom presentation, use of resources, and his need for further reading on his own to give depth to his background.

Recent experiences of some student teachers from both private and public colleges indicate that their course in educational methods is frequently filled with advice on organizing classroom panel discussions, student activities, audio-visual aids, and how to make attractive bulletin boards. Of course these are not useless procedures, but they are often the core of the methods course and are, therefore, over-emphasized. A teacher who has imagination and enthusiasm and, above all, some broad knowledge in his field knows that these procedures are aids to his teaching; that they are not substitutes for

real content. Certainly the neophyte teachers need to know this if they are to enter into situations where they will be called upon to work in the integrated social studies and humanities.

Occasionally, some teachers of methods courses present not only a substantial course in methods but also introduce students to the uses of the humanities in teaching social studies.² Most of the more recent texts in social studies methods advocate integrated approaches to social studies teaching. Many texts in English methods suggest the incorporation of materials from history or the social sciences. But there is no way to mandate such integration. Under these circumstances it is plain that the prospective secondary teacher is frequently not well enough prepared in substantive background to enable him to incorporate other areas into his teaching. Drastic changes are absolutely necessary to upgrade the preparation of secondary teachers who will be able to integrate social studies and humanities in their teaching. First must come the recognition that the social studies and the humanities can be integrated. Up to now most teachers simply never have been made sufficiently aware of the relationship between them and the possibility, let alone the importance, of effectively relating the two. For this disastrous failing or oversight the colleges must take responsibility: teachers do come out of colleges.

The situation is due in part to the abdication, in some colleges and universities, of the preparation of teachers by the academic departments to the education division. Only in rare cases are methods courses taught by the academic people. When academic people do teach the methods course, the person selected is often of low rank and one who has limited knowledge of the secondary curriculum. Right now college teachers of academic subjects in the social sciences and humanities are seldom interested in, or even slightly conscious of, the stake they have in the secondary schools.³ Some are aware that they may be teaching potential secondary teachers, but to most it does not matter. They prefer to let the education division provide the techniques while they provide the content. Sometimes, there is even a veiled antagonism between the personnel of the two divisions. Consequently, there is little or no communication between them.

And here is where the academic people might do great good — by communicating with and working closely with the methodology people in developing courses for teachers. As things stand now, unfortunately, the academic departments are likely to reinforce the traditional compartmentalized approach toward their respective subject areas.

Though there are exceptions, the college professor is inclined to think mainly in terms of his special field and area of specialization. His Ph.D. orientation and his career mobility may be tied to further narrowing of that specialization. Not all Ph.D.'s are without breadth, but too many professors of English can't relate a literary work or a philosophical current to its historical and social context. And too many professors of history, government, and sociology haven't the faintest notion of the relationships of novels, drama, painting, or music to the culture and social structure of a particular period. As one student said recently, "They are all caught up in their own special interests; they don't recognize the existence of any others. They never see any relationship to any other area."

What the purveyors of the neatly packaged lore don't seem to perceive is that astute students — even undergraduates — question the professors' insulation from each other. These students are troubled by the professors' lack of the least conversance with areas other than their own narrow specialized domains. Is it really any wonder that the high school departments are insular when one considers their training? The point is that only when teachers — whether in the education departments or in the academic disciplines — themselves recognize and are able to illustrate the integration of the social studies and the humanities, will their students go out into the secondary schools enthused and able to do the same thing. Is it possible that the college professors should do some communicating and some reading as we indicated earlier that the secondary teachers should?

There are some hopeful signs that the situation is changing. Some doctoral programs for the preparation of college teachers do stress breadth along with an area of specialization. This is particularly true in certain interdisciplinary programs like those in American Studies.

However, such interdisciplinary programs are often not highly regarded by the vested interests in a well-defined academic field, who adjudge the interdisciplinary proponents superficial "dabblers" and "academic imperialists."

CYCLE OF NARROWNESS

Teachers prepared for both breadth and depth are more likely to show students of recent American History, for example, the possible uses of drawing on novels by Dreiser, Norris, Dos Passos, Lewis, or Steinbeck in illuminating a particular cultural milieu.⁴ But the number of practitioners of a broad, interdisciplinary orientation who can show students the exciting possibilities of the mutual uses of the social studies and humanities is pitifully small. Most professors neither know nor care about the situation in the secondary schools. One hopeful sign is that a few do. Generally, however, there is almost no communication between the college professors and the classroom teachers in the secondary schools. It would seem that it is easier for each to complain about the shortcomings of the other than to do anything constructive about the basic problem of communication. As an instance, professors of American History lament the fact that many of their students, who have had some exposure in the fifth, eighth, and eleventh or twelfth grades, know little American History except the most superficial trivia interlaced with folklore and chauvinism. These students come to college prepared to dislike history because the high school fed them a tedious diet of memorized names, dates, and like factual data. Curiously enough, their secondary teachers may well have been taught by these same professors, who themselves stress the same fragmentary trivia that they complain about; who exclude broad meanings and interpretations and make no reference to the arts and literature. And so, the vicious circle perpetuates itself. So, too, we come back to the necessity for a revision of attitudes throughout: at both college and secondary levels; in both methods and discipline areas.

College and university administrators must share the responsibility for failing to encourage or develop programs which would break

down the artificial walls between the social sciences and the humanities. Some are lately attempting to give both breadth and depth to students through interdisciplinary freshman courses and senior seminars. This is not nearly enough, but it is a beginning. The college and university administrations are at fault, too, in that they do not as a rule accord the professor-teacher the same esteem that is bestowed upon the professor-researcher-publisher. All too familiar to the college professor is the understanding, tacit or otherwise, that his promotions — perhaps his very livelihood — depend on his publishing output rather than on his ability to teach. No one in the academic sphere will dispute the fact that a capable professor-teacher is also a researcher. The professor-researcher lives on specialization, necessarily narrow, and his writings are most often publishable. But the professor-teacher's research is broad, integrative, conducive to good teaching though not so easy to publish. There is no question that harm is being done to students at the college level because of the present situation and that that harm is reflected to the high schools by the "circle" process. If this wrong is not to continue, college and university administrations must accept the obligation to right it. The basic issue is value: human relations or public relations?

The circle is complete when the graduates go out to teach in secondary school, armed with inadequate backgrounds and with no particular desire to read further in the field to develop some depth. Once they settle into a school routine with its long, demanding day and all the extra-educational and non-teaching responsibilities, they find it easy to say that they don't have time. Very often, this is true; at least, they haven't enough time. It becomes much easier and less time-consuming to fall back on the old reliable text as the centerpiece of instruction. And, horror of horrors, there remain some places where the courses are mandated either by the administration or by sacred tradition. As a consequence, the social studies courses are narrow and repetitive, emphasizing politics and diplomacy to the exclusion of social, intellectual, literary, and cultural aspects. So, with neither teachers nor students reading in these areas, it surely is no wonder that students come out of high school viewing history as irrelevant; that they go through life never knowing or under-

standing anything significant about man's past, social change, social problems, principles of human behavior, the individual's plight in the contemporary world, the role of chance in history, or the contributions of unique individuals to historical change.

The crux of the matter is that too many teachers do not realize that academic areas and materials are not mutually exclusive. Their college preparation has been fragmentary and highly compartmentalized. They have rarely, probably never, experienced a sense of the parts merging into the greater whole. Is it any wonder, then, that they see their own areas as separate, neat packages unrelated to all the others? We can hardly be surprised when objections are heard echoing through the teachers' lounges because some unusual teacher of social studies asks his classes to read *Main Street*, or an alert teacher of English assigns *The Politics of Upheaval* to his senior section. What loss to the students because of indifference and conflict. And the situation need not be! If only the studies were coordinated by all departments concerned!

Typically, the separate departments of the high school jealously guard their own domains. There is little communication between the departments either on a departmental or an individual basis. Hence, there is little willingness to share time, materials, or methods. Each tends to think of its own area as a separate and distinct preserve upon which no others may trespass. Within some departments the split is even greater: the teacher of American History feels he has little in common with the teacher of European History; the teacher of American literature feels he is a world apart from the teacher of English literature. Small wonder that the departments are not compatible. The sad situation is not altered in any measure by a department head who is non-intellectual and who, therefore, does not see the error in this attitude. The administrator may be non-intellectual, non-academic, or both, and he is busy so he doesn't encourage closer cooperation between departments.

PROBLEMS OF PROCEDURE

Suppose that some rare individuals, the unusual social studies teacher and the alert English teacher, do start something of an integrated

program — whether by design or by accident. Suppose they do manage to interest other members of their departments in what they are doing. What next? First, they must work to break down the barriers of exclusivity and convince their fellows that a good course is NOT developed from one text. In cases where teachers may be under some pressures from the top to adhere to a rigid schedule in order to "cover" the book, or where there are subtle (or maybe not so subtle) pressures to limit the kinds and amounts of materials used in classes, efforts must be directed at eliminating these fallacious regulations. Many kinds and great varieties of excellent materials are necessary to the building of a good program. Searches must be made for them. Great demands will be made on personal time and energy. Some of the old mythology regarding materials, students, standards must be discarded. In short, whole patterns of traditional thinking must be revised. And the most difficult thing to accomplish in a high school, as anywhere, is change. Resistance is adamant — even when change would not only be desirable, but would be easier than grinding along the same old paths.

In the event that some enlightened souls do arouse their colleagues and surmount the blocking of the *status quo* crowd, the next hurdle is convincing the administration that the program will be valuable to the students and the school — at least as valuable as new uniforms for the band and athletic teams. The task of proving the worth of the program to the administration can be accomplished best by the committee or group who, up to this point, have laid the groundwork for it at a sacrifice of much personal time and labor. Now the administrator must accept his share of the responsibility for a program of interest and value to the school by providing moral backing and arranging financial aid. He must give teachers leeway in planning the courses. He will have to consider hiring more personnel, re-working teacher schedules, relieving teachers of non-teaching duties. And he will have to allow in his budget for new and additional materials, especially in the library. A well-stocked library is essential for the integrated courses. The usual "one copy" and "standard" works only will not suffice. The faculty has a responsibility to provide the librarian with bibliographic information on the best materials available.

The next task facing the administrator is that of obtaining the support of the community through its representatives, the board of education. Without doubt, he will request assistance from the faculty in his presentation to the board. Those who have worked most closely with the development of the program will be able to explain its value and so gain the approval of the board and the community. Without their approval, there will be no program. All too often some truly marvelous innovations in curriculum are lost for want of adequate financial support. Value to the students, the school, and the community must be made absolutely irrefutable. Therefore, it behooves the faculty and the administration to cooperate closely to plan the best possible presentation to the community.

GENERAL PROSPECTS

A flourishing program integrating the humanities with the social studies is plainly not about to happen in the next few days or even months, patently desirable though it is. The problems we have discussed will first have to be dealt with. Reformation in attitudes and goals will be necessary at all educational levels. Greater emphasis must be given to broadening and deepening knowledge of the many facets of the social science and humanities disciplines, especially in the training of secondary teachers. Unless secondary teachers themselves have this breadth and depth, it is impossible to expect that a program of any merit can be developed at the secondary school level. It seems, therefore, that the initial obligation to act must be accepted by the colleges and universities.

Professors of education methods courses and those in academic subject areas must act in concert to prepare the secondary teachers. Secondary teachers will have to accept the legitimacy of the integrated program and the onus of working out the program as well as of assisting administrators to gain full endorsement for it from the boards of education and the communities. The first step in the process is the upgrading of the social sciences and the humanities. The canons of rigid compartmentalization and fragmentation that now pervade them will have to be put aside. The disciplines will have to

be restructured to make it possible for students to see the interrelationship and the diversity of knowledge. Those who impart the lore of the social sciences and the humanities will have to become as able and ready to experiment and as flexible in method as the practitioners in the natural sciences.

Probably the best hope for promotion of the integration of the social studies and the humanities will be the impetus from the college and university professionals in both academic content and social studies education areas who DO CARE about secondary social studies teaching; who have knowledge of the worth of an integrated approach; who will ESPOUSE the integration by demonstration in themselves and in their teaching. We know very well, however, that we cannot wait for a whole new corps of teachers to be trained for this program. We will hope, then, for some impetus in this direction from exceptional secondary teachers in the field who have been exposed to the possibilities of integrating social studies with the humanities or those who, through their own experiences and insights, see advantages in the integrated approach and have the courage and imagination to experiment.

There are some immediate and effective and already operational means to make some inroads into the problem. For example, there are the Master of Arts in Teaching programs, candidates for which can be recruited from highly qualified Liberal Arts graduates. The American Historical Association maintains a number of services, including its service center for teachers of history.⁵ It sponsors symposia, workshops, and other groups to relate specialized areas, including social and cultural history to the needs of secondary teachers. There are the summer workshops-institutes sponsored by local school districts either independently or in conjunction with a nearby college and taught by specialists and professors of both scope and depth.

Despite the difficulties spelled out in this chapter which are now impediments in the way of an integrated social studies and humanities program, we are not all that pessimistic about its eventual success. We know it to be desirable; we know it to be possible. We also know that to bring it into being we must face the realities of its inception. Time is of the essence. It is critical that we begin now

to help students to understand who they are, where they are, why they are, and what they can do if man is not to dissipate his potential beyond retrievability.

FOOTNOTES

¹ For an account of some of the weaknesses in the preparation of secondary teachers of American History, see: Baxter, Maurice G.; Ferrell, Robert H.; and Wiltz, John E. *The Teaching of American History in High Schools*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964.

² For a good paperback suitable to the upper secondary level which places the development of American Literature in its historical context, see: Foerster, Norman. *Image of America*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.

³ Marienhoff, Ira. "A High School Teacher Looks at College Training." *AHA Newsletter* 5: 13-16; No. 4, April 1967.

⁴ An excellent piece delineating the potential of this kind of teaching is an essay by Nelson M. Blake: "How to Learn History from Sinclair Lewis and Other Uncommon Sources." *American Character and Culture: Some Twentieth Century Perspectives*. (Edited by John A. Hague.) DeLand, Fla.: Everett Edwards Press, 1964. pp. 33-47.

⁵ Smith, Wilson. "History Departments and History in the Schools." *AHA Newsletter* 5: 16-20; No. 4, April 1967.

THOMAS E. CLAYTON

The Humanities Approach to the Social Studies

. . . A "humanistic" concept of education . . . sets as its goal the development of each individual's potential, fosters school programs centered on man, takes teachers and teaching seriously, and values each student simply because he is a human being.¹

Ask today's child about the sun, and he will tell you that it is 93 million miles from the earth, approximately 866,500 miles in diameter, with a surface rotation of about 25 days at the equator. Yet, it will always be the larger purpose of education to show him the radiance of a sunset.²

Anything significantly observed is significant, and that is significant that teaches us something about ourselves, which is to say, something about the human experience. . . .³

ANY AREA OF STUDY MAY BE ORGANIZED AND APPROACHED IN A variety of ways. It may be useful to contrast two ways of approaching the social studies in order to get at the distinctiveness

of one of those ways and to draw inferences about methodology. The two selected ways are here labeled "the disciplines approach" and "the humanities approach."

THE DISCIPLINES APPROACH

In the disciplines, as disciplines, material is organized as structured knowledge. The teaching aim is to have students acquire and understand that structured knowledge and, perhaps at advanced stages, add to it. Whether one stresses the *structure* or the *knowledge* or places equal stress on both, the over-all objectives are primarily cognitive. Any effective or active responses are enlisted in the service of the cognitive domain.⁴ The objectives, teaching activity and learning activity in a discipline are consonant with the classification of the Taxonomy of the Cognitive Domain. The process is focused on knowing (recognizing, recalling, remembering) information at the simplest end of the hierarchy and on evaluation of the worth of the structured discipline at the more complex end. The activities between, aimed at comprehension, application, analysis, and synthesis provide clues to appropriate methodology and specific teaching strategies. Thus the teacher has students read for information, translate the information into other forms, apply it in different contexts. Teacher and students give reasons, derive principles, and analyze information about phenomena, events, and sequences. Questions are raised about meanings. Social phenomena are analyzed and syntheses are made. Theories may be developed or existing theories analyzed and applied. Ideally, the process can be described as intellectual, and the major approach, in a broad sense, is intellectual analysis.

Even in the purest disciplines approach, there are affective and active components. The student will do active things both while learning and as an outcome of learning. He will develop feelings and attitudes about the material. The cognitive satisfaction of discovery has a true affective quality. Devices to engage the motivation of the student frequently depend upon affective factors. The point here is that, in the disciplines approach, these components are instrumental to the intellectual activity, not valued for themselves.

THE HUMANITIES APPROACH

In the "humanities approach" the focus shifts. We are mindful of man and our feelings about him and his experiences. The teaching aim is to have students feel and react directly to manifestations of man in his "gropings toward self-realization," and, in so doing, grope toward their own self-realization. Direct experiencing of human phenomena is valued. Experience with art objects, artifacts, music, literature, products of other cultures and other times, is sought as the raw material for personal reaction. Such materials are experienced directly for their own immediate (sensory, esthetic, affective) value and also for the vicarious experiencing of the times and cultures that they represent.

The humanities approach is also concerned with intellectual and cognitive values, but in more of a phenomenological sense. A given phenomenon is experienced as a phenomenon with only enough analysis to get hold of it. Intellectually, the humanist, as here defined, would be more concerned with an empathetic relationship to medieval man and his thinking about theology than he would be about his contributions to a discipline labelled "theology." Abelard's relationship with Eloise is neither more nor less important than his contributions to theology. The valuing of the humanist is simply different from that of the disciplinarian. It may be a matter of preference or a matter of emphasis, but the *difference* is important.

The person who finds it difficult (or impossible) to separate the disciplines approach from the humanities approach may not be able to distinguish between the value of an empathetic relationship as such and its contribution to a better comprehension of the discipline. In the long run, there is certainly a fundamental contribution, but at the moment of experiencing there is a "gut level" difference, extremely difficult to verbalize, but nonetheless real. Cognitive activities are necessary to bring the student into contact with the phenomena under consideration. He must be aware of the situation and deal with it cognitively at some level in order to be able to respond, but it is the emotional response, the appreciation, the valuing that is important. Where, in the disciplines approach, the affective domain

was enlisted in the service of the cognitive, here, in the humanities approach, the cognitive is enlisted in the service of the affective domain.

The westward movement, the settlement of the American frontier and the events of the 1850's related to these historical phenomena are valid subjects for study in the discipline of history. A sympathetic reading of MacKinlay Kantor's *Spirit Lake* has different values. To live vicariously the life of the Indians of Lake Okoboji, to participate in the terror and hardships of the settlers, to feel the clash of cultures, to value the almost mystical, yet objectively correct, prediction that concludes the novel, these are the living qualities of human experiencing which cause us to *know* history more than *knowing about* it.

The affective domain has, until recently, received much less detailed attention than the cognitive domain. A more detailed analysis of its Taxonomy may be useful as a source of inferences about methodology in a humanities approach. Analysis of the two domains reveals some interesting differences. In the cognitive domain the ordering principle in the hierarchy is complexity of the thinking process, a continuum of simple to complex, of concrete to abstract. Thus, though we are concerned about the individual's conceptualization, the ordering principle appears to be in the material (i.e., in the objective world).

In the affective domain, the ordering principle is more subjective. It is a question of the degree of "internalization" (i.e., identification, incorporation, personal reaction). In building affect, the first level is the *receiving* of the stimuli. The sub-categories of this level start with simple *awareness* of the phenomenon, event, or situation with either neutral or mildly positive feeling (or at least without immediate rejection). This reaction proceeds through a *willingness to receive*, a slightly more positive tone, to *controlled or selected attention*. Some degree of interest has been caught, and the beginnings of an appreciative reaction have been started.

In the second major category, the student *responds* to the phenomenon, first in *acquiescing* in giving expected attention and response, second in an active *willingness* to respond (perhaps seeking

more extended ways to respond), and finally to *satisfaction* in response. This third stage of the second category is perhaps the crucial one, because it begins an internalization process that is less superficial than the earlier ones and can lead to more extended and relatively permanent kinds of reaction patterns. The student is perhaps "hooked."

These first two major categories are perhaps as far as a teacher can take a student in a relatively short-term instructional process. Higher level categories need a variety of experience with the opportunity for consistent responses over a period of time. Thus a teacher may help a student build on and combine earlier sets of satisfactions to broaden and deepen the development of attitudes and values. More typically, the student tends to do this on his own, outside the instructional situation. To use the *Spirit Lake* example, the student may say that he *enjoyed* the novel. He may comment that he had never realized there were such differences among Indian sub-cultures, or that he had never realized before what the settlers went through. These are responses that indicate the beginnings of internalization on a feeling level. To analyze movement to the upper levels of the hierarchy is a highly complex matter, which perhaps goes beyond a look at the humanities approach. To achieve acceptance of a value and real commitment to it, to conceptualize the values one holds and organize them into a value system, to develop a generalized set toward a value complex and internalize it so that it becomes a major characteristic of the personality — this totality goes beyond the humanities approach and involves consideration of a major part of the total educational experience, in school and out.

IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY

Methods to be used in the humanities approach as conceived here may be inferred from the first two levels of the taxonomy, receiving and responding, culminating in satisfaction in response. In order to achieve these objectives, the teacher selects materials and situations which are likely to attract the student's attention and impel him to give a positive response. Materials should be esthetically attractive

and appropriate to the level of the student's readiness to respond. It may be necessary to build readiness through some cognitive presentation, but this must be for the purpose of building readiness, not for the sake of cognitive learning itself. For example, it is extremely easy, with our customary analytic approach to learning, to be carried away with giving excessive information about the author of a novel or the life and times of an artist so that we get in the way of awareness and response to the novel or the work of art. It may be important to give enough background on Michelangelo to overcome the initial strangeness of viewing good pictures of *David*, *Moses*, and the *Pieta*. On the other hand, it may be better to view these without such background information. The expected readiness of the student is the cue.

At a later stage, exposure to the works of art may lead to an interest in the artist and his times and to a valuing of aspects of the Renaissance. But this is a later stage which does not precede direct experiencing of its products. It follows from the above that form and quality of the experiences are of utmost importance. A poorly prepared or presented film, poor art reproductions, a musical presentation that is acoustically bad, or a poem that is truly too naive or too sophisticated, can get in the way of positive response and interfere with desired affective learning. Better not present at all than to present inappropriately.

One of the major psychological factors in internalization is identification with others. The student who has a positive response to his teacher as a person, or to others with similar attitudes is more likely to "acquiesce in responding" and to be ready to find satisfaction in response. It follows that the teacher's interest in the phenomena must be genuine, so that *initial* responses of students may be equally genuine. Continued experience of the phenomena enables other factors beyond initial identification to operate.

It is presumed that one of the characteristics of the affective domain is greater heterogeneity of response than in the cognitive domain. The expectation of greater divergence among students implies that a variety of parallel activities be available and that students are helped to select those which are most appropriate to their current

stage of development. There is no reason why all students in a class will or must like the same poem or respond equally to the same music or art. Acceptance of divergence is characteristic of the humanities approach.

Many programs labelled "humanities courses" do not fit the model suggested here. Some are extended exercises in the identification of books and authors, art works and artists, music and composers. Others deal with vague verbal generalizations in watered down philosophy. Some social studies programs that purport to deal with attitude and value components use equally vague verbalisms quite divorced from the student's immediate experience. Such programs fail to focus on the affective domain and miss the quality of the humanities approach as here defined.

THE COMBINED APPROACH

The two defined approaches have here been dichotomized for purposes of emphasis and in order to stress the affective nature of the humanities approach. In practice, such a clear separation seldom occurs. The fabric of learned behavior and attitudes is woven from the warp and woof of cognitive and affective responses. The pattern of the cloth may be better if the weaver identifies the two correctly. It should be clear that, in any extended set of learning experiences in the social studies, the humanities approach and the disciplines approach will both be used. To some extent, the division made here is arbitrary and useful primarily for purposes of analyzing what we do. Yet, it may be useful to keep that analysis in mind as we plan and execute instructional activities. It is implicit in this analysis that we teach somewhat differently when our objectives are affective than we do when they are cognitive. Keeping clear when we are doing what for what purpose may sharpen our teaching and may even affect the learning of students.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Goodlad, John, as quoted in the *NEA Reporter* 5; No. 4, April 29, 1966.

² Sand, Ole, as quoted in the same issue of the *NEA Reporter*.

³ Ciardi, John. "The Curriculum of Perception." *Sixteenth Yearbook, 1963 Annual Meeting, AACTE*. p. 115.

⁴ See the *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I: The Cognitive Domain*, Bloom et al.; and *Handbook II: The Affective Domain*, Krathwohl et al. New York: David McKay Co., 1964. The term "active" is substituted in this paper for the more usual designation, "psychomotor."

VERNA S. FANCETT

*Planning to Use
the Humanities
in the Social Studies Classroom*

"I THINK THE OBJECT IS TO HAVE US COMPLETELY AUTOMATED BY the time we graduate." This was the comment of one young American as he and a friend sauntered toward the school building. Amusing? Perhaps, but certainly not so humorous if it in any way suggests that our students see no chance to make choices, try new paths, or make decisions about their own futures. The social studies teacher has a role in assuring students of these possibilities (as he or she keeps a clear focus on man as the pivot of society). How can the humanities be of assistance in this task? It would be unfair to indict social studies teachers for having rejected the humanities in their classrooms; it would be equally dangerous to insist that they have made the widest or best possible use of these areas of knowledge. We would perhaps be closest to a fair statement if we said that as a group, they have probably been most successful and pleased with their use of certain areas, have drawn on other areas occasionally, still others hardly at all. If this is a fair judgment of social studies

teachers in general, it is at the same time entirely unfair to those individuals who would consider their teaching empty if they did not integrate the humanities with the social studies. What, then, has kept teachers from greater use, and why are we beginning to see changes in this pattern? Answers to these questions seem to be related to matters of *preparation and background, time, and relevance to the social studies*. That problems are being solved is evident from the flood of reports of creative innovations in all parts of the country. Because the solutions are entwined with classroom methods, they should be reviewed here, briefly.

First, many teachers question whether they have the preparation and background necessary to draw from the humanities. Since the aim is to relate what goes on in the classroom to the understanding of man in society, the student must think about what he sees and hears, bring some knowledge to it, and identify some relationships between what man has created and the society in which it was produced. This goes beyond simple enjoyment; it demands direction and guidance from a knowledgeable teacher. In most cases, social studies teachers have been educated and trained to teach social studies, not the humanities. Even within the social sciences, there is such a vast accumulation of knowledge that one is constantly nagged by the realization that more preparation is needed in one or another discipline. Conscious of the dangers of inadequate preparation in their own fields, teachers are quick to recognize similar dangers in areas in which they have had no specific training. Those fortunate enough to have studied music, art, or the dance or who, over the years, have made an avocation of studying a particular area, probably draw heavily from their knowledge and experience. Those whose backgrounds provide little more than surface acquaintance, see a vast difference between listening to Beethoven's "Eroica," and relating it to a lesson in social studies. The wise teacher realizes that caution is needed when questions of philosophy arise in class; serious errors in interpretation and application may result from a too casual understanding. Even in the area of literature, where the social studies teacher seems to feel most confident, this same apprehension is evident from the

fact that its use may be limited to works of fiction and biography, slighting the essay, speeches, diaries, letters, and even ignoring poetry and drama. From a genuine respect for the value of knowledge, and a fear of miseducating, the teacher refrains from experimenting.

One of the best resolutions to this problem of preparation was found by many teachers in the John Hay Fellows Program. Similar programs are now being developed on a regional or local basis. American Studies programs and Foreign Area Studies programs at the college level are also filling needs. There seems to be little doubt that the combined efforts of a "team" help to resolve the problem for those who have been unable to acquire needed background through formal or informal study. In some cases, talent is found entirely within the social studies department; in others, voids are filled by calling on guest speakers, or by including a member of the English, art, or music department on the team. In smaller schools, the co-operative-teacher approach, usually English and social studies, works to achieve similar purposes. One of the long-neglected sources of talent in the humanities is the community in which the school is located. Some schools maintain a file of resource persons, members of the community who have special knowledge they are willing to share with the school. And the search for talent becomes a learning experience in itself, when it is planned and conducted by the students. Many communities have a school of the drama, or dance, sponsor concerts and film series, or maintain a museum of art. If a college is located nearby, there are probably foreign students who would be pleased to bring a view of their own humanities to the classroom and visit an American school at the same time. It might be added that we tend to overlook those resources closest to us, our own faculty members. The most knowledgeable person in religious history may be the math teacher; the expert in the dance may be the physical education instructor.

Second, assuming that the problem of background can be resolved, there is the question of *time*. Much as we may tire of hearing this old complaint, we must also concede that time is a vital factor in

deciding what shall be done. The teacher needs time to prepare; the student needs time to read, to think, to create, and to exchange ideas with his classmates. Together they need time to explore their findings, and to develop understandings. Current trends of change in social studies curriculum indicate that the teacher may be devoting more time to the various disciplines of the social sciences. Class periods are often too short to allow for discussion when it is needed most; the question that fascinates the student today may be a dead issue by tomorrow's discussion. The teacher who plans to include a 40-minute film in a 45-minute period can do little more than hang out the marquee! And learning theory tells us that the objectives we set for ourselves in the classroom are not reached in a single leap, but slowly, and with time. Time, then, becomes a very precious thing which must be utilized in the very best way possible. When there is so much we really ought to do, how can there be a moment for the humanities?

Solutions to this problem of time are also abundant, among them the team approach, module scheduling, and perhaps most important, the increasing emphasis being given to the development of concepts. The team facilitates planning and preparation as teachers pool ideas and draw on individual strengths. Module scheduling extends class time by having students meet two days a week in double periods, one day in single. If it can be arranged to schedule a social studies and an English class back-to-back, teachers cooperate to plan for the most efficient use of both time and subject matter. Variations of each of these techniques have been devised to provide time when it is most advantageous to teaching and learning. As we structure our courses with the development of concepts as a major goal, we find that some of the time previously spent on the accumulation of facts is now free to be used in more profitable ways. We need not search for more time, but simply change what we do. This leads us directly to the last of the problems posed, *relevance*.

This matter might well be phrased "recognition of relevance" since it may be closely related to the need for background. One must know a field in order to recognize what is pertinent and appropriate.

With knowledge, relevance becomes more apparent. Learning theory indicates that concepts are formed from experiences which allow us to see relationship between what we have met in the past and what we meet in the present. We see through the complexities of our lives to some sort of order which helps to clarify and simplify our understandings and our ability to communicate. In addition, research seems to indicate that the greater the *number* of related experiences we have, and the greater their *variety*, the more readily concepts may be developed. To know "democracy" only in its political sense is to know but a minuscule portion of its vast implications. To meet it in its most personal form, one may be required to examine the humanities. When the student considers an idea or an event through many kinds of expressions, he may come to see the many meanings of concepts, whether of substance, value, or process. The social studies teacher may choose at will from the variety of experiences offered in the humanities in order to make the best use of time and knowledge to help the student develop broader and deeper concepts.

The problems that have been mentioned are very practical from a teacher's point of view, since their solutions often depend on the size and the philosophy of the school itself. The teacher in the metropolitan area undoubtedly has certain advantages; the one in the rural area, mostly hurdles. However, it is interesting to notice that some of the most creative ideas have come from the latter group whose needs have demanded and received fresh approaches. As with any other content, relevance alone does not guarantee that the humanities will supply our needs in the social studies class. What is done with them is the most crucial factor. Selection must be made carefully with the teacher's objectives, the student's maturity, ability, and interest in mind. Care must be taken not to have what might be a rich experience become just one more chore. Planning is important, with the consistent goal of explaining man and his role in society. Before reporting some of the many variations of methods used by teachers, it should be made clear that they represent only a few, perhaps not the best. They have been drawn from personal experience or from observations of teachers at work. It will also be appar-

ent that there has been no attempt to give "equal time" to all of the humanities nor to all of the objectives of the social studies.

PLACING THE ACCENT ON HUMANITY

A parent, upon overhearing a group of students extoll the virtues of a certain social studies teacher, asked why they thought she was so fine. While others thought about their answers, one came back immediately, "Because she makes people *move*!" Here was a fortunate child who had found social studies relevant because a teacher had placed the accent on humanity. No simple task, this involves transporting life from out of the past into the present, and from vastly different cultural settings into the American schoolhouse. How can the humanities help us to make people "*move*"?

One way may be to go directly to original sources whenever possible so that the student may see what a man did, or read what he wrote, rather than what someone else said was done. Have you ever had the sensation as you read an original document, or view an original painting, that you are peering over the creator's shoulder to watch him work? You are transported from the "here and now" to the "then and there." You are involved, and the whole matter consequently becomes more real and relevant. How much more of the human being is revealed in his correspondence than in his official documents which, by their very nature, are meant to be exposed to public view! Letters divulge the forces that drove the heroes and culprits of history to fulfill their dreams. They reveal humans struggling, choosing, winning, and losing. They make man "*move*." Christopher Morley felt some of this when he suggested that . . . *there are certain people whom one almost feels inclined to urge to hurry up and die so that their letters can be published. It is chiefly — perhaps only — in letters that one gets the mother-of-pearly shimmer inside the oyster of Fact.*¹ Letters can be used in social studies for purposes of analysis or simply to provide some of that "shimmer," as does this brief note, penned but never posted, by Benjamin Franklin to an old friend in Britain:

[Philadelphia]

July 5, 1775

Mr. Strahan,

You are a Member of Parliament, and one of that Majority which has doomed my Country to Destruction. — You have begun to burn our Towns and murder our People. — Look upon your hands! — They are stained with the Blood of your Relations! — You and I were Friends: — You are now my Enemy, — and

I am

Yours,

B. Franklin²

Letters help to answer a student's questions as the teacher cannot possibly hope to do, like "What was it like when the Barbarians invaded the Roman Empire?" He might feel some of the despair if he read St. Jerome's letter to a friend in those first years of the fifth century when he reported, . . . *regions that have been sacked and pillaged by the Goths and Alans, Huns and Vandals. . . . Churches have been overthrown, horses stalled in the holy places, the bones of the saints dug up and scattered . . . the wolves of the North have been let loose. . . . The world sinks into ruin . . . everywhere Romans are in exile . . . her children are outcasts and beggars. We cannot indeed help them; all we can do is sympathize with them, and mingle our tears with theirs.*³

The flavor of reality that comes from the letter or diary, the journal or the eye-witness account of an historic event, adds to the total meaning the student can achieve.

LETTERS TO MAKE THE PEOPLE OF HISTORY MOVE

1. *Leonardo da Vinci to the Duke of Milan* — an application for employment, listing his talents.
2. *George Washington to Colonel Nichola* — a rejection of the suggestion that he become king of the new nation.

3. *Robespierre to Danton* — a declaration of lifelong friendship.
4. *Macaulay to Henry S. Randall* — a prediction of the downfall of the United States in the twentieth century under a constitution "all sail and no anchor."
5. *John Brown to his family* — a defense of his actions, on the eve of his death.
6. *P. T. Barnum to Ulysses S. Grant* — an offer of a job.
7. *Gauguin to Strindberg* — a discussion of art, savagery, and civilization.
8. *Emile Zola to President Felix Faure* — "J'accuse," a defense of Dreyfus.
9. *Robert Falcon to the British people* — a description of the last days before the death of the polar expedition, 1912.
10. *Lenin to the Communist Party* — a warning against the "too rude" Stalin.
11. *Bartolomeo Vanzetti to Dante Sacco* — a farewell.
12. *Thomas Mann to the Dean of the University of Bonn* — an accusation of Hitler for crimes against Germany.

What better way to bring the joys and agonies, the courage and the temerity, the hopes and the despairs of humans within the realm of understanding of our students? Nothing quite replaces an original. Children who viewed the *Piéta* at the World's Fair probably have a much better feeling for the genius of Michelangelo than those who know only the plaster casting from the dime store. For a long time now, I have envied a fellow teacher his possession of a fourteenth century illuminated manuscript; how I would like to take that to class for students to see! But we have the local sources for similar materials; our art galleries and museums are housefuls of originals. Special showings of an artist's work, or exhibits devoted to the many phases of a nation's creative talent, allow the students to examine the humanities of other cultures in the original.

Children studying local history can view the handicrafts, antique jewelry, country store art, greeting card designs as they discover what past generations considered the "good" life. Some schools have their own museums in a converted classroom where students collect items,

prepare descriptive materials, and act as guides, at the same time that they are adding to their understanding of history.

A tour of almost any urban or rural community will uncover examples of architecture from several periods of history. Students may use their cameras to build slide sets which can then be used in class to find relationships between time, place, function, and form as reflected in the types of shelter people have devised for themselves. The field trip is most valuable as a learning experience when students know what they are going to see and why, and have the opportunity to discuss their findings when they return to class.

The photographer is an artist who makes people move when he captures the drama of a situation with the flash of his shutter. Winners in yearly national competitions and our photographic periodicals are visual evidence of the many sides of man's nature and of society. The work of the artist-photographer in past years helps the teacher who struggles to convey to students the mood of those elusive periods of history like the Great Depression. Poverty, futility, and hope are perhaps most vividly defined in photographs of faces in a bread line or of apple sellers on city streets. Use of photographs like the planting of the flag on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, or the "Leap to Freedom" of the East German soldier, gives dramatic focus for class discussion of such concepts as freedom and courage.

The cartoon is an art form which communicates, often at a glance, and is a medium which children enjoy. It is especially helpful to the teacher when the class is involved in the meaning of *viewpoint*, whether it relates to history, a current international problem, or a matter of cultural differences. Cartoons in foreign newspapers and magazines help us to see ourselves as others see us. They are also a tool for pointing out the changes in a nation's attitudes over a period of years.

The teacher who is a "clipper" has a personal store of cartoons to show change in a myriad of areas, from politics to pastimes. Think of the changes cartoons would reveal about the image of the teenager, or for that matter, the teacher, in American history! The

flood of humorous and chilling cartoons related to the automated thinking machine certainly reveals something about the conflict between progress and security that exists in our society today.

Our students sometimes seem to believe that creative talent lives apart from society, somewhere in another world. The musician or the artist is presumed to be interested in nothing but his work, divorced from the mainstreams of life, most assuredly from politics. They might change their view after listening to the work of a Chopin or a Wagner, and learning that these composers were inspired by devotion to country, and, in turn, inspired even greater devotion in others of their countrymen. They might understand the depth of desire for democracy at the turn of the nineteenth century better if they listened to the magnificent "Eroica" by Beethoven, who had originally dedicated the masterpiece to the young Napoleon, but upon perceiving a move toward dictatorial powers, slashed the manuscript with his penknife, and rewrote ". . . composed to the memory of a great man." Beethoven, the artist, and Napoleon, the conqueror, might both come alive.

Folksongs, when examined for their message as well as their melody, bring students closer to matters which concerned peoples of other times and places. "Ye Parliament of England" gives the American viewpoint of the War of 1812; "Eight Hours" describes the strength of sentiment among workers for shorter hours, as early as the Civil War; "We Shall Overcome" stands as evidence of a struggle for equality in modern America.

One additional point directed to the teacher activity which, when misused, is guaranteed to drain the life from any subject — the lecture. And although we might question the lecture-oriented classroom, we would also have to agree that there are times when it provides the very best method for presenting necessary information to students. It need not be lifeless. A lecture on medieval man's conceptions of his world as one in which the realities of life blended and balanced with the mysteries of the afterlife, can be made more meaningful by focusing on Van Eyck's *Saint Francis Receiving the Stigmata*. Though it concentrates on the miracle of the stigmata,

the painting is filled with objects of everyday life in minute detail. As John Canaday points out, it illustrates the contradictions of medieval life . . . unified by the assumption that the universe in its totality was a divinely ordained system of parallels in contrast. In this faith the age found its harmony. Heaven balanced hell, winter balanced summer, sowing balanced reaping, birth balanced death. Each virtue balanced its corresponding vice. And, in this harmony, ordained by God, the smallest detail of the world had its place. Nothing was accidental; everything was meaningful.⁴ This balance of contradictions fairly oozes from the painting, providing students with visual illustration of the information stressed in the lecture.

DEVELOPING CONCEPTS AND SKILLS

By drawing on the humanities, the teacher is able to help students build concepts at the same time that they develop their skills of investigation. Students in a class described as non-academic, pad and pencil in hand, spent a period at various stations in the classroom. They examined a travel poster showing the ruins of a temple at Karnak, a cut-away model of King Tutenkamen's pyramid, a modern replica of a Queen's necklace, a portion of Ikhnaton's poetic "Hymn to the Sun," excerpts from the *Book of the Dead*, a plaster, imprinted with hieroglyphic writing and translation, a section of freize from the walls of a tomb, a love song written by an Egyptian woman. The teacher explained the activity somewhat like this:

The students know that we are to begin a study of ancient Egypt. I realize that some of them have previous knowledge, and that they are not very excited about it. I'm really trying to manufacture an interest. Right now, they are guessing from these materials, what they think the people of ancient Egypt were like, and how they lived. If you look at what they are writing, you should see some of their guesses and the evidence on which they are based. Tomorrow, we will pool them and try to determine which may be most valu-

able. As we develop the unit, they can check on their guesses and their judgments.

Here was a teacher who had utilized art, literature, poetry, architecture, language, and religion, not so much for content, as for motivation and practice in the skills of search. In addition, the students were actively involved in planning and directing their study. An approach of this type is adaptable to any subject and any level to give the student a visible goal for his study. The content selected for use and the methods for using it are best determined by the teacher on the basis of his own objectives, and the background, abilities, and interests of his students. The student examines what people did or wrote, and considers the possible causes. From his answers come the focus and the direction for the investigation that follows. He examines the other fellow's hunches as well as his own, rates them for value, discards some, keeps others. During the study, if he tends to search only for evidence to support his favorite guess, the teacher has the opportunity to develop his concept of objectivity. The testing of guesses can be continuous, culminating with a re-evaluation of the original list. A final point, that the hypotheses are still not "proved," may help to clarify the method of the historian and, incidentally, the method students might use to meet their own problems. At times, it may be advisable to concentrate on one area of the humanities rather than to touch on several lightly. Certain combinations suggest themselves:

Mythology — Greek sculpture

The Middle Ages — Architecture

The Renaissance — Painting

The Age of Enlightenment — Philosophy

The American West — Folklore

The Twenties — Literature

One sometimes wishes that the term "book report" might be stricken from our vocabulary, at least when its connotation is "to tell the story." At times this may be necessary, but hardly ever is it all that is desirable in the social studies class. How to lead students to perceive additional values is apt to be a problem. With the student whose reading level permits, it is helpful to have him read

the work of respected book reviewers in magazines and newspapers to ascertain method, style, and apparent purposes. Questions can then be developed as guidelines for his own "review":

1. What is the author trying to do?
2. How does he go about doing it?
3. How well do I think he succeeded in doing it?
4. Does the book reflect the times in which it was written?

There are many variations one might develop to fit particular needs. Similar questions may also be used for other forms of literature, the drama, poem, editorial, treatise, essay, and all of the art forms, or realia.

One creative teacher combined the humanities with an exercise in the skills of questioning and reporting in a slightly different way. Two energetic students possessing a tape recorder volunteered to interview celebrities who might visit the community on questions of social interest. The entire class helped to prepare the basic questions to be used, and to watch the newspapers for leads on arrivals. Topics for the interviews ranged from culture, the American teenager, foreign aid, reapportionment, and civil disobedience, to the values of equality and democracy and the use of leisure time. By the end of the year, the list of notables included a folk trio, several authors who appeared at local bookstores, an actress appearing for a fund drive, the director of the art museum, church leaders, the editor of the local newspaper, a television script writer, the dean of a nearby liberal arts college, plus a multitude of athletes! During the activity, techniques of interviewing were polished, and the interviewers were forced to improve their listening skills, for when they reported to the class what they thought had been said, then played the tape of the actual conversation, they were amazed to find two quite different versions. In this type of activity, students gain information and ideas on social issues from persons in many areas of interest, while practicing their skills in questioning, listening, and reporting.

One of the most refreshing classes I have ever observed was that of a first year teacher who prepared his eighth graders for the reading they were to do that night in their textbooks. He helped

them to "read" the fine reproductions and graphics included in the material. A little bit of the detective in each child came out as they searched for meaning and evidence. By the time they had exhausted themselves, a store of information had been accumulated, and they were anxious to get started reading about something with which they were already familiar.

The concept of change is often difficult to convey to students. It requires that they see differences in ideas that are often subtle or deeply embedded in philosophy. Here again, the humanities may be of special assistance, when the need is to clarify a point for students without delving in over their heads. For instance, if the objective is to explain the complex changes in thought between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, a sampling of creative expressions on a single subject from both periods presents obvious differences in mood, style, form, and treatment for the student to analyze. A comparison of Cimabue's "Madonna with Angels" (thirteenth century), and "Madonna Del Cardellino" (sixteenth century) may be made on the basis of answers to the questions:

1. What does each artist *seem* to be saying?
2. What does each *seem* to believe about his subject?
3. What happened during each period that *might* help to explain why he painted as he did?
4. How is *change* reflected in the paintings?

Similarly, a comparison of the creative work of persons of different cultures today invites the effort to understand what they believe and what they do. If the student can develop this understanding, his judgments may have a basis in reason rather than pure emotion or bias.

One cannot overlook the many fine uses to be made of televised programs, some of which can be brought right into the classroom. A production of *Richard the Third*, *Darkness at Noon*, even a re-run of an old moving picture like *Inherit the Wind*, can be more impressive than any passage in the textbook. A film, which shows an historic French museum to have a life history of its own, serves to tie the loose threads of a course together into a substantive and humanistic whole. Educational television offerings, like those spon-

sored by Project Cue and the New York State Education Department are becoming more numerous. A sampling of the titles of one of their series, on Africa, indicates their uses:

"Voices of Africa" — changes in Africa reflected in poetry.

"African Music Speaks" — culture conveyed through tone, melody, rhythm, and sound.

"Art in Africa" — art in everyday African life and its influence on western art in general.

"Brother Jero" — the misuse of religious belief, an original drama by Wole Soyinka.

One of the more recent innovations is the independent study kit. The kit contains materials related to the development of a single concept and may be one of several in a series. The student uses the material in the study center when he needs additional help, or when he is capable of going beyond the regular classwork. He may examine paintings, slides, poetry, and realia as he uses a prepared guide to direct his thinking and develop his understanding.

DEVELOPING THE ABILITIES OF EXPRESSION

And for what purposes are we stressing the acquisition of skills and abilities, and the development of concepts? Certainly not to produce what Professor Bruner calls "little living libraries." Repeatedly, in statements of objectives in our national, state, and local programs, we cite "effective citizenship" and "purposeful action" both of which imply that unless our students put their knowledge to work, unless they communicate the *results* of their thinking to direct their lives and the society in which they find themselves, we fall far short of our goal. As we give more attention to what goes into the student's mind, should we not be doubly concerned about what comes out?

Silence is not conducive to this goal. Students must be given many opportunities to express themselves, to get their ideas out into the open where they can be examined, not only by the teacher and fellow students, but by themselves. How else can we determine

what is known or needs to be known, what is believed to be true, and why? Knowledge, unexpressed, may soon evaporate or be discarded as worthless. The humanities, because they are forms of communication, offer a number of ways in which to express understanding and belief. Students may have individual preferences for style of self-expression. Some prefer the discussion, the debate, or the oral report; some choose the written form of the essay or diary or poem. Still others are happiest when creating a skit to present to the class. Sometimes, the child who resists our every effort to become involved with the group, joins in willingly when allowed to "play a role." If it is important that expressions be clear and honest, then we may do well to allow some freedom of choice in the form that expression takes.

Language remains the most common form of communication, but for some elusive reasons, students are apt to feel that it is important only in the English class. What teacher has not struggled with this problem! The student says, "But you know what I meant!" and the teacher replies, "But that is not what you said!" Somehow students must be convinced that no matter how valuable an idea may be, it will have little effect unless it is communicated in a clear, convincing manner. Surely, this point cannot be made unless we help students to understand their language and give them ample opportunities to practice using it. Some examples of the use of various forms of expressions focusing on the concept, *language*, are:

1. A *skit* illustrating the problems a foreign visitor might have because of the complexities of our language.
2. A humorous *dialogue* illustrating the confusion created by semantic differences.
3. A *pantomime* intended to express a complex idea.
4. A *discussion* of the meanings of the word, freedom, to peoples of different cultures.
5. An analysis of the *dance* as a means of communication.

Discussion, carefully led around a meaningful question, provides the atmosphere for students to exchange opinions and ideas gained from their experiences in using the humanities. Reactions to what

they see at the museum or art gallery, what they feel after reading a poem or seeing a play, should be aired and exchanged in the discussion that follows.

In a World History honors class, students considered the gothic cathedral as an expression of medieval thought; in English class, they read Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. The culmination of both studies was a discussion of the question, "What is symbolism?" In searching for answers to the question, students drew from literature, architecture, history, and philosophy. New ideas were generated as relationships were suggested between what might have been isolated bits of information. With the discussion as background, they then viewed a film of Chartres Cathedral in which an art critic comments on the structure for its symbolic nature, and were able to benefit from a highly sophisticated analysis. Finally, comparisons were made between the critic's ideas and their own as they clarified meanings. The teachers involved in this activity saw bridges being built between many areas of knowledge, and as the weeks went by, additional evidence that what had been learned in the activity was being applied to other situations.

The *position paper* is appropriate when the student is called upon to explain what he feels "ought to be." He may speak his mind, say what he really thinks, not what someone else wants him to repeat: and, since he is dealing with something that is his own possession, he may see the need for expressing himself well. Care should be taken here to select questions that are of real interest to the student, and ones which he can be expected to evaluate. He must have something to say. Questions might include:

What ought to be the goals of education?

What are the ingredients of leadership?

What is the nature of justice?

How should conflict between nations be resolved?

This, I believe . . .

Expressions may be in artistic form. A ninth grade geography class had read selections from that delightful book, *The Forest and the Sea*, by Marston Bates,⁵ in connection with their study of ecosystems. On display were several paintings, done in tempera, by

students to express their feelings after reading his chapters: "The Coral Reef," "The Rain Forest," "The Open Sea," and "Lakes and Rivers." Expression may be in the form of an original play, a dramatic sketch, or, as in this case, a homemade film. Four imaginative eighth graders studying the American past assumed the titles of writer, director, scenario artist, and costume designer to create a 20-minute film entitled, "Way Way, Out! — WEST." The plot described the struggles between frontier homesteaders and cattlemen which ended in the "Barbed Wire War." Several weeks went by as the script was written, properties and sites located. Then the company went on location to plant fields of wheat, and repair fences destroyed by cattle drives. The conversations of determined farmers, and the thunder of stampeding cattle were recorded on tape. The final scene, "The last great drive," was filmed with the permission of a friendly local farmer, and accompanied by the singing of an original ballad which described the trials and joys of days on the trail. The acting was short of "oscar" quality and the tape was not always synchronized. The few minutes consumed in presenting the final product hardly reflected the time spent checking accuracy of detail, and certainly not the feelings of accomplishment shared by the company of producers.

Role playing opportunities exist in the social studies classroom and in extracurricular activities related to the social studies. When the student assumes a role, he is asked, not to "be himself," but to be someone other than himself. If he is to succeed, he must assume some of that person's feelings and beliefs and imagine how he might react under different situations. Role playing may involve a handful of students in a classroom activity or hundreds in a model assembly or United Nations simulation. The goal is not to show the student that he is wrong in what he believes, but to help him understand better why the other fellow may differ. Empathy, understanding, and the opportunity to examine ideas are the objectives.

It seems appropriate as a final illustration of the use of the humanities in developing intellectual abilities, skills, and concepts

in the social studies, to describe an activity that begins after the last class is dismissed in June—the summer tutorial. The entire program is voluntary for students and teachers, and the emphasis is on learning for the pleasure of learning. The student (tutee) selects a teacher (tutor) and the area which he would like to explore. The tutor helps him to engage in a variety of activities. The study begins in the social sciences but soon branches out to the humanities, sciences, even technology. All knowledge is fair game if it helps to explain the subject being pursued. Although much reading is done, it is by no means the most fruitful activity. As the student visits a gallery or sees a play, he records his thoughts and reactions in a log. This provides the basis for discussions with his tutor. So rewarding are the informal conversations between teacher and student, one-hour sessions often turn into two. At the close of the summer, each tutee gives evidence of what he has learned in some creative form: a paper, a collection of visuals, poetry, a collage to illustrate the results of his thinking. At a final session of all tutors and tutees, students trade accounts of their successes and failures. A sampling of the subjects pursued:

- The Greek Idea of Beauty
- The Roaring Twenties
- The Hero in American Culture
- The Many Talents of Winston Churchill
- The Method of the Cultural Anthropologist

Topics, whether broad or narrow, are not meant to be “covered,” but to be tasted for the rich flavor of the ideas involved.

In summary, what might be some considerations for the social studies teacher who draws from the humanities?

1. Selection of materials for specific purposes in the attainment of social studies goals.
2. Consideration of students' maturity, abilities, and interests.
3. Decision on need for limited or concentrated use.
4. Use of “experts” when need is for depth in an unfamiliar area.
5. Allowance for discussion and exchange of opinion.
6. Provision for creative expression.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Quoted by M. Lincoln Shuster in *A Treasury of the World's Great Letters*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1940. p. viii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

⁴ Canaday, John. *Metropolitan Seminars in Art*. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1958. Portfolio 2, p. 9.

⁵ Bates, Marston. *The Forest and the Sea*. New York: Time, Inc., 1964.

MELVIN ARNOFF

Toward Higher Levels of Cognition and Behavior

FOR ALL THE WORDS DEVOTED TO EXTOLLING THE BENEFITS which can accrue from the utilization of the humanities in social education, one must wonder why it is that we have had sorely little success in utilizing materials beyond those intended to develop cognition. Of course, it is difficult to ascertain the impact which education has had upon specific aspects of adult cultural life but one must consider, if not totally assess, what has education done to raise the aspirations of man, to change or enrich his level of appreciation of the arts, to fill the leisure hours with distinctly humanistic pleasures or to promote those ideals which would permit a greater assignment of energies to creativity. True, the level of popular culture has risen, but this has generally been attributed to the rise in per capita wealth rather than to the development of an intrinsic yearning of the people for aesthetic satisfaction to match their heightened levels of appreciation. And so as educators, we again must focus upon the problem of how to approach the task of humanizing man.

In seeking solutions to this problem, it appears essential 1) to examine some behavioral outcomes of current educational efforts, 2) to review an instrument which is of potential value to the teacher and curriculum builder, and 3) to consider the implications for methodology associated with the use of this instrument.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO EFFECTIVE GOALS

That the area of values is well within the jurisdiction of the educational system is generally accepted in professional as well as lay thought. Definitions of education by men of ideas have frequently included a concept of attainment in the area of attitudes and behaviors. Bertrand Russell stated that education was "the formation by means of instruction, of certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life and the world."¹ Outlook is certainly not solely a function of intellectual assimilation of material or the development of a prescribed set of skills. Similarly Dewey believed that the process of education involved "forming a fundamental disposition, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow man."² Of course, if one is initially disposed to be prejudiced toward his fellow man, it is appropriate that educators seek to modify this inclination, for not all dispositions are valued by our democratic society and some are even antithetical to it. Thus, not only are educators concerned that the student have a disposition, but they believe that students should cognitively and affectively develop societally approved attitudes and behaviors.

Even in the midst of the curriculum upheaval of the current decade, it is apparent that it is the cognitive domain which is receiving emphasis. Newly conceived curriculum materials are concerned with developing an understanding of the theoretical base upon which the science is built. In the social studies, much effort has been expended to retain the integrity of the structure of the disciplines. Special materials and units have been designed also to teach the methods by

which the particular social scientists seek answers to their domains of problems.

In another vein, one finds that in the majority of social studies textbooks published for the first grade much emphasis is paid to the development of the value of family cooperation. Some of the books, through the medium of the story, indicate that father and brother can help set and clear the table, that father can barbeque at the outdoor grill, and that children can help bring in the packages. This is the material which is utilized to develop the concept of the interdependent family to whom one gives loyalty and service, the family which is an economic and social unit involved in the production, consumption, and distribution of goods and services. Many who have looked at these texts have asserted that this is not the appropriate level of material for children of these grades. But what do the children think?

In a study which the author conducted in early 1966 a survey of the most commonly used social studies texts in grade 1 was made to determine the content of units on the family. Children were tested in 18 classes which included persons who came from social classes ranging from lower lower to upper middle and perhaps lower upper. While it is not the intent of this treatise to review all the elements of the study, it is appropriate that one of the major findings be reported here. The theme of family mutual cooperation was found in almost all the texts. The children, however, in a test of concepts of the family, were asked to imagine the following situations: "Six-year old Mary and ten-year old Johnny went to school one morning just as their father was leaving for work. During the day, Mother Smith did not feel well and had to go to bed. She slept and when she awoke she felt so bad that she could not get out of bed to make supper. Mary and Johnny came home from school. Who do you think should cook supper and who should set the table—six-year old Mary or ten-year old Johnny?" When asked these questions, first-grade children split almost evenly in their reactions to cooking while the greatest majority, four to one, selected Mary to set the table. A further complication in the problem was introduced when father came home. The children were then asked "Who should

wash the dishes and who should dry them? Mary again received the greatest number of votes for both the washing and the drying. Father came in for a close second on washing the dishes but still 23 votes behind Mary. The combined votes of Johnny and father on drying the dishes could not match Mary's.

What does all this mean? It means that some children have caught the message, either through the social studies program or through the experiences in their own homes, that in adversity, the family works as a unit and redistributes the workload to its members, regardless of sex. But the majority of children even after having encountered similar concepts in their texts, successfully ignored the total situation and conceived of the distribution of labor along sex-appropriate lines. Perhaps if the examples had been drawn *directly* from their texts without being generalized to a hypothetical situation, children might have had the opportunity to evidence their recall of the facts, which is precisely the skill the researcher, hopefully, was not evaluating. One must conclude, therefore, that children in grade 1 have successfully identified sex-appropriate behaviors and functions which, even in the face of family crisis, they indicate they should not break. One must also conclude that the teachers who conducted the "learning experiences" which were to have led to the realization of changed behavior, were not very successful. In a later section, the reasons for this apparent failure to reach the goals of the affective domain will be explored.

Empirical evidence of the failure of education to achieve a change in behavior, an expression which was once the very definition of the process, is abundantly available. Let us recall the well-known problem concerning the voting habits of the American citizen. Has a better education altered this behavior? And how willing are the citizens to support the Bill of Rights? According to the results of many surveys, this is a function of the panic of the times, even to the point of judging a person guilty who chooses to exercise his Constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. Yet the concept inherent in the Fifth Amendment is a basic tenet of American democracy consistent with the belief that a man is innocent until proven guilty, cognizant that the protection of the accused under the law

discourages the badgered admission of guilt and maintains that delicate equilibrium between the individual and the state. Thinking which asserts that the public interest overrides individual protection under the law is in contradiction to America's basic principles. Similarly, inferring the degree of guilt of an individual by the frequency with which he asserts his legal and moral right to avoid self-incrimination, is equally fallacious.

All of this is not meant to indicate that social education has made no contribution to our society, for such generalizing is certainly unwarranted. It is, however, intended that educators be confronted with the negative as well as the positive attributes of the products of our teaching so that we may evaluate areas of weakness with the intent of experimenting and innovating to discover superior approaches in affecting the affective domain.

A BASIC TOOL FOR AFFECTIVE TEACHING

Now that Krathwohl and others have developed a taxonomy in the Affective Domain, it behooves educators to explore its structure, and to learn its implications and applications. In structure, the taxonomy is designed to provide from the most elemental concepts to the most sophisticated. It includes:

*. . . the emotional quality which is an important distinguishing feature of an affective response at certain levels of the continuum, the increasing willingness to attend to a specified stimulus or stimulus type as one ascends the continuum, and the developing integration of a value pattern at the upper levels of the continuum.*³

The elements of the taxonomy are briefly presented in a most abbreviated form merely to remind the reader who has probably already familiarized himself with this important tool.

- 1.0 RECEIVING (Attending)
 - 1.1 AWARENESS
 - 1.2 WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE
 - 1.3 CONTROLLED OR SELECTED ATTENTION
- 2.0 RESPONDING
 - 2.1 ACQUIESCENCE IN RESPONDING

- 2.2 WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND
- 2.3 SATISFACTION IN RESPONSE
- 3.0 VALUING
 - 3.1 ACCEPTANCE OF VALUE
 - 3.2 PREFERENCE FOR A VALUE
 - 3.3 COMMITMENT
- 4.0 ORGANIZATION
 - 4.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A VALUE
 - 4.2 ORGANIZATION OF A VALUE SYSTEM
- 5.0 CHARACTERIZATION BY A VALUE OR VALUE CONCEPT
 - 5.1 GENERALIZED SET
 - 5.2 CHARACTERIZATION

At its most basic level, the affective domain involves the act of *receiving*, that is being sensitized to the existence of a quality. Thus, when looking at a painting, the individual may see a landscape, but with appropriate instruction, he may begin to perceive something about focus, perspective, hue, and a variety of other qualities which combine to give the effect of a landscape. Such receiving is the essence of level 1.0.

The gamut of level 2.0 takes one from passive acquiescence to a stimulus to the observation of emotional and physical manifestations of finding pleasure in the stimulus. *Valuing* is observed over a long period of time and is inferred from the actions of the individual who appears to perform in such a way that one perceives his holding of the value. At the lowest level in this category the individual *permits* this impression to develop; at the highest he endeavors to *foster* it. When values are discovered which conflict, the individual, when functioning at level 4.0 systematizes these values, ascertains the relationships between them, and discovers which one will dominate and pervade. At the highest level, the value has been so internalized that it is employed by the individual so much that he has become characterized by it and that it has become integrated into his total philosophy.

Now how can this taxonomy be of aid to the educator? Krathwohl indicates that:

If our analysis of the affective domain is correct, we have a developmental picture of the way in which these goals are reached, from simple receiving and responding through characterization. It makes clear the beginnings of complex objectives such as appreciations, interests and attitudes. It focuses the teacher's attention on the development of these simple behaviors which are the building blocks out of which the more complex objectives grow — simple behaviors which rarely are now deliberately taught.⁴

And so, according to one of its authors, the taxonomy aids us in perceiving the development of attitudes and behaviors, and in focusing upon their more certain attainment.

IMPLICATIONS DRAWN FROM THE TAXONOMY FOR TEACHING STRATEGIES

Unquestionably, the affective domain draws heavily upon cognition. Becoming sensitized involves intellectualization, a differentiation among the stimuli bombarding the senses. In such an act the individual begins to perceive the detail of which the whole is made. In much this way, humans learn an initial concept of good and bad, black and white, only to face the problem of having no categories for certain types of behavior which their broadened experience teaches them is the reality of life. Is lying evil when it spares someone's feelings? Is truth good when it destroys an individual's self-respect and obviates all possibility of success? The gamut of human experience is the proper study of man but not in the manner of a survey taught from a lexicon. Rather it must be examined in minute detail, in the gray areas of value which force those who make encounter in this realm to conduct constant reevaluations of their own beliefs.

One of the most exciting characteristics of a gifted novelist is the ability to expose the intertwined composite of values of his characters in such a manner as to simultaneously convince the reader that the character is a real human being and permit the reader to dissect human motivations and aspirations, to view the tortures of

the mind in the decision-making process, to live vicariously as the hero, the coward, the unsure, the faltering, the victimized, and in living each role, to gain a deeper understanding of man in all his stages, at all his levels, in his greatness and infirmity.

If literature and the arts can offer such benefits to the social educator, naturally, the tool must be employed. Perhaps, however, in utilizing the humanities, we do injustice to purists who might contend that such borrowing violates this long sacrosanct area of the curriculum. It might well be argued, however, that so utilizing the humanities is in accord with the spirit of these disciplines, for if the name connotes those areas of study which are concerned with content specifically the realm of man, then tolerance of difference and love of fellow man qualify.

If I have developed the capacity for love, then I cannot help loving my brothers. In brotherly love there is the experience of union with all men, human solidarity, of human atonement. Brotherly love is based on the experience that we all are one. The differences in talents, intelligence, knowledge are negligible in comparison with the identity of the human core common to all men. In order to experience this identity it is necessary to penetrate from the periphery to the core. If I perceive in another person mainly the surface, I perceive mainly the differences, that which separates us. If I penetrate to the core, I perceive our identity, the fact of our brotherhood. . . . Only in the love of those who do not serve a purpose, love begins to unfold. . . . Compassion implies the element of knowledge and of identity.⁵

These words of Erich Fromm are themselves penetrating. They reach inside and bear meaning. To achieve identity, it is, no doubt, desirable to approach the learning task with an intent to accost more than the intellectual sphere. Entering battle with only limited objectives usually yields limited objectives.

It seems apparent, then, that one of the implications of the taxonomy to the educator is that all the arts should be tools with which the master teacher approaches the task of education.

While the discussion thus far has been declamatory and valuing, the succeeding section will become practical in that it will attempt

to present an account of teaching strategies which can successfully utilize the humanities to attain prescribed ends.

A STRATEGY FOR HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

As long as teaching remains an art, its practices can go unanalyzed and be attributed to some unknown compounding of the sorcerer's personality and knowledge and the shamanistic act called for. In this era of striving for the development of quality education and practitioners, such a state is an undesired luxury which clutters and obscures.

On the other hand, human behavior and reactions are complex and so defy simplistic statements or formulae which, if followed, will manifest knowledge in the minds of disciples. While some persons discover especially effective patterns of teaching through the interaction of their own personalities and their students, even they must examine the structure of the experiences they create to evaluate and modify them toward the end of making them more efficient. While it is not the purpose of this treatise to present a complete theory of teaching, it is desired that the role of active intelligence in the teaching process be underscored. As Smith has written:

If we look frankly at teaching, I believe that we shall become aware at least of the truly linguistic and symbolic nature of the teaching process, and that the fundamental role of logical operations in teaching will become abundantly clear.⁶

On the assumption that the teaching act is more than an art, we will attempt to specify some broad outlines of a strategy for the development of values.

DETERMINING INSTRUCTIONAL DIRECTIONS

Of utmost importance in developing a strategy for humanistic education is the forging of a statement of appropriate goals. Unfortunately education has long been hampered by such an uncritical

genre of goal formulation that those who have suffered as participants in their formulation or those who have surveyed the final product are likely to wince at this suggestion with the reaction, "Oh, no! Not again!" And so the following is designed to be a "not again" in that it bears considerable difference from earlier attempts at goal formulation.

To believe that one can proceed to teach in the absence of goals is folly. One who so attempts, most likely develops impromptu goals as he proceeds, seizing haphazardly upon first this strand and that as it strikes a familiar chord within his psyche. Such ephemeral goals are exactly those against which educators must fight, for in their very evasiveness they escape examination and evaluation. They slither back into the realm of the shaman who works himself into a fever pitch to attain a mystical cure for an unknown malady. And so, as a first step in the design of any educational experience, especially those dealing with affectivity, a precise identification of objectives is a prerequisite.

Throughout the literature there is much discussion about the appropriate criteria to be employed when writing objectives. Perhaps the most succinct is that by Lindvall in which three criteria are presented for the writing of specific objectives.⁷ The objectives must be 1) stated in terms of pupil responses, 2) specific in content or in outcome, and 3) observable. If one employs these criteria he avoids becoming ensnared in the vast numbers of goals which fall into the category of mellifluous and philosophic platitudes which offer little guidance toward the structure of the learning activities.

And so the goal, "to develop democratic citizens" must be re-worked so that it becomes an educational North Pole which guides the pedagogic compass. If one were to ask a group of teachers to write down the meaning of this goal, most assuredly their answers would cover a broad range of the spectrum of thought and would include many sub-goals which would conflict with each other. In one program in which a teacher of American history spoke, the audience was warned that if today's children whom we have in our classrooms become the marchers and demonstrators of the future,

we will have only ourselves to blame. The unspoken goal probably represents this teacher's concept of the "democratic citizen" but to others it may better characterize the social sheep and the passive victim of an uncontrollable circumstance. Now let us assume that this teacher were on a committee to develop the objectives for this course. As soon as the objectives were closely formulated, it is possible that the teacher would be confronted by her peers and asked to examine this goal. Certainly, mere confrontation does not mean goals will be eliminated from the classroom situation, but at least there will have been the opportunity for the teacher to have evaluated the purposes of instruction. In addition, one who supervises or otherwise aids the instructional process can begin to evaluate lesson outlines with reference to some pole.

In an example of precise goal identification, reported by Ord, ten values were identified and agreed on by the school district and actively included in the curriculum. These are well-stated objectives which meet the criteria and so deserve examination. Only three, however, are quoted here for the purpose of illustration.

Every person, regardless of differences, is of value. I must treat him with dignity, understanding, and brotherly love.

I must take responsibility for my own actions and condition. In addition I must accept responsibility for protecting, assisting, and promoting the safety and well being of others to the extent of their needs and my ability.

I live in a world that has beauty and sustaining strength of many kinds. I must be glad for these gifts and learn to maintain and share them with others.⁸

With the exact articulation of these guidelines, it now becomes feasible to develop methods which more precisely can approach their attainment.

In the remaining exposition in this section, examples will be drawn from a curriculum development program directed by the author under a contract awarded by the U. S. Office of Education.⁹ The unit, *Families in Japan*, was conceived as part of a Comparative Problems Curriculum for a four-to-six week period during the second semester of the first grade and was designed to be utilized in the first

grade. In the main, examples are drawn from those objectives which deal with the affective domain.

The first objective in the Attitude section of *Families* indicates that as a result of the unit children will "believe that learning about other people is interesting and essential to the attainment of world brotherhood as evidenced by children bringing in pertinent realia and by completing inquiry tasks." Let us consider if this objective meets the above criteria. Is it in terms of the pupil? As it appears in the unit it is stated "to believe that learning . . ." To be most technical it might have been stated "the student will believe that . . ." In this case, however, it was not believed that the objective as stated could be construed as being other than descriptive of desired pupil behavior.

Is the goal specific? This is tied to the objective of observability. Although the reader may not agree that the acts of the students, as identified in the goal constitute equivalence with interest, at least what is meant is specifically stated and is therefore observable. The statement of the objective exposes the criteria and, should there be disagreement concerning the efficacy of judging interest on the basis of the stated activities, having the statement in black and white makes possible its alteration.

Some other goals in the affective domain which are drawn from the *Japan* unit are also stated:

4. *To recognize that differences in customs, physical appearance, comparative wealth, and social organization of the Japanese are specifically at variance with our patterns but generally are much like ours.*

10. *To have a positive feeling toward the Japanese which may be evidenced by children indicating that they like meeting Japanese, that they would like to visit Japan, or that they like using Japanese words or doing origami, and as evidenced by the absence of negative comments concerning aspects of Japanese life, and by the willingness of children to participate in exploratory "Japanese" activities.*

It is hoped that the above examples will suggest a format which can be used when stating goals. It is also desired that these ex-

amples serve well to illustrate the detail necessary to make a goal specific and observable.

GOAL ATTAINMENT

How does one proceed from goal statement to goal attainment in the affective domain? If ever method is crucial, it is at this juncture. In developing cognition, method is important but facts can be accumulated with only a meagre display of teacher technique. Higher levels of cognition, however, can be attained only with the development of improved procedures. But if one wants to sustain pupil interest or excite pupil curiosity, these are non-cognitive goals which must be attacked through imaginative techniques. If children are "to behave democratically . . ." it is not enough that they are able to recite the appropriate rules of behavior. They should "*behave democratically.*"

In moving from goal statement to goal attainment, reference will be made to objective four quoted above from the Japan unit. "To recognize differences in customs . . ." first implies that children know Japanese life patterns such as traditional cherry-blossom viewing, rice-eating, shrine-visiting, raw-fish eating, voracious book reading, and so on. *Too often, however, this first phase is the only stage of teaching.* The teacher fails to recognize that, as Krathwohl and others have noted, mere awareness is but the lowest step on the affective scale. Perhaps the teacher, now aware of the taxonomy, can perceive that there is a ladder which can be taken, a ladder which, with the aid of the taxonomy, has now become apparent. *Once children perceive the differences, the challenging and demanding phase of the teaching act can begin.* Perception and recall, then, are but the beginning of learning.

Methodologically, one can convey the cognitive aspects of this goal through a variety of approaches ranging from lecture to student discovery. But whatever the technique utilized, one must be aware of goals which simultaneously demand attention beyond the content of the moment. These are those pervasive affective goals which are approached through every learning experience, the ends which educators seek to achieve as a result of the total educational

experience. Thus one must be concerned that the students self-generating desire to learn be kept alive and inflamed. As Horace Mann so intuitively remarked:

*The teacher can neither transfuse knowledge by any process of decanting, nor inject it by any force, into the mind of a child; but the law of the relation subsisting between them is that he must have the child's conscious assent and concurrence before he can impart it . . . the first great duty of a teacher is trustfulness, respect and affection in the breasts of his pupils . . . But if a teacher . . . introduces himself by beginning to speak of his power and his authority, he will soon create the occasion for using them.*¹⁰

But these specific methods for presenting content, important as they are, must be left to other treatises in order to focus herein upon the problem of what to do after awareness has been developed.

Edgar has some useful insights into the approaches to achieving the next stages of affectivity.¹¹ Applying these to the topic of Japan, we might consider the Japanese tale of "Momotaro," a name compounded from the Japanese word for peach, momo, and the boy's name, Taro. Peach Boy was delivered to a childless but honorable aging couple in the pit of large peach. When grown to manhood Momotaro destroys the demons and returns home with wealth which he returns to its rightful owners among whom were his foster-parents.

While the word load of this story is too advanced for the average first-grader, it can be read to the children by the teacher. But when, then, is the next step? The teacher's question, "How did Momotaro repay the kindness to his parents?" would probably yield answers which would point to his diligent application in school on their behalf, his attention to his wood-cutting chores, his being of good character, and his returning to care for his parents in their old age. The lesson might continue with an exploration of the feelings of each of the dramatis personae by posing questions such as "How did Momotaro feel when he saw the dog blocking his path?" How did the Demon King feel when he found himself defeated by Momotaro, the dog, the monkey, and the pheasant?" and "Would

you have given the money back?" and "Why does the story tell us that Momotaro stayed with his parents, caring for them when they were old?" "Have you heard any other Japanese stories which have said something like this?" "Can you think of any American tales which tell of children taking care of their parents?" Thus during the developmental phase of the specific unit the children are led a bit beyond the fact to awareness.

ACHIEVING HIGH LEVELS OF AFFECTIVITY

Subsequent to the conduct of the majority of formalized learning activities, the children should be given the opportunity to pause at their new vantage point, resting upon the information they have obtained through their study, in order to look at their findings to make sense from them. At this point the role of the teacher as the intellectual leader becomes crucial. The prize of the lesson will be having the children develop reasonable generalizations as a result of the study. In preparing for this, the teacher should be well armed with a knowledge of the parts of the generalization and the inter-relationships of these parts. A useful conceptual goal to be utilized at this juncture will be the *data matrix*, a technique which consists of organizing information in a tabular way so that the relationships between the parts becomes clear. And so the teacher might ask, "What kind of a man was Momotaro?" to which the children might respond, "honest, brave, good in school, and because he took care of his parents." This information should be entered in a column on the blackboard:

Japan
honest
brave
good in school
cared for parents

The teacher might then pose questions to elicit the qualities which are espoused in American folk literature. These should be entered

into the right hand column of the matrix so that it appears somewhat as below:

<i>Japan</i>	<i>United States</i>
honest	honest
brave	marry well (handsome prince)
good in school	brave
care for parents	good (do no harm)
	respect parents
	etc.

Finally the teacher should ask, "What have we learned about the things which are taught in Japanese and American stories?" The children after some discussion will probably conclude that many of the same things are talked about but that there are some differences. This in essence is one part of goal four presented above although, of course, the wording is not, and need not be, identical.

As for the differences, the teacher might ask that these be pointed out. From our abbreviated list we find "good in school" and "care for parents." The children could then be asked if these are good things to have in a story or if they think that the stories are "funny" because of these elements. Here, of course, we are seeking to assess and develop respect for cultural variation which is the essence of a part of goal eight in the Japan unit as well as being related to the third goal quoted from Edgar. Such utilization of the content studied causes the student to approach knowledge analytically to interpret its meaning. This procedure has the potential of involving the personality through one's intelligence.

When speaking to one parent about the behavior of her child during the pilot study of the Japan unit, it was learned that there was a very unusual reaction. The girl became exceedingly polite, an end which the parents had long encouraged with but modest success. When asked why, she replied that she was practicing being very Japanese. This girl had taken the value and accepted it to such a degree that we might estimate attainment of 3.1 level or higher. Should this quality become a permanent part of the personality, undoubtedly the highest level of affectivity would have been attained.

RECAPITULATION

The reader who has followed the argument this far has *received* the message, but an educator cannot be satisfied with this level of attainment. One must now be concerned with the reader's *response*. Will he comply? Words on paper cannot mandate compliance and no authority figure springs forth to coerce or prod. And so I choose to employ the muse of literature to say that which I, in common tongue, have perhaps not been able to convey or say too well. The following excerpt from Kaufman's *Up the Down Staircase* shall be my aid.

There was one heady moment when I was able to excite the class by an idea; I had put on the blackboard Browning's "A man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?" and we got involved in a spirited discussion of aspiration vs. reality. Is it wise, I asked, to aim higher than one's capacity? Does it not doom one to failure? No, no, some said, that's ambition and progress! No, no, others cried, that's frustration and defeat! What about hope? What about despair? — You've got to be practical! — You've got to have a dream! They said this in their own words, you understand, startled into discovery. To the young, cliches seem freshly minted. Hitch your wagon to a star! Shoemaker, stick to your last! and when the dismissal bell rang, they paid me the highest compliment, they groaned! They crowded in the doorway, chirping like agitated sparrows, pecking at the seeds I had strewn . . .¹²

Mrs. Kaufman has recorded the joy of teaching which comes from leading students, even pupils, beyond the stage of memorizing as a defense mechanism utilized in the place of understanding the mass of data strewn with impunity and insensitivity on untilled, unprepared minds. Such pleasures can be known by the social studies teacher who seeks goals beyond the realm of cognition, who seeks to motivate his pupils to develop attitudes and behaviors which serve as guides in the art of living well. The means toward this end, as identified in the monograph, include a precise statement of desired educational outcomes which can be translated into appropriate methods. As one of the concluding steps, the teacher must serve as the

mentor who aids children in surveying the data and drawing warranted conclusions. Through this process the child is permitted and encouraged to interact with the world of ideas with which he has come in contact and to be an active participant in the learning process. With the aid of the data matrix, the teacher can help the student to understand facts and to develop a more reasoned base of attitudes and behaviors.

Educators, however, will not seek this type of attainment unless we come to *value* the excited involvement of the kindled youthful spirit and take it upon ourselves to *organize* teaching so that interaction characterizes our procedures. To do this takes additional effort, to be sure, but the educator who seeks quality must also be the one who harkens to the world of Browning and continually seeks to extend his reach and capability to attain the fullest measure of meaning from the appellation, teacher.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Russell, Bertrand. *Mysticism and Logic*. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1917. p. 37.

² Dewey, John. *Democracy and Education*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916. p. 383.

³ Krathwohl, David R.; Bloom, Benjamin S.; and Masia, Bertram. *A Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II, The Affective Domain*. New York: David McKay and Co., 1964. p. 28.

⁴ Krathwohl, David R. "The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives—Its Use in Curriculum Building." *Defining Educational Objectives*. (Edited by C. M. Lindvall) Pittsburgh: Regional Commission of Educational Coordination and the Learning Research and Development Center, 1964. p. 35.

⁵ Fromm, Erich. *The Art of Loving*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. p. 48.

⁶ Smith, B. Othaniel. "On the Anatomy of Teaching." *Journal of Teacher Education* 7: 346; December 1956.

⁷ Lindvall, C. M. *Testing and Evaluation: An Introduction*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. pp. 12-32, *passim*.

⁸ Ord, John E. "Modern Trends in Elementary Social Studies." *Social Education* 28: 202-4; No. 4, April 1964.

⁹ Arnoff, Melvin. *Families in Japan*. (A four-to-six-weeks unit for the second semester of grade 1.) Kent State University, June, 1966. (Developed pursuant to a contract with the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.)

¹⁰ Mann, Horace. "Mann's Ninth Annual Report (1845)." *Life and Works of Horace Mann*. 5 vols. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1891. Vol. IV, p. 25.

¹¹ Edgar, Robert W. "History, Reading, and Human Relations: An Integrated Approach." *Social Education* 29: 155-58; No. 3, March 1965.

¹² Kaufman, Bel. *Up the Down Staircase*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. pp. 55-6.

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